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De Klerk and ANC set date for talks

Meeting will discuss conditions for full negotiations

From Patrick Laurence
in Johannesburg

HISTORIC talks between President F. W. de Klerk and an African National Congress delegation will be held on April 11 to clear the way for negotiations on South Africa's future.

The "talks about talks", announced yesterday by Mr De Klerk's office, will take place amid ANC demands for the release of all political prisoners, the free return of all exiles without fear of arrest, and the lifting of the state of emergency.

These demands, voiced on several occasions by Nelson Mandela since his release on February 11, have been set by the ANC as pre-conditions for the start of negotiations.

It is a fair bet that the ANC demands will be on the agenda next month. Mr De Klerk may, however, put another item on the agenda: Mr Mandela's "war talk", as he labels the ANC leader's continued commitment to "armed struggle".

Mr Mandela, who will be a member of the ANC delegation, has several commitments in the next few weeks: a visit to Namibia for its independence celebration next week, a trip to Transkei to pay his respects to his family and ancestors, and a

meeting with the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, to try and bring an end to the violence in Natal.

The talks with the Government take place against a background of growing demands by political prisoners for their freedom and continuing turmoil and violence in the black townships.

A hunger strike by prisoners on Robben Island was called off about 10 days ago after they were visited by lawyers, who helped obtain an undertaking from the Justice Minister, Kobie Coetsee, to investigate their complaints. They are demanding immediate release.

With the Robben Island prisoners placated temporarily, a similar crisis is starting to test the nerves and negotiating skills of Mr Coetsee, who is Minister of Prisons as well as Justice.

Seventy black activists, detained in a swoop by security forces a week ago, have started a hunger strike of their own.

They are demanding to be charged or released, according to the Detainees Aid Centre. They resent the allegation that they were responsible for orchestrating the violence which has swept through most black townships in South Africa since Mr Mandela was freed.

In another upsurge of violence, a white businessman was yesterday hacked to death on a

highway near Sebokeng, the black township where the turmoil of 1984-1986 started, with the murder of four township councillors.

The businessman, Elmley Corfe, was attacked when the vehicle in which he was travelling was stopped by crowd of blacks. He was battered and chopped to death by blacks wielding pickaxes and machetes.

His business partner who was in the car with him, Michael Brown, managed to escape. He ran and, when he felt safe, walked to a toll gate on a motorway eight miles away.

Later, a white schoolgirl, Ronel Swanepoel, from the nearby town of Vereeniging, was injured on the road where Corfe was killed. A garden fork was thrown at the car in which she was a passenger.

Police yesterday offered a reward of 5,000 rand (£1,150) for information leading to the arrest of Corfe's killers.

Yesterday's violence appears to have been sparked by unsubstantiated reports that "Zulus" or, according to some versions, "vigilantes", were preparing to attack youths in Sebokeng, about 20 miles south of Johannesburg. Bands of youths were stopping all cars from entering Sebokeng.

Corfe's car was reportedly intercepted by one of the roving bands.

INDEPENDENCE DAY

MORE than 70 years of disputed sovereignty over the deserts of south-west Africa come to an end on Wednesday when the flag of independent Namibia is raised in Windhoek. Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary-General, will swear in Sam Nujoma, the veteran leader of the Swapo independence movement, as President and — apart from two tiny Spanish enclaves in Morocco — there will be no more colonial rule in Africa.

Windhoek expects more than 5,000 guests for the ceremonies. They are expected to include President FW de Klerk of South Africa, Presidents Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Quett Masire of Botswana, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and India's Prime Minister, V P Singh. Foreign ministers will include James Baker of the United States, the Soviet Union's Eduard Shevardnadze, Britain's Douglas Hurd and West Germany's Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Probably the most welcome will be Nelson Mandela, who shared cells with Swapo prisoners in South Africa's Robben Island jail.

F3: Guardian (Br), 90 03 06

Dirty tricks plot against Tutu disclosed

David Beresford
in Johannesburg

THE head of a South African army hit squad has been detained by police amid fresh disclosures about dirty tricks operations mounted by the military against anti-apartheid activists.

The South African hit squad controversy began to take on the farcical over-tones of the CIA's efforts to overthrow Fidel Castro in the 1960s with yesterday's disclosure that among other secret operations was a plot to send a monkey foetus to Archbishop Desmond Tutu.

The latest evidence about the army's dirty tricks emerged

from the first day of hearings before the Harms Commission of Inquiry which President F. W. de Klerk was forced to set up to investigate the involvement of the security forces in political assassinations.

At the start of the hearings, Mr Justice Harms was informed that Colonel Joe Verster, the head of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) which has been identified as an army hit squad, had been detained for questioning on Friday under a section of the Internal Security Act usually used against suspected terrorists.

The disclosure was followed by an extraordinary claim from the head of military intelligence, General Rudolph "Wit-

kop" (white-headed) Badenhorst, that he had no knowledge of the CCB's existence before late last year. The Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, has previously told Parliament that the CCB has been a formal unit with the South African Defence Force since the mid-1980s.

The intelligence chief said he had discovered that the CCB had been responsible for two bomb blasts — one in a Coloured area of Cape Town and the other at a Pretoria shop belonging to an anti-apartheid sympathiser.

The unit had also mounted surveillance on leading anti-apartheid figures, including Archbishop Tutu; the trade

union leaders, Jay Naidoo and Cyril Ramaphosa; as well as the general-secretary of the South African Council of Churches, the Rev Frank Chikane.

Gen Badenhorst said a computer printout showed that the plot to send a monkey foetus to Archbishop Tutu was code-named Operation Apie (ape). Two former policemen working for the CCB were to have carried out the operation. He complained that he was now the target of anonymous telephone calls.

The first detailed account of the structure and operations of the CCB was given by the head of the SADF's special forces, Major-General Eddie Webb. He said it was organised by cells

with members of one group unaware of the existence of others. Total membership was about 139, of whom between 50 and 80 knew they were employed by the state.

Gen Webb denied knowledge of a plot to tamper with Mr Chikane's luggage, or to substitute heart pills used by a Cape Town lawyer, Dullah Omar. Mr Chikane fell ill last year, after insecticide had apparently been planted in his luggage. Mr Omar is a legal adviser to the family of Nelson Mandela.

The Commission is to hear evidence from Gen Malan on Friday over his claim that the murdered Swapo leader, Anton Lubowski, was working for military intelligence.

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The selling of an African conflict

Lionel Barber looks at Angola through professional lobbying in Washington on behalf of the country's warring parties

MR JAMES Baker has discovered Africa. Having focussed almost exclusively on Europe, the Middle East, and Central America during his first year in office, the US Secretary of State plans to visit Africa this month.

The ostensible motive is to attend Namibia's Independence Day celebrations on March 21, but Mr Baker has at least two other countries on his mind: South Africa, where dramatic political reform is under way, and Angola, where the US is being sucked into the civil war on behalf of the Unita movement led by Mr Jonas Savimbi.

The latest Angolan government offensive has prompted the US to step up covert military aid to Unita, though its supporters in Washington complain that this falls far short of earlier South African assistance. (Pretoria's aid to Unita was stopped in December 1988 under US-sponsored accords which also provided for the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola in return for Namibian independence.)

The question is whether Mr Baker is prepared to risk his own prestige and take over the mediation previously led by President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, whom the administration identified, perhaps ambitiously, as the man most likely to produce "African solutions to African problems."

One obstacle to peace, some informed observers believe, is the extraordinary lobbying which both Unita and the Angolan government have sustained in Washington over the past five years to push their respective cases to Congress and the administration.

The Angolan war is big business. Washington, Perito & Dubuque, which represents the Luanda regime, is said to have picked up an account worth \$800,000 a year. Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly - a public relations firm which also represents the governments of Kenya, Nigeria and Zaire, as well as Vice-President Salvador Laurel of the Philippines - earns a reported \$900,000 from the Unita account.

Since it took Unita as a client in 1985, Black Manafort has turned Mr Savimbi into an icon for Washington's conservatives. With his black beard, his gleaming smile and his unabashed anti-Soviet credentials, he is the magnetic hero-figure which the Nicaraguan Contras and the Afghan mujahadeen never quite managed to produce for middle America. The selling of Savimbi has been so slick that it has smoothed doubts about his record on human rights and his previous links to South Africa.

Black Manafort's success lies in well-timed interventions, starting in January 1989 when it secured a pledge from President-elect George Bush to supply Unita with "effective and appropriate" assistance, while pursuing a negotiated settlement with the MPLA regime in Luanda.

At times, Unita has complained about the degree of commitment, most notice-

ably when Mr Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, has stepped up efforts to entice each side to the negotiating table. But Mr Cohen lacks the influence enjoyed by Mr Chester Crocker, his predecessor, whose painstaking diplomacy over several years led ultimately to the Angola-Namibia accords.

All assistant secretaries, including Mr Cohen, are kept on a tight leash at Mr Baker's State Department. Foreign policy is often conducted on a low-risk, how-will-this-play-before-Congress basis. The other favoured Baker method, which some argue undercuts the career foreign service, is to "sub-contract" mediatory roles in regional conflicts to third parties. Examples include Lebanon (France), Cambodia (Australia) and Angola (where the US has sought help from Portugal as well as Zaire).

Such caution leaves the State Department vulnerable to pressure from well-organised lobbies on Capitol Hill, particularly those that cry "communism" first and ask questions later. In Angola, the turning point appears to have come on September 17, when the Department issued a rare Sunday statement "strongly supporting Unita and its call for free and fair elections".

The statement was released after a high-level intervention at the State Department by Mr Christopher Lehman, a Reagan administration National Security Council aide who joined Black Manafort in 1985 and now runs his own consultancy.

It came one day before an African summit called to revive a stalled effort by President Mobutu to secure a cease-fire in Angola - and tilted the administration decisively toward Unita's bargaining position. Mr Savimbi failed to attend; the Angolan offensive, which some believe was long-planned, followed shortly after.

Aside from these high-level contacts, Black Manafort has cultivated a core of support in Congress, where, as Ms Margaret Calhoun, a former Black Manafort employee, notes, "there is enormous ignorance about Africa."

House and Senate Task Forces on Angola, each with its own staff and publicity machines, also act as powerful counterweights to established congressional committees. The trick is to leaveen conservatives such as Senator Jesse Helms and Senator Steve Symms with a Democrat, such as Senator Dennis DeConcini, and then proclaim a "bi-partisan policy."

A more questionable practice concerns the tactics used against Unita opponents. Black Manafort secretly pushed the idea of a Justice Department investigation of Mr Randall Robinson, a prominent anti-apartheid activist. It was also involved in the successful campaign to persuade Gray and Co, a rival public relations firm, to drop the Angola as a client.

Ms Calhoun recalls conservative activists handing out pink cards stamped with Gray's telephone number and the eye-catching question: "Want to call an Angolan prostitute?" Two of Gray's main clients - Morocco and Turkey - were also warned that the Angola connection could compromise their own national security. "We did not discourage the campaign," said a spokesman for Black Manafort, "but we did not instigate it."

Most seriously, a Black Manafort employee last year sought to obtain transcripts of broadcasts from the newly-appointed Voice of America correspondent in Luanda on the grounds that the reporter was unduly favouring the MPLA regime. A Black Manafort employee, posing as a research student, telephoned the VoA and requested the material. VoA, a government organisation banned by law from distributing material in the US, discovered the subterfuge and delivered a rebuke to Black Manafort.

Ms Riva Levinson, who handles the Unita account at Black Manafort, said the employee, her own researcher, had been reprimanded. She said the firm had enjoyed a co-operative relationship with VoA for more than four years. "This was just one aberration," she said.

A re-run of the Gray affair came only last year when conservatives pressed Mr Paul Laxalt, former Republican Senator for Nevada and friend of President Reagan, to step aside as a partner of Washington, Perito & Dubuque after it took the Luanda account. Mr Laxalt, it was thought, might have enabled the Angola regime to build support among moderate Republicans on Capitol Hill.

Unita's success is partly due to the Angola regime's failure to present a palatable alternative. Despite Luanda's pro-investment policies, generally good relations with US companies and its gradual shedding of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, its US supporters have tended to focus on discrediting Mr Savimbi and raising the Pretoria apartheid connection.

This message is, at best, outdated. The weakness of Angola's case is further underlined by long-standing rivalries between Mr Pacque Vera, Angolan representative at the UN, and the more pragmatic voices in Washington of those who believe there is an acceptable face to Angolan socialism. These tensions - plus the adverse publicity created by the Angolan government offensive - were responsible for the abrupt cancellation of a planned trip to Washington by President José Eduardo dos Santos earlier this year.

For the time being, Unita will continue to appear as the voice of moderation and Mr Savimbi will continue to be cast as the last best hope against communism in southern Africa - however simplistic this characterisation may be. Mr Baker's trip to Africa offers a chance to gain a more thoughtful perspective.

F79: Radio Report (abr)

UNITA claims "further gains" on Mavinga front A report by the UNITA agency on 15th March said that UNITA has marked its 24th anniversary with "further important military gains... against... MPLA troops engaged in a large-scale military offensive on the Cuito Cuanavale/Mavinga front".

Following recent sabotage by UNITA the Gove Dam on the Cunene river in southern Angola is showing signs of being on the verge of collapse, the Angolan agency reported on the 14th citing "an official source". The collapse would release some 2.5m cu.m of water, with catastrophic consequences, particularly for Namibia's economy. [4]

F80: Guardian (Br), 90 03 19

Ex-Marxists

Lisbon (AFP) - Lopo do Nascimento, a member of the MPLA Central Committee and a former prime minister of Angola, said in an interview published here that the ruling MPLA party had abandoned Marxism-Leninism. He told the Portuguese socialist weekly, *O Jornal*, that this would justify certain reforms, starting with the education sector where the teaching of Marxism-Leninism was obligatory.

F81: Radio Report

Angolan cabinet approves resolution on "socialist emulation" (Excerpt) The Council of Ministers of the

People's Republic of Angola has approved a resolution to organise and strengthen socialist emulation in production units. The socialist emulation process will be organised and led by the National Union of Angolan Workers and national trade unions, in co-ordination with relevant state organs and the party youth wing. Socialist emulation's immediate objectives include: increasing production, productivity and the quantity of products; fulfilling a production plan; conserving resources; and lowering costs to improve the working and living conditions of the Angolan people... (Radio Nacional de Angola, Luanda, in Portuguese 0600 gmt 7 Mar 90)

F82: Radio Report (abr)

Angola: peace talks

Addressing journalists in Cape Town on 7th March, the South African Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Neil van Heerden, said that during talks between Pik Botha and President dos Santos the previous week, the Angolan government had "openly declared" they were prepared to talk with UNITA, the South African agency reported on the 7th. South Africa was trying to facilitate this process, Van Heerden said, "without usurping the mediating role of Zairean President Mobutu". He expected the first meeting between the MPLA and UNITA to take place "soon" and said "an even more neutral" venue than Zaire was required, the agency added. [3]

F. 84: Guardian (Br), 90 03 16

Angola visit

The Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, will begin a seven-nation African tour with a 24-hour visit to Angola on Sunday, Angola's official news agency Angop said yesterday. — Reuter.

F86: Southscan (Br), 90 03 02

Reporter 'sees chemical bomb'

In a dispatch from the Unita headquarters in Jamba, south-eastern Angola, AFP correspondent Marc Pondaven, reported on March 3 that two MIG-23s dropped chemical bombs. The bombs were allegedly dropped on the outskirts of Jamba from a 8,000 meter height and no one was injured.

The French journalist said he saw one of the bombs explode with grey smoke which caused irritations in the mouths of those who breathed it. Several hours later, the reporter went to the crater which was much smaller than those made by a 'classical bomb'. A rotten smell wafted from the place, he reported.

AFP said that it was the first time Savimbi's headquarters were bombed by government aircraft. However, in a communique from Lisbon released the same day, Unita spokesman Aldeias Sakala denied that any bombing took place.

"This information is completely false and does not have any substance at all", he stressed. "These declarations aim to divert the attention from the difficulties of government troops in the region of Mavinga", he said.

Unita previously denied that Jamba had been bombed on February 24, or that rebel leader Jonas Savimbi had been injured.

F83: Windhoek Adv.(Nam), 90 02 27

Savimbi willing to negotiate

LISBON: Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi has said in letters to Portuguese leaders he is willing to accept a single national Angolan army and is "open to all realistic suggestions" for a negotiated peace the Lisbon Weekly Expresso reported Saturday.

According to Expresso, Savimbi, in a letter to Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva last weekend, said his Unita rebels were ready to "accept a single national army without prior political dialogue."

Savimbi has previously made free elections a precondition for Luanda's proposal of combining rebel forces with all Angolan government institutions.

F. 85: Afr.Confid.(Br), 90 03 09

Savimbi alone

In late February, the victor of the battle of Mavinga, General Roberto Monteiro, made an unpublicised visit to the Pentagon, asking United States officials to cease military aid to the *União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA). This is a measure of the extent to which the capture of Mavinga by the *Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola* (FAPLA), the government armed forces, has strengthened the government's diplomatic hand.

The FAPLA offensive against Mavinga began late last year after President José Eduardo dos Santos had come under severe criticism in ruling circles for his strategy since the Gbadolite summit last June. UNITA bomb-attacks in Luanda itself, and continuing disruption of electricity and water supplies, strengthened the hand of the hardliners who argued that there could be no negotiation with Jonas Savimbi other than from a position of military strength.

The decision to attack Mavinga yet again was taken at a meeting of senior political and military leaders in Luanda where, to the surprise of many, the military argument won the day. The key protagonist was Chief of Staff General Antonio dos Santos França 'Nдалу', who had not discussed the idea with his Soviet advisors. It has long been Nдалу's ambition to hold Mavinga and to make it the last link in the chain of air bases he has built across the country (AC Vol 28 No 11).

Nдалу advanced the following reasons for an immediate attack on Mavinga:

- **'Surprise.'** Although FAPLA troops had been gathering at their forward base in Cuito Cuanavale for weeks, UNITA strategists believed them too weak to attack Mavinga, especially during the rainy season. The FAPLA launched their offensive just when Savimbi was leaving his capital at Jamba for a visit to Portugal, his first officially for 15 years.

- **Logistical support.** Nдалу argued that he had a trump card: the airforce. Aircraft supported the siege of Mavinga by ground attack, sometimes using phosphorous bombs, keeping UNITA pinned down. Crucially, air power secured the supply-routes from Cuito Cuanavale to the FAPLA front line. The most difficult logistical problem for the government troops was to get their equipment across two rivers, the Lomba and the Cuito, in order to reach Mavinga. This was a triumph for FAPLA engineers. A defeat for the FAPLA at Mavinga would have left them stranded and in danger of being wiped out.

- **The international context.** It was inconceivable that South Africa would intervene to help defend UNITA as it had in the past.

The UNITA failure was due above all to poor logistics. UNITA is no longer the guerrilla army it was in 1975, but a semi-conventional force reliant on good back-up. It is only now becoming evident just how important for UNITA was the logistical support provided by the South African Defence Force in the past. At Mavinga, government troops were operating only 150 kilometres from their base at Cuito Cuanavale, while UNITA was some 300 kms. from its head-

quarters at Jamba, across difficult terrain. FAPLA troops, with air support, were able to launch a three-pronged attack making particular use of mobile rocket launchers. They have now advanced some 15 kms south of Mavinga, although there are still pockets of UNITA fighters behind their lines. Both sides have lost hundreds of men in the last two months.

In losing Mavinga, UNITA has lost an important advance base and the key depot for the Savimbi trail, the supply-route to northern Angola. Savimbi himself, just before leaving Lisbon to return to the front, told the press he would never allow the government to take Mavinga - a measure of how highly he rates its importance. Savimbi has now admitted Jamba was bombed on 24 February. It was also hit again by two MiGs on 1 March.

Military victory has greatly strengthened dos Santos' diplomatic position. He was able to boycott the latest peace meeting called by President Mobutu Sese Seko, even neglecting to inform Mobutu of his intention to stay at home. This was a calculated insult to demonstrate his displeasure that Mobutu was simultaneously calling for a new round of peace talks and allowing fresh shipments of US weapons to reach UNITA via the Zairean base of Kamina. Dos Santos is now demanding the cessation of these supplies as the price for continuing the Gbadolite peace process sponsored by Zaire and the USA. Savimbi is calling for a ceasefire.

As for Luanda's military men, they are keen to show the Americans that they can beat UNITA on their own, without Soviet or Cuban support, and that US support for UNITA is therefore pointless. Washington has a clear choice: either to re-think its policy towards Luanda, or to step up military aid to UNITA. The latter would carry the risk of US advisers being killed in Angola at a time when the whole world is speaking of peace and an end to regional conflicts. It would also be rather pointless, since Angola does not threaten the vital interests of the USA and is far from the Soviet Union. Since the beginning of the Cuban pull-out from Angola and since the victories in Panama and Nicaragua, there has been little logic to the US policy of confronting Cuba in Angola. Anti-Communists have their sights on Havana itself.

If Luanda is not yet sure of securing a closer relationship with Washington, it can be confident of its new friendship with Pretoria. Foreign Minister 'Pik' Botha made his first official visit to Luanda on 1 March to meet his opposite number Pedro de Castro dos Santos van Dunem 'Loy' and discuss a meeting at presidential level. Certainly President dos Santos and President F.W. de Klerk are likely to meet at the 21 March independence ceremonies in Namibia. This will help South Africa to break out of its isolation. In return, Pretoria may recognise the dos Santos government. Once more, the diplomatic positions in Angola are made on the battlefield ●