

Land & Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Huambo Province in Post-War Angola



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Allan Cain
Director
Development Workshop
Luanda, Angola

Acronyms

ADRA	Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (Angolan NGO)
ADRP	Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (of the RSEM/World Bank)
CCF	Christian Children's Fund
CFB	Caminho de Ferro de Benguela (Benguela Railway)
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DW	Development Workshop
GA	Gathering Area(s)
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas de Angola)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the United Nations)
IDP	Internally displaced people
INE	National Institute of Statistics
IOM	International Office of Migration
IRSEM	Institute for Social Reintegration of Ex-military
MINARS	Ministry for Social Reinsertion and Assistance
MPLA party)	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (majority political
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation(s)
OCHA Nations)	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (of the United
OFDA	Office of Food and Disaster Assistance

QA	Quartering Area
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (largest opposition party, until April 2002 an armed movement)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Executive Summary

Angola's 27-year civil war ended in April 2002. Since then demobilization of over 100 000 UNITA troops was initiated involving their quartering, disarmament, demobilization, transit to areas of resettlement and eventual reintegration into Angolan society.¹ A concurrent process of return and resettlement of millions of IDPs (internally displaced persons) has also been underway, against a backdrop of a shattered infrastructure and widespread poverty.

This research examines the land issue in relation to the return, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants in post-war Angola. It focuses on Huambo Province, which has the highest rural population density in Angola, the greatest concentration of the demobilized, and a long tradition in agriculture. Specifically, it seeks to understand the mechanisms used by the demobilized to access land for agriculture and the constraints, problems and conflicts they face in the process.

The disarmament and demobilization undertaken single-handedly by the Government of Angola was completed relatively quickly and almost without incident. Most registered ex-combatants aged 20 and over received the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) benefit package: demobilization and photo identification cards, a travel authorization certificate, a five-month salary based on military rank, and food assistance. They also received a transport allowance and a reintegration kit upon arrival in their destination communities. The number of conflicts appears low and the situation is generally more stable than many had feared. However, effective and sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants remains a long way off.

A total of 384 demobilized soldiers were interviewed.² The average age of respondents is 34 years. The majority (78 percent) did not complete beyond a primary education, 25 percent completed only a year. The average number of children per household is 4.5 compared to an average household size of 7, indicating the presence of non-nuclear family members. The majority returned to places of prior residence, often their birthplace. Over half were aged 19 or less when they left. On average, they have spent almost 15 years away from their communities. They are overwhelmingly dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods, with few alternative livelihoods registered.

¹ MINARS puts the total number of UNITA demobilized as just over 90 000; ADRP cites 105 000.

² Fieldwork was carried out from December 2003 until the end of January 2004 in rural communities of four Municipalities of Huambo Province: Caála, Bailundo, Lunduimbali and Vila Nova, which represent a range of characteristics and patterns of land use.

Access to a sufficient quantity and quality of land is problematic for many of the demobilized in Huambo Province. While most of the demobilized did gain access to land, the amount and quality of land they have secured is cause for concern. Only around half have access to over two hectares – the minimum needed to establish a sustainable economic livelihood for a family over the medium to long-term. An even smaller proportion actually cultivates this amount, primarily due to the lack of animal traction to clear abandoned land and work larger areas. The average (mean) area of land actually cultivated by ex-combatants was 0.75 hectare (the median was even lower, 0.5 hectare). Overall, it seems that only 30 percent of those surveyed have access to land that is both of reasonable size and reasonable quality. The majority therefore remains dependent on food aid from the World Food Programme (WFP) and NGOs; this is unlikely to change in the near future.

Family networks – the previous relationship of a person to the community and their family ties there – appear to be key to gaining access to land of a reasonable quantity and quality. Those returning to their birthplace (84 percent) generally inherit land from their parents, or are granted (ceded) land by other members of their family – most often parents, uncles, aunts, or siblings. But mechanisms for inheritance of land are not at all clearly defined. Most land conflicts arise over competing claims by different family members. Those who appear to be in a weaker position are those who have been away the longest, or were the youngest when they left.

Those ‘with nowhere to go’, i.e., those who did not have any family or previous connections in their return location (three percent) had noticeably less land and what they had tended to be of inferior quality. They are therefore more vulnerable and considerably less likely to be successful in establishing themselves in agriculture and will need alternative means of support.

Women are little addressed by economic reintegration programmes that mainly target the men. Single women and widows from UNITA, unless part of the very small minority officially registered as combatants, are not eligible for DDR support. Women now only really benefit if they have remained in a family unit with a demobilized UNITA combatant. If single, widowed, divorced or abandoned, they are particularly vulnerable in the land allocation and inheritance process as traditions that deprive women the right to directly own or inherit land persist. Sometimes too, they are subjected to verbal abuses and hostility in the return communities. For a female-headed household to succeed in subsistence agriculture without substantial inputs and support would be virtually impossible simply because of the physical effort required to clear land for cultivation.

The disabled and underaged are potentially among the most disadvantaged groups of ex-combatants but little information is available about them. Disabled ex-combatants are not receiving additional or special DDR support and are able to cultivate only small plots of land. Ex-combatants who were aged below 20 did not qualify for the DDR support. Moreover, the duration of the war meant that most returning child ex-soldiers have now reached the age of majority. Having little education or civilian job skills and possibly psychologically traumatised by their war experience, many likely face added difficulties in rejoining community life.

An informal market for land now exists, in which land can be bought, sold and rented but security of tenure is unclear. Formal, legal land titles very rarely exist; the land management system is obsolete. Only three percent of those who have acquired land possess written documentation of ownership. Rights to land are 'guaranteed' by oral testimony of witnesses including the *soba* (a traditional authority or village chief) who, in case of conflict, attests to the right of an individual or family to cultivate a given parcel of land. Large-scale displacement and population movement have caused problems. Conflicts have arisen over the sale of land by relatives while ex-combatants were away. These are difficult to resolve since the new occupier may have paid for the land and witnesses who may no longer be present are needed to establish previous ownership and rights. Local conflict resolution mechanisms are not always able to resolve these conflicts while the judiciary's capacity to deal with a large number of land conflicts is currently non-existent.

The *fazendas*, or large commercial plantation farms, present a further problem. *Fazendas* date back to the colonial era when much of the best, most accessible land was given as concessions to Europeans, many of whom abandoned them at Independence. These *fazendas* were later under the 1992 Land Law transferred to new claimants (mostly urban based) but due to the war were not able to farm. War affected populations have in many cases occupied some of these same concession lands. Some returnees may now find that their ancestral lands fall within a demarcated concession. There have been conflicts when *fazenda* claimants take over the land or worse extend the limits beyond the original concessions. The proposed new Land Law recognises traditional and communal land ownership but leaves the concession system intact. The reoccupation of *fazendas* and competition for land as resettlement progresses can put small-scale and peasant farmers at risk and provoke conflicts over occupation rights.

Without significant investment, agriculture cannot provide sustainable livelihoods for ex-combatants and other returnees who may face similar challenges in accessing land. Livelihoods for ex-combatants and other returnees will depend on a combination of strategies. At the very least, there is a need for programs that will

combine targeted intensive agricultural support and extension on the one hand, and on the other, programs for the diversification of vocational training opportunities coupled with access to support, credit and materials over the medium-term. Effective and sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants and other returnees will require the creation of non-farm rural employment to absorb surplus labour, particularly in the off-season.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Monitor resettlement of demobilized soldiers and systematically collect information on their means of support and coping strategies in order to identify factors that facilitate/restrict their progress towards reintegration. This information will allow more effective and focussed program development.
2. Allow ex-combatants more flexibility in the choice of reintegration options. Those who are unable to support themselves over the medium to long term in agriculture – whether because of access to, quantity or quality of land, or inability to cultivate it, should be given flexibility to choose other reintegration options.
3. Redesign reintegration programmes to address the needs of vulnerable subgroups – women, those with ‘nowhere to go,’ underage and disabled ex-combatants – who are currently either underserved or do not qualify in existing programmes. In some cases some of their problems are not acknowledged. Work needs to be done to raise awareness about the particular vulnerabilities of these subgroups.
4. Agriculture based reintegration programmes need to diversify beyond the distribution of seeds and tools.
 - ✍ Increase availability of farm power particularly animal traction.
 - ✍ Provide fertilizers for smaller, poorer quality plots. Reactivation of traditional means of fertilizer production is preferable to commercial inputs.
 - ✍ Establish simple, gravity-fed irrigation systems to counteract erratic rainfall. In some areas larger scale projects including damming of rivers, may be feasible and appropriate.
 - ✍ Initiate community rehabilitation of the remains of irrigation systems in former *fazendas*, if these are not privately owned

- ✍ Make the development of drought tolerant low-input crop varieties a research priority.
 - ✍ Re-establish agricultural markets and networks by developing economic linkages between rural producers and the market places.
 - ✍ Improve capacity to provide agricultural extension services.
 - ✍ Revitalize the Huambo Agricultural College as an agricultural and rural development college.
5. Establish rural credit programmes targeted to help small landholders, small-scale producers to increase agricultural productivity as well as to develop rural farm and non-farm enterprises. There are ongoing microfinance programs (mostly urban or peri-urban based) that can provide useful lessons.
 6. Provide related financial, business development, and training services to assist the establishment of farm and non-farm enterprises.
 7. Develop a non-farm rural employment strategy linked to the massive reconstruction and rehabilitation needs in the provinces, these can include:
 - ✍ Rehabilitation of schools and clinics, public buildings & markets
 - ✍ Labour-intensive rural road construction and maintenance especially of farm- to- market roads
 - ✍ Construction of water supply systems and hand dug wells
 - ✍ Vocational training in support of the above mentioned activities. Training programmes should incorporate development of functional literacy given the very low levels of education of the population.
 8. Provide support to/strengthen local conflict resolution mechanisms and monitor closely the progress of reintegration and reconciliation within communities. NGOs and civil society organisations should not undertake projects seen to privilege ex-combatants, but must also ensure they are not excluded from projects and associations.
 9. Promote civic education programmes through Government, civil society and religious institutions, including generating awareness about the proposed Land Law.

10. Protect and promote the rights of small scale and peasant farming sector in the proposed Land Law.
11. Allocate resources to update the system of land registration, including development of a *simple* means of regularisation of rural land titles accessible to all.
12. Support Government and relevant institutions in the process of delimitation and regularisation of communities' land, with involvement of local traditional leaders.
13. Monitor and evaluate the impact of distribution/withdrawal of food aid by WFP.

1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

This research aims to contribute to knowledge on the reintegration of ex-combatants in rural areas of Angola, specifically how demobilized soldiers and their families gain access to agricultural land. The research was needed because:

- 1) A large proportion of ex-combatants are expected to be dependent on subsistence agriculture for their economic reintegration and thus need access to agricultural land in their areas of resettlement; and
- 2) Land is frequently contested and has been widely tipped as a future flash point for conflict in Angola, with the potential to exacerbate underlying social and political tensions and derail reintegration of communities and peacebuilding.

The World Bank supported Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (ADRP) requested Canada's assistance to carry out research to better inform their project planning process. Development Workshop, a Canadian human settlements organisation working in Angola with extensive research experience on land issues agreed to carry out the research. The research focuses on Huambo, one of the most war-affected and populous provinces with the largest number of returning ex-combatants. The Human Security Programme of Foreign Affairs Canada (HSP-FAC) provided funding for the project.

1.1 The End of the War, Early Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration

Following the death of UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, on the 22nd of February 2002, a cease-fire was agreed in March and the Luena 'Memorandum of Understanding' was signed in April between the Government and UNITA forces thus ending Angola's 27-year civil war. The 1994 Lusaka Protocol was restored as the basis for peace, but with revised military clauses that gave more limited provision for integration of UNITA troops into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA).

Two previous attempts at conflict resolution had failed – in 1992 and 1994-98 – due to the intransigence of both parties but also due to the incomplete demobilization of armed forces. In 1992 UNITA rejected the results of the elections, which the MPLA Government had won. The Government armed forces had deserted Quarters Areas *en masse* due to poor conditions and were unprepared while UNITA's armed forces were still fully mobilised. Demobilization was also incomplete in the period following the Lusaka Protocol of 1994, during which UNITA began to regroup and retrain its forces.

The current disarmament and demobilization process was completed relatively quickly and almost without incident. Around 85 000 UNITA combatants were initially quartered, of which 5 000 UNITA combatants were subsequently integrated into the Angolan national armed forces (FAA). Another 30 000 are believed to have subsequently presented themselves for registration, some as late as April 2003, after the official closure of the Gathering Areas.³ Most ex-combatants who were 20 years and over received demobilization and photo identification cards, a travel authorization certificate, a five-month salary based on military rank, and food assistance. They are also to receive a transport allowance and a reintegration kit upon arrival in their destination communities.

The Government of Angola single-handedly undertook the administration and finance of demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants. This was positive for national 'ownership' of the process but it was at times done with inadequate resources. Relocation was sometimes delayed, with over 100 000 ex-combatants and families still awaiting transport after closure of the Gathering Areas. Some ex-combatants and their families waited for long periods at military airports and in transit camps where conditions were poor, and assistance minimal. There were irregularities in the provision of demobilization documentation to an estimated 10 percent of ex-combatants; delivery of salaries, contingency payments and reintegration kits was variable.

As a result, there were some fears that reintegration would be a difficult process with widespread tensions and resentment on the part of both ex-combatants and resettlement communities. The worst-case scenario has not occurred. On a national level, security has generally been good and fighting has not resumed. Predictions of an increase in armed banditry and a rise in general insecurity were common⁴ but have not occurred on a large scale. However, the 25 000 small arms that were handed in are believed to be significantly below the real total that UNITA possessed, indicating the possible presence of arms' caches.

There have also been signs of social strains. Conflicts that had occurred in and around Gathering Areas began to spill over to the resettlement communities of a

³ UNITA's original estimates, cited in the Luena Memorandum of Understanding and the basis for the first demobilization and reintegration plans, were of 50 000 troops. Over 85 000 presented themselves by August 2002 when the official integration of the armed forces and demobilization of surplus troops was done. A further number continued to arrive after that. The total number of ex-UNITA combatants demobilized was recently given by MINARS as just over 90 000, although the ADRP cites a figure of 105 000.

⁴ See, for examples of these warnings: Economist Intelligence Unit (2003), *Angola Country Profile*, February 2003; and International Crisis Group (2003), *Dealing With Savimbi's Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian Challenges in Angola*, Africa Report No. 58, Luanda/Brussels, 26 February 2003

few ex-combatants and their family members, often triggered by disputes over resources such as land and houses. Research by Development Workshop in Huambo Province in December 2002 showed weak communities unlikely to be able to withstand the pressure of a new influx of people.⁵ It further warned of the consequent revival of political and personal antagonisms created by the war, which could be exacerbated by the widespread culture of violence and of easy availability of small arms.

Previous experiences, both in Angola and other countries, show the dangers of inadequate implementation of demobilization and reintegration programmes and of the potential for future instability in these cases. In Mozambique, "a steady stream of demobilized soldiers in search of employment have, since early 1995, moved from rural communities (where they had been transported in 1994 as part of the demobilization package) to urban areas where there has since been a marked increase in social unrest and criminal activity."⁶ Donors, Development Workshop, and other nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) were therefore concerned that any potential sources of future conflict identified and investigated in order to diffuse future threats to peace.

⁵ Development Workshop (2003), "Action Research on Priorities for Peace-building in Angola: Huambo Province Pilot Research, December 2002 - March 2003", Final report submitted to Centre for Common Ground.

⁶ Mats Berdal (1996), "Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts", Adelphi Paper 303, Oxford: OUP for IISS, p. 40

Chronology of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Angola

22nd February 2002 Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, killed in fighting.

4th April 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding signed, putting an end to the war. Quartering Areas (QAs) established around the country with plans for demobilization of an estimated 50 000 UNITA troops.

April-August 2002 Around 85 000 UNITA troops report for disarmament and demobilization. Official process of integration of approximately 5 000 UNITA combatants into FAA and demobilization of the remainder is completed.

Sept-Dec 2002 UNITA combatants continue to arrive, total reported to pass 100 000. UN mission winds up & closure of QAs (renamed Gathering Areas) announced but does not happen. NGOs are allowed increased access to Gathering Areas.

Jan-March 2003 World Bank support for ADRP is approved. UNITA combatants continue to arrive but in smaller numbers. Final date for closure of Gathering Areas is announced and transport begins.

April-May 2003 QAs are officially closed. 45 transit centres established (many of which are former IDP camps) with 27 000 to 31 000 people in them.

31 of 35 Gathering Areas are declared officially shut by end May.

June 2003 20 Gathering Areas still open with about 85 000 people in them

July-August 2003 Transport of ex-combatants and families continues. Reports

1.2 The Land Problem in Angola

Angola is a large country with a low average population density, but land is not necessarily abundantly available for returning refugees and IDPs or the demobilized. Large areas of land are of low fertility, located in low rainfall areas or are remote from markets and services. Angola's population is highly concentrated around the main cities, coastal regions, and in the Central Highlands. This pattern dates from the colonial period but was further intensified by patterns of rural-urban displacement during the war. In the last census of Angola done in 1971, less than 10 percent of Angola's population lived in the eastern half of the country, the vast majority being concentrated along the top of the escarpment from the

province of Uíge to Lubango where rainfall is highest. Since then there has been further movement towards the cities of the coast and Luanda. Major transport arteries such as the Benguela Railway (although it completely ceased functioning during the war) and major cities such as Huambo have also attracted large population densities to their immediate vicinities.

The majority of the rural population are today dependent on small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods, and live close to the poverty line. Land is generally the only real form of asset rural families have. It is their major source of income and of their food. As such it is essential and, understandably, heavily contested. Contrary to popular belief, soil fertility is not as high in some areas, such as the Central Highlands, therefore each family requires larger land holdings to guarantee subsistence. Soils have been degraded in many areas of the Central Plateau, particularly those easily accessible from the Benguela Railway, and would require quite high levels of fertilizer even after long periods of fallow.⁷ The “very fertile agricultural land” of the Central Plateau was a myth of the colonial era that has tended to persist.⁸

Another significant factor is the commercial plantation estates or large farms known as *fazendas*, which tend to be concentrated in more accessible areas that are also likely to be the preferred resettlement sites of returning IDPs, refugees, or the demobilized. *Fazendas* originated in the colonial era when much of the best and most accessible land was expropriated and given as concessions to European settlers, most of whom abandoned Angola at independence in 1975. In some cases these *fazendas* were built on land abandoned by communities who were forcibly relocated by the Portuguese in the 1960s and 70s –these communities may now wish to resume cultivation in these areas.

The *fazendas* present a further complication because under the 1992 Land Law many of the concession titles were transferred to new claimants, often urban residents who were unable to occupy concession lands due to the ongoing war. War affected populations and IDPs have in many cases occupied some of these same concession lands. Some ex-combatant and former IDP families returning to their home communities may find that their ancestral lands fall within a demarcated concession and under the law now belong to an absentee landowner.

⁷ Beatriz Marcelino, (1996), “Assessment of slowly exchangeable potassium reserves in some African ferrasoils.” in SAFE. Silsoe, England: Cranfield

⁸ Nina Birkeland, (1999), “Construction of a myth - “the very fertile agricultural land” in the Planalto Central, Angola.”. Trondheim: Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Following the end of the war, some of these new concession-holders have begun to reclaim *fazendas* but often do not have access to sufficient capital to cultivate it; the hoped-for foreign investors have not yet appeared.⁹ Thus the land is likely to remain unproductive for some time even though peasant farmers may be dispossessed. Its potential for job creation and for stimulation of economic growth is limited as foreign investment is unlikely to be forthcoming given the current decline in world agricultural markets, particularly for the commodities traditionally exported from Angola such as coffee, sugar and sisal. This is likely to apply not only to Huambo and the Central Highlands, but also to Huila, Cunene, Kwanza-Sul, near the periphery of Luanda, and to the more densely populated areas of the North such as Malange and Uige.

1.3 Changing Traditional Land Ownership and Inheritance Systems

Several different 'traditional' land use systems exist in Angola but there has been no recent systematic research on these. The systems vary depending on such factors as population density and distribution, soil fertility, commercial activity and interests, and they may have been modified in recent years. It is often assumed that 'traditional land ownership' equates to a communal ownership system. Today this is the case only in areas of Angola with low demographic pressure and relatively isolated communities, primarily in the eastern and southeastern half of the country.¹⁰ In other areas, it seems to have transformed into a more individual system but with some basic tenets such as the 'right to return' to land remaining.

Under a communal land ownership system, no one plot of land specifically 'belongs' to any given family or individual. Land 'belongs' collectively to a community; any member of that community has the general right to cultivate one or more plots of land simply moving to another plot in order to allow fallow periods so the soil can regain its fertility. A community member does not lose this right, even if he temporarily abandons the land or is away from the community for a period of time. This right cannot easily be transferred to 'new members' however, unless they are adoptive children.¹¹

Women, however, have a less secure position. In many areas, women do not have the right to directly own or inherit land.¹² Typically, rights to land only accrue to women as a result of their status in the family although this is slowly changing. As such, a woman does not automatically gain the right to land through marriage, especially if childless.

⁹ Fernando Pacheco (2001), "Rural communities in Huambo." in *Communities and reconstruction in Angola*, edited by Paul Robson. Guelph, Canada: Development Workshop.

¹⁰ Fernando Pacheco, "Land and Agricultural Issues in Angola" InAcord News Issue No. 9 From http://www.acord.org.uk/inacord/land_angola.htm

¹¹ Fernando Pacheco, *Land and Agriculture in Angola*, FAO/USAID/OFDA, January 2002, p.7

¹² In some groups inheritance is matrilineal, among the Yaka of southwestern Angola, for example.

In areas of high population density such as Huambo, the situation has evolved to one where 'right to land' pertains more often to a specific parcel of land that is associated with an individual nuclear family. This includes areas of fallow land, which are similarly tied to individual farmers. Communal ownership, where it still exists, pertains to land used for gathering of wood, grass (for house building), and hunting. These may be done in unused *fazendas* or other abandoned land (if a family was displaced, abandoning their land, for instance), or in areas that have never been cultivated.

Formal, legal land titles very rarely exist. Rights to land are 'guaranteed' by witnesses including the *soba* (a traditional authority or village chief) who, in case of conflict, attests to the right of an individual or family to cultivate a given parcel of land. Disputes may occur between siblings who expect to inherit land, or in the case of women who are widowed and denied land inheritance since it may revert to the family of the deceased. The *soba* may intervene and attempt to convince the family to let the woman stay – indeed in some areas of Huambo Province traditional leaders are making a concerted effort to stamp out this practice – but many cases exist where the woman has been forced to leave the house and land, usually to return to her own family.

This creation of a definite link between families and a particular piece of land also created the possibility for other forms of 'transaction' associated with land however – buying, selling, renting – things which traditionally had not been possible but began to emerge during the colonial period. There is now a market for land – albeit limited – and despite what was believed, it seems that it has been possible to buy land since the 1980s or maybe even earlier (a small number of interviewees even mention having bought land even before they went to join UNITA).

Large-scale movements of populations have also broken the traditional links between people and land. Groups of IDPs have been accorded land access in some areas as 'adoptive community members'.¹³ In other areas, the Government – before the arrival of humanitarian assistance and the IDP camp – created entirely new settlements for those displaced by fighting or fleeing UNITA areas and therefore do not have traditional entitlement to land in the communities they fled to. UNITA combatants often left their family land for as long as 30 years ago, many died. Meanwhile communities and families uncertain if those who left would return understandably took over cultivation of their land. The returnees may find themselves bypassed by the normal inheritance patterns and processes.

¹³ Fernando Pacheco, *Land and Agriculture in Angola*, FAO/USAID/OFDA, January 2002

Therefore the 'right to land' is no longer as clear-cut as it once may have been, but may be contested, with different 'systems' overlapping and interacting with each other. Dated and disorganised land management further complicates the situation. The emission of new titles has been made on the basis of the 1975 cadastre, with a tendency to recreate the pre-independence structure that favours commercial agriculture.¹⁴

1.4 Research Hypothesis and Objectives

A reasonable hypothesis then is that the combination of these factors – the importance of land as an asset for household survival, competition between peasant and commercial farming, low soil fertility, the limited availability of rural areas with adequate rainfall and services and the limited capacity to effectively regulate land access – could lead to conflicts over land. While communities are reported to have promised the allocation of land to new returnees, and official documents mention the distribution of land to new returnees, little concrete information exists about the mechanisms by which this is done, and the quantity and quality of land given – key factors in the successful reintegration of ex-combatants and other returnees. It was believed that *sobas* would simply allocate land to returnees, using 'the normal mechanisms', or that customary law would be followed according to which a man may leave his family's land for over a generation and still return and reclaim it. Little was known about how this would function in practice, given the changes wrought by the war, or what would happen in cases where land had been taken over in the absence of ex-combatants and IDPs.¹⁵

Studies on reintegration expectations of ex-combatants done by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and by the Institute for the Reintegration of Ex-combatants (IRSEM) indicated that the majority of ex-combatants wished to return to their areas of origin and that almost half would want to be self-employed in agriculture. Apart from the rapid assessments of the needs and intentions of ex-combatants who left their areas of origin on average 14 years ago and generally have not returned since, little was known about how they would reintegrate in rural communities and access land. A World Bank document related to the ADRP expressly stated:

¹⁴ Fernando Pacheco, "Land and Agricultural Issues in Angola" InAcord News Issue No. 9 From http://www.acord.org.uk/inacord/land_angola.htm

¹⁵ World Bank Aide-Mémoire Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project of 04 June 2002 says that "Ex-combatants access to land would be facilitated by the participative processes used for others who need land" without specifying what these are.

“Disputes over access to land as individuals and communities return to former home communities now inhabited by others may also present challenges to reintegration... further analysis of the land tenure and access constraints needs to be done.”¹⁶

Reports emerged that suggested the perceived need for this research was justified. An OCHA situation report, for the Month of February 2004, stated that

“There have been allegations of discrimination against recently returned refugees and demobilized soldiers in Huila, Namibe and Moxico in land allocation and hiring practices. However, for the time being, the anecdotal evidence of discrimination as well as some isolated incidents of physical and verbal abuse does not indicate a more widespread trend.”¹⁷

The objectives of the research are:

- ✍ To understand the mechanisms used by demobilized soldiers in the Province of Huambo to gain access to land for agricultural production;
- ✍ To understand the constraints, problems and conflicts faced by the demobilized and their families in the process of acquiring land and reintegrating themselves;
- ✍ To draw useful lessons that can inform the implementation of the ADRP.

¹⁶ World Bank “Technical Annex for a Proposed Grant of SDR 24 Million (USD 33 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Angola for an Angola Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project”, Report No. T7580-ANG, Washington, March 7 2003, p. 26

¹⁷ OCHA, Humanitarian Situation in Angola, Monthly Analysis, February 2004.

2 METHODOLOGY

2.1 Selection of Research Sites

The case study focuses on Huambo Province because it has a high percentage of ex-combatants resettling in the area, which already has the highest rural population density in Angola,¹⁸ demand for land is significant and it has a strong tradition of agriculture. The province of Huambo is located in the *Planalto* (Central Plateau) region of Central Angola. One of the provinces worst hit by the war, it was divided and bitterly fought over by Government and UNITA forces right until the end of the war.

Huambo has the biggest influx of returnees in general. IRSEM expected about 25 000 ex-combatants (along with their dependents) to resettle in Huambo Province alone, this is more than 25 percent of the total number of UNITA ex-combatants quartered nationally. IRSEM's most recent data indicated slightly over 20 000. The real number may be even higher, estimated by some to have surpassed the 25 000 mark. Huambo and surrounding areas of the Central Plateau that are similar to Huambo Province in land use and climate, though slightly less densely populated, are expected to reabsorb the majority of UNITA ex-combatants. The rate of return of IDPs has also been high, from Luanda to Huambo City and from the city and municipal towns to rural areas, in particular to the Municipalities of Caála, Bailundo and Vila Nova (also known as TchicalaTcholoanga).

Huambo is an area of high rainfall and relatively high rural population densities. Soil fertility has, however, declined in areas close to Huambo city and contiguous to the Benguela Railway. Huambo Province has a strong tradition of agriculture, including subsistence, small-scale commercial and *fazendas* (larger scale commercial farming). However, community land is known to have given way to a higher number of 'privately owned' plots, the size and productivity of which have steadily declined since the 1970s. For the 2002-2003 agricultural campaign, the average area of land cultivated by small-scale farmers was estimated to be only around 0.8ha per family.¹⁹

¹⁸ Reliable population figures are difficult to get since the last census in 1971. The Provincial Government's Provincial Profile for Huambo gives an overall population density of 59/Km² in 2002 but goes as high as 346/Km² in Huambo Municipality. Population coverage of the province is very uneven and some estimates predate the return of IDPs, refugees and the demobilized. Development Workshop's water and sanitation program in Huambo has seen the population in some municipalities double since the end of the war.

¹⁹ Provincial Socio-Economic Profile: Huambo, January 2003.

The *fazendas* are concentrated around Huambo city and in the two municipalities closest to the Benguela Railway: Caála and Vila Nova. Between them, the three municipalities account for around 73 percent of all commercially farmed land in Huambo province. Conflicts over commercial agricultural land are known to have occurred, with communities staging mass land invasions and media protests. Both IDPs and ex-combatants have reported problems in resettlement, in securing land and housing and in earning a sustainable living.²⁰

This research was carried out in four municipalities of Huambo Province: Bailundo, Caála, Londuimbali and Vila Nova, specifically in rural communities where small-scale agriculture is the predominant livelihood of most families. Given the resources and time available, it was not possible to cover a large enough sample of demobilized soldiers in the province to be statistically significant. Instead research was targeted at locations that represent a broad range of characteristics previously identified as likely to impact on the research questions.

The four municipalities are each qualitatively different – in terms of location and characteristics – but were also chosen for the reasonably large number of ex-combatants expected to resettle there, in order to facilitate the fieldwork. Thus Caála is relatively near Huambo city and one of the more economically diversified and populous municipalities, with high associated pressure on land. Caála and Vila Nova are both intersected by the Benguela railway (currently mostly non-functioning), which represents the area of highest population density and concentration of commercial farming, but both also have very remote rural areas that are difficult to access. Londuimbali and Bailundo are both more remote from the central axis of the Province (the Benguela Railway), although major transport arteries intersect each. Most of the communities included in the research have been displaced at some time over the last 25 years but those closer to urban areas have also sometimes received IDPs. Please see below for a detailed description of each municipality.

In each municipality, two *comunas*²¹ were chosen, and within those a number of communities/villages selected. In Angola the identification and naming of settlements is highly complicated incorporating both colonial and traditional authority structures in the post-Independence framework. For the purposes of the study, the term ‘community’ is used, which refers to a village (*imbo*) or a small group of villages (*imbo linene*). For more general analysis and characterisation, communities have been grouped into *Ombalas*, which can comprise a large number of villages and represent the zone of traditional authority. Each

²⁰ Reports in *Ondaka*, Development Workshop’s community newsletter published in Umbundu in Huambo Province.

²¹ The *comuna* is the lowest administrative unit of local government.

community/village is represented by a *soba*, who is in turn subordinate to a 'head *soba*' known as *soba grande* at the level of the *Ombala*. Some *Ombala* are very large so in some cases they have been subdivided for the purposes of characterisation into groupings of villages, or in some cases amalgamated.

The factors considered important in the selection of communities for research were as follows:

- ✍ HISTORY OF COMMUNITY: Establishment and composition of population, history of displacement and resettlement, government administration/NGO presence.
- ✍ LOCATION AND ACCESSIBILITY: Distance from Municipal centre, Provincial capital, Gathering and Transit Areas, and transport arteries.
- ✍ PATTERNS OF LAND USE: Presence of functioning or non-operational *fazendas* or other commercial farming/claims on land.

2.1.1 Caála

Caála is located close to Huambo city, along the Benguela railway, the major artery of trade and communication for Huambo during the late colonial period. It was formerly the site of large numbers of *fazendas*, some of which are now being reactivated. It remains one of the most economically active areas of the province – at least compared to the very low levels of economic activity elsewhere in Huambo. It has one of the highest population densities of the province, and attracted large numbers of displaced people during the war, especially to the Municipal town (*sede*). The more rural parts of Caála Municipality have been secure since around 2001, which is when the majority of IDPs in this area resettled.

The main communities for fieldwork in Caála were in the *Ombalas* of Sakonombo and Kassupi, both of which are highly populated rural areas. Sakonombo is around 10–20 kilometres from Caála and was established during the colonial period, in the early 1900s. Its population was largely displaced in 1999 to Kantão Pahula IDP camp in Caála. Kassupi was founded early in the 20th century, by a Dutch farmer, and was originally home to people from the northeast of Huambo Province. It is a large *Ombala*, comprising 17 villages situated from 7–27 kilometres from Caála town. Almost the entire population of both *Ombalas* was displaced during between 1998 and 2001, and only recently resettled. There is a large, operational *fazenda* near Kassupi.

2.1.2 Bailundo

Bailundo lies north of Huambo city, around three to four hours (in the rainy season) away along a very poor dirt road. It was the base of former UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi during the 1990s. Government forces secured the town of Bailundo in 1999; this area was the site of intense fighting during the war. It has a relatively low population density, but one of the higher concentrations of ex-combatants in the Province. Three Quartering Areas are located close to or are accessible through Bailundo. Chiteta Quartering Area was located very close to Bailundo. Esfinge Quartering Area was closer to Vila Nova but access was often via Bailundo due to destroyed bridges. Menga Quartering Area, in Kwanza Sul Province, was also accessed primarily through Bailundo. Being the focus for a number of training and other initiatives for ex-combatants, Bailundo attracts ex-combatants from other areas of the Province.

The main locations for research in Bailundo were Velha Chika, Chilume, Quinze and Epamba Samuchuka. The former two are densely populated and within about 3 kilometres of Bailundo town and on the edge of the peri-urban area. The Government established Velha Chika and Chilume around 1978 to house people displaced from other parts of the country. It benefits from the government administration and NGO presence in nearby Bailundo Municipality town. The entire population of Velha Chika was again displaced in 1999, while Chilume suffered heavy fighting but minimal displacement.

Quinze is around 6 kilometres away from Bailundo town and Epamba Samuchuka about 10–12 kilometres away.²² Quinze and Epamba Samuchuka both have lower levels of population density and date from the colonial period (the former around 1911 and the latter 1970s). One non-operational *fazenda* exists near Epamba Samuchuka but no others were reported around research sites.

2.1.3 Londuimbali

Loduimbali is situated to the northwest of Huambo, near the border with Kwanza Sul Province. Although located along the road to the major port of Lobito, it is relatively remote with few economic opportunities or healthcare/education services (beyond what is provided by NGOs) and so rarely attracts migration or resettlement of people who are not originally from that area. There have been political problems associated with the opening of UNITA offices in Londuimbali, indicating some tensions among local leadership and Government and MPLA party members. The principal areas for research were Chitaka, around 11km from the Municipal town, Ukonga (12 – 21 km away), and Pukosso (30 – 35 km away). In all, there was

²² Travel beyond 12 kilometres from the Municipal town was not possible due to an exceptionally wet rainy season that led to roads being closed and bridges destroyed.

high population displacement in 1999 due to fighting, with people fleeing to Huambo and Ekunha Municipalities. The presence of unused *fazendas* was registered in all research sites, with one operational in Ukonga.

2.1.4 Vila Nova (also known as Tchicala Tcholohanga)

Vila Nova lies east of Huambo city, near the road that leads to Bié province. Research in Vila Nova was carried out in three distinct areas. The first, part of the *Ombala* of Chitaka, covers areas bordering the peri-urban areas of the Municipal town. The second covers rural areas on the Comuna of Vila Nova, up to 25 kilometres from the Municipal town. The third, the Comuna of Located about 60 kilometres south of the town of Vila Nova Sambo, Sambo is much more remote. It is several hours drive from the nearest urban centre along roads that are in very poor condition and frequently inaccessible in the rainy season. The main town of the Comuna consists of a few run-down buildings (most without a roof) and a very small market. There are very few economic opportunities apart from agriculture. Sambo was the location of a Gathering Area. Surveys completed in Sambo include ex-combatants from a wide range of *Ombalas* because food distribution that was ongoing at the time of the research attracted ex-combatants from many other areas of the Municipality.

Table 1 gives a summary of the main characteristics of the research sites in each of the four Municipalities.

Table 1. Main characteristics of research sites

Municipality	Comuna	Ombala	Distance from Municipal town	Proximity to CFB corridor* and Gathering Areas	Presence of <i>fazendas</i>
Bailundo	Epamba	Epamba Samuchuka	Medium distance from town (>10km)	Not close to CFB corridor, Chiteta GA nearby	Inactive
	Bailundo	Others: Chilume, Quinze & Velha Chika	Close to the town (1-6km)	Not close to CFB corridor, Chiteta Gathering Area very close	None
Caála	Kalenga	Kassupi	Medium distance from the town (7-27 km)	Close to CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby	Inactive
	Caála	Sakonombo	Medium distance from the town (10-20km)	Close to CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby	Active
Londuimbali	Galanga	Pukosso	Far from the town (30-35km)	Distant from CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby	Inactive
	Londuimbali	Ukonga & Chitaka	Medium distance from the town (11-21km)	Distant from CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby	One active, others inactive
Vila Nova	Vila Nova	Chitaka: Sao Jose & Jika villages	Close to town (½ - 1 km)	Close to CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby (Sambo in same Municipality however)	Some active, others inactive
	Vila Nova	Chitaka: other villages, other Ombalas in Vila Nova	Medium/far from town (4-25km)	Part of CFB corridor. No Gathering Areas nearby (Sambo in same Municipality however)	Inactive
	Sambo	All	Remote from Municipal town	Remote from CFB corridor Sambo Gathering Area nearby	Inactive

* The Caminho de Ferro de Benguela (CFB) corridor is the densely populated area around the Benguela Railway, which cuts across the Province.

2.2 Field Research

The research team was made up of a Field coordinator from Development Workshop's Policy, Research and Monitoring Unit, two Senior Research Advisors, and 12 researchers of whom two specialised in focus groups and qualitative data gathering while the rest worked in pairs administering structured questionnaires. Of the 12 researchers, eight were from Development Workshop's community media

project, two were technicians from the National Statistics Institute (INE) and two were seconded from the Angolan NGO Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA).

The original research design was to study of the whole process of demobilization of ex-combatants from the quartering/gathering areas through transit and return to their areas of origin but due to delays in obtaining funds for the study, the above processes had been largely completed by the time the research began in late 2003. Transit centres had by-and-large been closed by that time, so the research focused on families who had already returned to their areas of origin and were already resettling. This presented some logistical problems in that the target groups were dispersed in the rural areas.

Researchers spent a minimum of four days in each Municipality over the period December 2003 and January 2004. The period coincided with unusually heavy rains in the Province making access to research sites very difficult. Research was focussed at different levels: individual ex-combatants, peer groups of ex-combatants, UNITA women and resident community members, leaders within the community, and key individuals at the Municipal and Provincial levels.

The research methods used were a combination of structured interviews, focus group discussions, key informant interviews and participatory mapping. Structured interviews were carried out with individual ex-combatants: these gathered general background and demographic data, specific data on the return and resettlement process, the process of land acquisition and tenure, and on the ex-combatants' perceptions, future aspirations and hopes. Within each community included in the study, the coverage (in terms of the proportion of demobilized soldiers interviewed) was generally high, at over 75 percent. Researchers approached local leaders in communities to establish numbers and locations of ex-combatants and then proceeded to interview as many as possible. Surveys were backed up with more qualitative methodologies.

Two of the researchers were trained specifically to lead focus group discussions, and these provided useful information, which was not forthcoming from the structured interviews. In addition, participatory land mappings helped both community groups and researchers to better understand the issues facing each community. Key interviews with community leaders, Government and UNITA representatives were also conducted in each area, and interviews with NGOs and Government bodies at the Provincial level were finally held to check research findings against the experiences of other organisations working in this field.

A map of Huambo province with research sites marked, copies of the survey methodology and focus group guides are in the Appendix.

The research completed:

- ✍ 384 surveys of demobilized soldiers;
- ✍ 10 focus groups of demobilized soldiers, UNITA women or community residents;
- ✍ Eight key informant interviews with sobas, IRSEM officials and local administrators;
- ✍ Participatory land mappings of 11 communities.

Preliminary results of the research were presented through individual meetings with NGOs and Government representatives in Huambo and Luanda. In addition two participatory seminars were held in May 2004 in which findings were presented and feedback gathered. Meetings and seminars held in the course of this research included representatives of: OCHA, FAO, USAID, WFP, World Bank, IRSEM, MINARS, ADRA-Angola, CARE Angola, Caritas, Oikos, Save the Children-UK, Halo Trust, Okutiuka, Rede Terra, Solidarités, and World Vision. The results of these discussions are incorporated into the report where appropriate.

3 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

This section presents demographic characteristics of the 384 demobilized soldiers respondents to the structured interview questionnaire.

3.1 Age and Sex Composition

The respondents to the structured interview were overwhelmingly male. Of the 384 ex-combatants interviewed 366 were men (95 percent), and 18 women (5 percent). This reflects the fact that the numbers of registered women combatants is small. The World Bank estimates around 0.4 percent – of the first 78 000 registered ex-combatants, only 320 were women.²³


The respondents ranged in age from 17 to 69 years with the average at 34 (median 32). Almost 60 percent are aged between 21 to 35 years. The average age of respondents is slightly higher than that given in other larger scale surveys of the demobilized in Angola. An IOM study done in Quartering Areas in 2002 among 4731 ex-combatants found an average age of 32 (median 30), while a preliminary assessment of 30 309 ex-combatants from IRSEM's database done by the World Bank in October 2002 put the average age at 32.76.

Table 2. Age of respondents

Age	Frequency	Percent
Age not reported	4	1.0%
20 years or less	19	4.9 %
21 – 25 years	61	15.9%
26 – 30 years	86	22.4%
31 – 35 years	77	20.1%
36 – 40 years	55	14.3%
41 – 45 years	41	10.7%
46 – 50 years	19	4.9%
51 years or above	22	5.7%
Total	384	100.0

²³ Human Rights Watch, *Struggling Through Peace: Return and Resettlement in Angola*, Vol. 15, No. 16 (A), Washington D.C., August 2003.

Figure 1. Age of respondents



3.2 Education Level

The ex-combatants surveyed have a very low level of education. A quarter got only as far as the end of the 1st class – although this may have taken several years – and over three-quarters did not get beyond the end of primary education. The small sample size of female ex-combatants precludes a statistical analysis of the difference in educational level between sexes but the observed range of educational level of female ex-combatants is similar to that of male ex-combatants.

Table 3. Education level of respondents

Education	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Never studied	18	4.7%	4.7%
Iniciação*	1	0.3%	4.9%
1 st year	61	15.9%	20.8%
2 nd year	67	17.4%	38.3%
3 rd year	70	18.2%	56.5%
4 th year	81	21.1%	77.6%
5 th year	29	7.6%	85.2%
6 th year	37	9.6%	94.8%
7 th year	11	2.9%	97.7%
8 th year	6	1.6%	99.2%
9 th year	3	0.8%	100.0%
Total	384	100.0%	

* One year of pre-school education, under the Portuguese colonial system

3.3 Religion

Eighty-five per cent of respondents report being member of a Christian church, which indicates the strong Christian influences in the Central Plateau. UNITA has in the past been associated with the Protestant churches, but the results of this survey indicate that over half the ex-combatants interviewed are in fact members of the Catholic Church.

Table 4. Religious Affiliation

Religion	Frequency	Percent
None	53	13.8%
Catholic	214	55.7%
Protestant	87	22.7%
Adventist	18	4.7%
Pentecostal	2	0.5%
Unknown	10	2.6%
Total	384	100.0%

3.4 Languages Spoken

Umbundu is the predominant spoken language within the respondents' households; only five stated that they did not. Of these five, two were not originally from the area while the other three had been away for between 12 and 17 years – all five said that Portuguese was the language most commonly spoken in their homes. Overall, two-thirds reported that they spoke Portuguese within their households as well but it this does not imply a thorough literacy in Portuguese given the low levels of education of the majority of the ex-combatants interviewed.

Table 5. Languages Spoken

Languages	Frequency	Percent
Portuguese	260	67.7%
Umbundu	379	98.7%
Nganguela	22	5.7%
Tchokwe	11	2.9%
Kimbundu (incl. Ngoia)	4	1.0%
Total	384	100.0%

The population movements that resulted from the war are apparent in the linguistic diversity of the respondents. Several other languages were also spoken, including for example, Kikongo, Lingala, Hanyu, and Humbi. As shown in Table 6 over half (235) speak two languages, while 7 percent speak three or more languages. Ex-combatants returning with wives from other areas of Angola and from different ethno-linguistic groups further add to linguistic diversity.

There are also communities established in the late 1970s or 1980s by the Government as resettlement areas for IDPs from other parts of the Province and/or country, who came one or less generations ago speaking other languages or dialects. The villages of Chilume and Kavata demonstrate the highest degree of linguistic variation in the research area. Chilume Ombala was founded in 1888, but the villages covered here (Vila Moises and Boa Vista) were both established by the Government as resettlement sites for IDPs from other locations. It is also very close to Bailundo town and attracted a comparatively high number of non-residents (who may therefore derive from different ethno-linguistic groups). In Kavata those that speak 3 or more languages have generally been away from this area for between 15 and 30 years. They have likely learned new languages while living in different areas of the country with UNITA and also through marriage. Respondents in Bailundo and Vila Nova have higher levels of linguistic diversity than those in Caála and Londuimbali. This may be explained by the proximity of Gathering Areas to Bailundo and Vila Nova. These types of areas (especially if peri-urban) have shown a tendency to accumulate ex-combatants who are unsure of where to go or in transit to more distant areas.

Table 6. Number of Languages Spoken, By Ombala

Municipality	Ombala	Number of languages spoken				
		1	2	3	4 or more	Total
Bailundo	Epamba Samachuka	17	14	1	1	33
	Quinze	0	11	1	0	12
	Velha Chica	3	8	1	0	12
	Chilume	9	21	5	1	36
Caála	Kassupi	12	27	1	0	40
	Sakanombo	8	28	0	0	36
Londuimbali	Chitaka	3	4	0	0	7
	Ukonga	29	32	2	0	63
	Pukusso	5	13	0	0	18
Vila Nova (Vila Nova)	Chitaka: Sao Jose and Jika	4	28	1	1	34
	Chitaka: other villages (further away)	0	5	3	0	8

	Others: Kalunda, Kamjungue, Moma Soya, Ulondo	3	6	0	0	9
Vila Nova (Sambo)	Kavata	21	23	7	1	52
	Others (nearer town): Chiyaya, Kalembe, Kapule, Sambo	3	10	1	1	15
	Others (farther away): Etunda Kajombo, Ndele, Ngondo	2	5	1	1	9
		119	235	24	6	384

3.5 Previous and Current Occupation

The majority of the respondents (280 out of 384) worked in small-scale agriculture before joining UNITA forces (see Table 7). Those who previously worked in trades and professions each accounted for only three percent. A comparison of previous and current occupations shows the continued reliance on small-scale agriculture for employment with an even greater proportion of respondents (93 percent versus 73 percent previously) now describing themselves as primarily small-scale farmers. Only 6 percent now engage in non-agricultural occupations. The range of current occupations is noticeably more limited than that for previous occupations.

The high proportion of respondents now employed in small-scale agriculture is expected, given the focus of the research was on areas in which small-scale agriculture is now the main livelihood. It should be noted, however, that in the colonial period other forms of employment were an important contribution to household income even in rural areas. The lack of other forms of livelihood potentially presents an economic vulnerability if they are not re-established in the near future. It should also be noted that non-agricultural occupations were rarely mentioned in the interviews even in areas near the towns, where some alternative occupations would have been expected.

Table 7. Previous and Current Occupation

Occupation	Previous occupation*		Current occupation	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Small-scale agriculture (camponês)	280	72.9%	356	92.7%
Wage/agricultural labour (biscatos)	3	0.8%	1	0.3%
Trades (carpenter, mechanic, tailor etc)	10	2.6%	2	0.5%

Professional (teacher, nurse etc)	13	3.4%	13	3.4%
Government/UNITA party employee	0	0.0%	3	0.8%
Business/commerce (negócio)	2	0.5%	6	1.6%
Student/training	69	18.0%	2	0.5%
Was a child	4	1.0%	0	0.0%
Unemployed	1	0.3%	0	0.0%
Other	2	0.5%	1	0.3%
Total	384	100.0%	384	100.0%

* Refers to occupation prior to joining UNITA forces.

Figure 2. Previous Occupation





Figure 3. Current Occupation



4 LAND CONFLICTS & INSECURITY

4.1 Causes of Conflicts

Overall, only 10 people interviewed in surveys directly reported conflicts. In most cases these related to disputes over the right to land within families or between a returning family and people who have taken over land while ex-combatants were away. Five of these conflicts were reported to have been resolved.

The true number of conflicts is likely underestimated because the focus group discussions revealed additional conflicts had taken place, but since they had been resolved were no longer considered as such. It was further suggested in a number of group discussions held with resident community members that demobilized soldiers may be unwilling to report problems for fear of aggravating them, particularly given the apparently widespread fear of witchcraft in rural communities in Huambo. In many cases resident community members report conflicts with demobilized soldiers while the ex-soldiers themselves deny any specific problems. One focus group with resident women reported the following: *“When returnees arrive here they cannot complain about anything, because if they do they will be the victims of witchcraft.”*²⁴ Other demobilized soldiers and communities also complained of a rise in the number of cases of witchcraft, indicating an increase in tensions. One demobilized soldier specifically linked this to the advent of peace saying that the only bad thing peace had brought was *“increased freedom for those who practice witchcraft.”*

The following are indicative of the kinds of problems that were reported:

- ✍ A group of UNITA women in Londuimbali reported that some of them had suffered from reprisals when they returned. They reported it to the *soba* to try and prevent it from happening in the future. They thought it was a phase in the reintegration process and would not last forever. One woman said crops had been stolen from her field regularly and that she had received verbal abuse.
- ✍ In Bailundo women reported that while many people had received them well, and they knew that instructions have been given to the community about how to act, others frequently insulted and abused them. They felt it was related to general insecurity of living in this area, and while they had reported cases to the *soba*, nothing had been done to resolve them.

²⁴ Focus group, resident women, Vila Nova

- ✍ In Vila Nova, a group of demobilized (male) soldiers reported conflicts over land when returnees attempted to repossess their families' land, but that the *soba* has resolved them. These conflicts occurred 'especially' with the demobilized soldiers, and are not always resolved.
- ✍ In Caála, some problems between community residents and returned demobilized soldiers were reported, but blamed on alcohol. Overall people seemed more concerned about losing their land to the *fazenda* – which would affect residents and returnees alike.

Their 'root causes' are difficult to pin down, land is likely only one factor which must be situated in the context of general poverty, social and political tensions. Witchcraft, notably, is often a proxy for other kinds of tensions, and demonstrates the existence of other underlying problems without really shedding light on them. To really understand the causes and manifestations of conflict in communities, further, more in depth research on this would be required and would not be easy since people are often reluctant to discuss this issue.

4.2 Means of Conflict Resolution

Five unresolved conflicts is too small a number to draw conclusions from. Yet it is at least consistent with the common understanding that the resolution of conflicts within communities is primarily the preserve of the *soba*. Focus group discussions also suggest that conflicts are reported first to traditional authorities. However, it also seems that they are not always able to resolve these conflicts – or not in a way that is satisfactory to one or other party. In such cases, they are reported to the administrator. Solutions to land conflicts reported in this research included the further subdivision of land between family members, a practice already prevalent in the 'means of acquisition' of land. The concern is that the range of solutions is not great; people have few alternative options and few resources with which to support them. In many cases solutions seem to be temporary as in land is loaned or rented to the ex-combatant while they establish an alternative.

Table 8. Parties Involved in Resolution of Conflict

Who was involved in the resolution of the conflict?	Frequency
Between themselves	2
By the <i>soba</i>	2
Both <i>soba</i> and themselves	1

Case Four

A 28-year-old ex-combatant returns to his village after nine years with UNITA, the last four of which he was away from his land. He returns and finds that his uncle has sold his land while he was away. He consults his remaining family members, the *soba* and the community, and the case is resolved as the uncle returns the money to the purchaser of the land and the ex-combatant is able to resume cultivating the land.

4.3 Land Tenure Security

The research examined the respondents' degree of security about land tenure. Of those who say that they do feel secure (97 percent), only 11 (percent) actually have any kind of written documentation to prove that the land belongs to them. By far the most common reason given for feeling secure (cited in 84 percent of cases) is the existence of witnesses, while 49 (13 percent) mentioned the fact that they had gone through a process of consultation of the *soba* and community as conferring security of tenure. 'Ancestral right' or "*porque é terra dos pais*") is also invoked in a number of cases. These may, in the future, intensify the vulnerability of rural communities, if faced with challenges to their land ownership by people arriving from the city with formal land deeds. Currently, this not even perceived to be a problem, except in areas where *fazenda* ownership has already begun to be contested.

Table 9. Degree of Security Regarding Land Tenure

Do you feel secure in the possession of your land?	Frequency	Percent
Yes	363	97.1%
No	9	2.4%
No response	2	0.5%
Total	374	100.0%

In a system in which land rights are attested to orally, large-scale displacement and population movement have caused problems. In a number of reported land conflicts, it was mentioned that the case could only be resolved upon recall of witnesses, who may be in Huambo, Luanda or elsewhere. The system may further break down in future and written documentation may become increasingly important. It will be important for civil society groups to monitor this process, especially in the context of the new land law, which very few of those interviewed in focus group discussions has any kind of knowledge of.

Those who say they do not feel secure are a different group from those who report land conflicts – only two of the nine who claim to be insecure also report problems having occurred. Insecurity appears to be linked to problems in land acquisition even if these are not reported. Of the nine who did not feel secure, seven had returned to their village of birth, but only three were now cultivating their family's former land – suggesting the other four had been unable to retake that land. An interviewee's accounts of the acquisition process in one case, confirms this. The respondent says he arrived to find his land taken over by people who claimed he had no right to inherit it since his relatives were dead.

Furthermore only one of these three who were cultivating their ancestral land had actually inherited that land. The other two had been granted land by relatives and one of them also reported conflict with his relatives who did not agree with this acquisition – see case below). In addition, two report that they had formerly possessed other, better quality land in the same community, which they were now unable to cultivate. Of the others, three had been allocated land by the *soba*, two were borrowing land and one was renting it. Most of them (5 of 9) said they would only be able to continue to cultivate that land for one season.

Case Five

A 27-year-old ex-combatant returns to his village in Londuimbali after 11 years away. When he departed, at the age of 16, he left all his belongings with his sister. On his return, his sister agrees to give him some land, but his cousins disagree because he is only a stepson and therefore not entitled to inherit. This caused a conflict within the family, which was only resolved by agreeing he can stay there for the moment because he has no other means of support. The land he cultivates now includes one good quality piece near the river, but is mostly infertile/abandoned land in any case, plus a piece around his house. This is not a long-term solution,

4.4 Commercial Agricultural development and the Land Law

A further constraint on access to and secure tenure of land is the presence of commercial farming. The research team found one area where the local *fazenda* owner was not only taking over land that had been cultivated by local families but was pushing back the limits of the old *fazenda* beyond where they had previously been. People in this area were highly worried about this.

“In the future I think there will be a lot of problems over land because many *fazendeiros* are beginning to arrive here and this means they are going to get our land – this will affect old residents and ex-combatants alike. This is the only fear the community has, and the process has already started.”²⁵

There are many other areas where people living near old *fazenda* sites – many of which have been vacant since 1975 – have become accustomed to using them for community purposes such as wood gathering and hunting, even if not for actual cultivation. If and when these *fazendas* resume operations, land availability will decrease further and pressures are likely to mount. Furthermore, since the majority of people (only ex-combatants were surveyed but it can be assumed that the same applies to communities more broadly) do not have any kind of official

²⁵ Focus group, Caála Municipality

documentation, this puts them in a vulnerable position relative to well-connected outsiders. With the new Land law already claimed by NGOs and civil society groups to privilege the rights of commercial farming over families and communities, it will be important to monitor this process and if appropriate provide support.

5 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES

This section looks at the ex-combatants' perspective on the future, how various subgroups have been affected by return and reintegration, and key issues facing reintegration programmes.

5.1 Ex-combatants' perspectives on the future

Overall, ex-combatants surveyed appear to have reached their 'final destinations' and the majority are content to settle there. Only 17 of the 384 survey respondents (4.4 percent) said they expected to relocate. Economic motivations – difficulties in earning a living or expectations of better possibilities elsewhere – are the main reasons cited by those who expect to relocate.

Table 10. Reasons for Wanting to Stay

Why would you prefer to stay?	Frequency	Percent
Because it is ' <i>terra natal</i> '	207	65.1%
Because fields are here/to continue cultivating	60	18.9%
Because family/family members are here	40	12.6%
Unwilling or unable to move location again	12	3.8%
Prevented returning to area of origin by problems there	3	0.9%
Other reason	23	7.2%
No reason given	3	0.9%
Total number of respondents	318	

NB: In some cases more than one answer was given, percentages are therefore proportion of the total number of respondents

When asked if, given the choice, they would prefer to stay or to move, a slightly higher number – 55 (14 percent) – said they would choose to leave if there were better economic conditions or employment elsewhere (Table 11). The majority, however, had returned to their *terra natal* (birthplace) and so wanted to stay there.

Table 11. Reasons for Wanting to Move

Why would you prefer to move, if given a choice?	Frequency	Percent
Would prefer to return to area of origin	2	3.6%
Would like to join family members elsewhere	4	7.3%
Would move if employment was available elsewhere	21	38.2%
Would leave if education or training was available elsewhere	5	9.1%
Would leave if better standard of living/'conditions' were available elsewhere	11	20.0%
Would leave because of land related problems here	3	5.5%
Would leave because of social/community problems here	4	7.3%
Reason not specific but 'might change their mind'	3	5.5%
Other reason	2	3.6%
Total	55	100.0%

5.2 Land related problems

Overall, the number and severity of problems facing demobilized soldiers was not found to be alarming in this study. Nevertheless, problems do exist and may intensify in the future, especially now that the two-year period of supplementary food assistance given to ex-combatants by WFP has ended,²⁶ and as the non-operational *fazendas* are recuperated. In addition, while only 14 said they would consider relocating in the future, over half of those cited employment opportunities or a better standard of living as reasons to move. A small number specifically cited problems related to land. However, it is reasonable to assume that most of those who had resettled in rural areas had done so precisely because they were able to access land. Cases were also found in transit and peri-urban areas of ex-combatants who had not returned to rural areas because of land problems, either real or anticipated.

Problems faced by ex-combatants relating to land can be categorized into four types:

- ✍ QUANTITY & QUALITY OF LAND: those demobilized soldiers who do not have access to sufficient quantities of land for self-reliance in agriculture, or the land is infertile or difficult to cultivate and unlikely to produce enough for self-reliance without major inputs.

²⁶ The WFP assistance to ex-combatants ended in April 2004 but the demobilized may continue to receive assistance if deemed 'vulnerable' based on the same criteria used to evaluate everyone else.

- ✍ SECURITY OF LAND TENURE: those ex-combatants whose land tenure is insecure or limited due to failure to access own family's land and need to borrow/rent while arranging alternative, or lack of availability of sufficient land in a community to allocate for all new arrivals.
- ✍ LOCALISED LAND CONFLICTS: those who experience intra-family or intra-community conflicts relating to the acquisition and ownership of land, driven by poverty and greed or simply the result of a confusing process over the past decades. This may exacerbate underlying personal and political tensions and social divisions.
- ✍ COMPETING LAND CLAIMS: Ownership of land cultivated by communities may be contested by commercial farmers or those who have received land under the concession system; encroachment onto communities' land by existing *fazendas*.

5.3 Vulnerable Groups

Constraints to reintegration in rural areas affect different subgroups of people differently. The research has found that some subgroups among the demobilized are more vulnerable than others. Currently, however, there is a shortage of data about the numbers and locations of these subgroups because they are generally not acknowledged and included in the national demobilization process. These groups will require a targeted approach for support and assistance.

5.3.1 Women

As pointed out earlier in this report (section 1.3 Changing Traditional Land Ownership and Inheritance Systems), women appear to be particularly vulnerable. Although customary and public laws on land ownership are changing in Angola, traditions that deprive women the right to directly own or inherit land persist in Huambo. These apply in general to all women but they make the position of widowed, divorced or abandoned women particularly difficult.

A daughter does not inherit land - she is expected to marry but when a woman marries she does not automatically gain the right to land through marriage. If her husband dies, she may keep it 'in trust' for her children but has no ownership rights herself. If she is childless, her husband's family has the right to dispossess her of everything. If she has joined her husband in a community other than her own, a widow may be additionally vulnerable. It is assumed that women will return to their own family and receive land and housing there. Many wives of UNITA demobilized soldiers have come long distances from their own families; it is

difficult for them to return. The researchers did speak to *sobas* who acknowledged this as a problem and were trying to change it.

Cases Six & Seven:

Upon demobilization, a 25-year-old woman, Maria [name changed], accompanied her husband and their children to his birthplace, a village in Bailundo. They settled and were given land by his family, which they began to cultivate. Soon after this he died, however, and his relatives promptly turned against Maria, demanding the land they had given them back. She was thus left with nothing. The *soba* was aware of the problem but had not been able to resolve it so at the time of the interview she was expecting to have to return to her own family in another part of the Province.

Another woman interviewed in a peri-urban area of Huambo reported that her main problem was lack of land. She had tried to return to her area of origin but her paternal uncles had not agreed to give her even a small piece of her father's land. When asked why, she claimed it was because she was a woman.

Women ex-combatants also appear to be able to access only smaller quantities of land. Five of the 18 women interviewed said that they did not have any land at all, compared with five out of 362 men. Even if they have access to land, they face additional obstacles in cultivating it simply because of the physical effort required to clear land for cultivation. As noted earlier, two hectares is difficult for an average family to cultivate without access to animal traction, but for a single woman or a female-headed household it is impossible.

Single women and widows from UNITA (unless part of the very small minority officially registered as combatants) are not eligible for reintegration support under the ADRP. Economic reintegration programmes are targeted at the men, not at their wives, although women are responsible for at least as much of the family's livelihood as the man. In addition, some tasks may be separated on a gender basis, e.g. agricultural tasks, cultivation of particular crops or plots of land for consumption or sale, and market trading activities. As a result, to support only economic activities of those of the male ex-combatant is to neglect one half of the equation and of the family's income and support mechanisms.

Social integration also seems more difficult for women, at least those interviewed in the research. Because the majority of ex-combatants were young when they joined UNITA, many married women from outside their community of origin. The status of wives as 'outsiders' appears to be a source of increased social conflict. Most often, it is women who report (in group discussions) that they have received verbal abuse or aggression from resident community members. The researchers could not confirm these reports (as this may risk compromising the security of the group participants), but the trend is common to several research sites, which are not linked to each other. It is not possible to say conclusively whether or not this is linked to their being 'outsiders' to the community but it is certainly a possible hypothesis and would not bode well for reintegration and reconciliation.

Females who were forced into the war when they were young, including female 'child soldiers' are another vulnerable group (see discussion on 5.3.4 Underage ex-combatants below).

5.3.2 Those with 'nowhere to go'


Those who have resettled in a community where they have not lived in previously or do not have family members there – appear to be the worst off in terms of land quantity and quality. This is true both in rural areas and in areas closer to towns. For some they may simply be in 'transit' and plan to relocate elsewhere so having access to less land is less important. However, it is likely that they simply have nowhere else to go. As stated earlier overall the majority of the respondents appear to have reached their 'final destinations.'

The demobilized in this subgroup are particularly vulnerable because they lack family and kinship support structures that are a key element in survival strategies of Angolans. Their proximity to municipal or provincial centres, however, provides them with alternative employment possibilities and easier access to humanitarian assistance. There is no evidence in Huambo that the Government has allocated land or resources for the resettlement of these people, although this may vary between provinces.

It seems likely that a significant sized group of these people exists in and around urban areas, although they were not covered by this survey and no reliable statistics exist on their numbers or whereabouts. The IOM survey in 2002 estimated that 85 percent of ex-combatants were planning to return to their previous place of residence, which in 70 percent of cases was the village of birth. This indicates that of the total, around 15 percent would be going to a place they had not lived in before (identified as vulnerable here), and that around 40 percent would not be returning to their place of birth (also vulnerable, if marginally less so). This data does not take into consideration other family support networks ex-

combatants may have access to, or the reasons for their choices, but nevertheless does indicate a potential problem. There does not appear to be specific provision for them in reintegration programmes at present.

Figure 4. Amount of Land according to Previous Ties with the Community



5.3.3 Disabled ex-combatants

Assistance to the disabled is provided through existing Government and NGO support mechanisms. A very small number of the ex-combatants in this survey had any kind of physical disability but it was mentioned in one or two cases as an impediment to the cultivation of land (one was only cultivating the land around his house, the *Ocumbo*, as a result). These ex-combatants did not appear to benefit from any additional support and were highly restricted in their abilities to support themselves. They are potentially one of the most vulnerable groups of ex-combatants.

5.3.4 Underage ex-combatants

Although anecdotal evidence exists about 'child soldiers'²⁷, there is little data on boys and girls who were forced or abducted into the war. Advocates for children's

²⁷ Defined as "any person under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to, cooks, porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members." Definition adopted at Unicef International Symposium in Cape Town South Africa, 1997.

rights estimates range from 7,000 to as many as 11,000 children (on both the Government and UNITA side) were involved in the last years of the fighting.²⁸ Some had combat duties and learned to use weapons. Many others acted as porters, foragers, cooks, spies, laborers, and – for the girls – also ‘assigned’ as wives to the soldiers. The Government’s DDR process makes no provision for those aged below 20.²⁹ This group is not eligible for the normal DDR benefit package, receiving only an identification card and food aid. Those who were still underage at the time of quartering benefited from a special family reunification programme supported by MINARS and Unicef early in the demobilization process.

The registered numbers of underage combatants is considerably lower than estimates and previous experience with UNITA would indicate.³⁰ It is likely that their numbers are underreported – particularly the females – as many are members of extended families of male ex-combatants rather than registered on their own as ex-soldiers. Officially, “the problem of girls involved in Angola’s armed conflict does not exist.”³¹ The anecdotal evidence gathered by the Christian Children’s Fund (CCF), an international NGO, which currently assists war-affected children in four provinces and in Luanda, is that these when these girls return to their communities, they lack the emotional, social, legal and economic support needed to reintegrate and move ahead in building their lives.³²

Children (along with women) are particularly vulnerable to the effects of violence. None of the respondents were underage at time of interview but half of them were when they originally left their communities. The duration of the war meant that children who were forced into the war (many through abduction) grew to adulthood during the course of the war, and most returning child ex-soldiers have now reached the age of majority. Many have had very little education or the opportunity to gain job skills outside of the war and given their experience in the war could have added difficulties in rejoining community life. The reintegration of child soldiers (and former child soldiers) therefore involves child protection and children’s rights issues as well as general protection and human rights issues. DDR

²⁸ Human Rights Watch Angola Forgotten Fighters Child soldiers in Angola April 2003 Vol. 15 No. 10 (A) retrieved from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/angola0403/Angola0403.htm>

²⁹ The official conscription age of the FAA is 20 years but boys are registered at age 18 for future military conscription; thereafter they must get an authorisation from the army to leave the country. Boys cannot be forcefully conscripted until they are aged 20 but they can join the army voluntarily at age 18. The demobilisation process required [on paper] integration into the FAA and then all (except 5000) the UNITA ex-combatants were demobilized from the FAA. The Government’s position was that it could not legally conscript the under 20s, in order to formally demobilize them. In the process the soldiers who were aged below 20 did not qualify for the standard DDR benefit package.

³⁰ World Bank, Angola Country Report April 21 2003 in MDRP Supervision Report July 2003.

³¹ Vivi Stavrou, “Breaking the Silence: Girls Abducted During Armed Conflict in Angola Preliminary Data Analysis of wWork in Progress,” presentation at the War and Children: Impact Conference, 1-3 April 2004, Edmonton, Canada.

³² Vive Stavrou, Ibid.

programmes need to make provisions for the specific needs of those in this subgroup.

5.3.5 Young ex-combatants

Young ex-combatants are often assumed to be a particularly vulnerable group. The research did not inquire into specific problems of problems of young returning ex-combatants in accessing land and therefore cannot ascertain whether this subgroup had more problems relative to their older counterparts. The findings do show, however, that in cases where conflicts are reported, they are generally among ex-combatants who were very young when they left (and hence, on average, still relatively young now). This may be because they had not passed through the traditional processes of land inheritance. Furthermore having been absent for long periods of time, most were probably presumed dead. The conflicts are sometimes resolved by the current occupier leaving, often with some kind of compensation or payment from the returning demobilized soldier, but in some cases they are not resolved and demobilized soldiers rent or borrow a piece of land instead while they attempt to secure other land. International organisations working in Huambo also noted that young ex-combatants or UNITA family members (if not demobilized as combatants) were often dependent only on patches of *Ocumbo* land (small parcel of land near a house) for their subsistence and were particularly vulnerable.

5.4 Reintegration Programmes and Progress

A full picture of the economic reintegration of ex-combatants will not emerge until programmes are underway. At the time of research, few activities had actually begun in Huambo. In Bailundo some demobilized soldiers were being trained by the churches to be electricians, and the integration of UNITA trained nurses and teachers into Government service was underway. The World Bank funded ADRP was formally launched in Huambo in April 2004, although a delay is expected before project proposals can be approved, funds disbursed, and activities actually begin.

5.4.1 Increasing Productivity in Agriculture

On arrival at their 'destination area', ex-combatants must register with IRSEM. Registration includes selection of a 'reintegration option', on the basis of which access to economic reintegration programmes is to be decided and allocated. The final results of this selection were not available to the researchers, but the numbers choosing agriculture as their preferred option in Huambo Province were (Table 12).

Table 12. Agricultural Reintegration

Municipality	Number of Ex-Military Registered end Nov 03		Number choosing agriculture as their first reintegration option	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Huambo	5187	24.9	1092	14.7
Caála	2141	10.3	841	11.3
Ecunha	475	2.3	172	2.3
Tchicala				
Tcholoanga	1513	7.3	582	7.8
Katchiungo	1614	7.8	970	13.0
Mungo	1694	8.1	412	5.5
Bailundo	4124	19.8	1329	17.9
Londuimbali	1722	8.3	505	6.8
Longonjo	1165	5.6	639	8.6
Tchinjenje	380	1.8	256	3.4
Ukuma	787		623	8.4
Total	20802		7421	

Source: IRSEM data

This data indicates that around one third of ex-combatants in Huambo Province chose agriculture as their preferred reintegration option. According to IRSEM Huambo, this number is lower than had initially been expected based on registrations done in the Gathering Areas, which predicted that around half would enter agriculture. Furthermore, although the overall results of the registrations done in GAs and on arrival in return destinations have not been made public, the IOM study done in a number of Gathering Areas in the Central Highland found that 43 percent of ex-combatants wanted to be self-employed in agriculture.

At present, regardless of their preferred reintegration option or other economic activities, agriculture represents the primary survival strategy for the majority of demobilized soldiers. Of the 384 ex-combatants surveyed here, 356 (93 percent) said that agriculture was their principal economic activity. Another survey by Development Workshop in an urban/peri-urban context in Huambo city – where agriculture might be expected to be less important – showed that even in this group, around one third (32 percent) of demobilized soldiers depended on agriculture for their livelihoods. Agriculture is therefore crucial to the livelihoods of the majority of ex-combatants, over the short-term at least. Recognising that, the

UNDP/FAO 'special project' has provided 15,000 kits of seeds and tools to be distributed among ex-combatants in Huambo. Distribution was about to begin at the time of research and has since proceeded though with some logistical difficulties and particular difficulties in locating and targeting ex-combatants. It is not clear how the beneficiaries of this distribution were decided, since the total number of ex-combatants is higher, and the total number choosing agricultural support is lower. Concerns also exist that seeds were too late for the last planting season and too early for the next, and that the majority would be eaten instead of planted. Only monitoring of the distribution results will confirm whether these concerns were founded.

As a sector, agriculture certainly needs support however. If the current pressures are to be relieved, then productivity at the level of each family needs to be increased – possibly for resident families as well as returnees. Seeds and tools are a short-term input. These must be backed up by other strategies to increase the productivity of land and, if possible, the amount available for cultivation, including:

✍ PROVISION OF ACCESS TO ANIMAL TRACTION. If adequately available, this would greatly increase the amount of land each family could cultivate, from a sub-subsistence level to one permitting trade and diversification. This has been successfully done by some NGOs in Huambo, among them Solidarités, who transported cattle to the northerly Municipality of Mungo. Projects of this type must be done with involvement of community organisations to ensure access is equitable.

✍ REPOPULATION OF OTHER LIVESTOCK. Provision of chickens and goats to selected families and/or communities may additionally be part of an agricultural development and diversification programme.

✍ REINTRODUCTION OF SYSTEMS OF FERTILIZERS PRODUCTION. As with seeds and tools, the establishment of local systems of production of fertilizers is preferable to the provision of inputs by NGOs and Government, which need to be repeated from year to year. Much knowledge of this type was lost during the war, and its reintroduction to communities may need to be supported. Projects of this type are already active and reputedly successful.

✍ IRRIGATION. Simple, gravity fed irrigation systems were previously common in Huambo Province but have since fallen into disrepair. Given the unpredictability of rainfall in Huambo this would be an important way of increasing the reliability of agriculture in the Province. In 2003-2004 rains were too heavy, largely destroying the first harvest, and then too light so that the second harvest was

also inadequate. This, according to international NGOs, is a common pattern and necessitates continual emergency inputs by them. Irrigation construction through food-for-work programmes of the WFP in association with other NGOs has proven highly successful, necessitating only simple inputs of basic construction materials. Some systems built in the past may be sufficiently preserved that they can be rehabilitated.

✍ REHABILITATION OF ACCESS ROUTES AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE. This would significantly improve access to markets and increase possibilities for trade. At present large parts of the province are all but inaccessible during the rainy season. As discussed below, it may also enable an increase in the amount of land cultivated by opening up areas that are currently inaccessible.

✍ LAND DELIMITATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF AVAILABLE LAND. Although this study found that all land near the research sites was 'owned' by someone, certain Government and NGO representatives contest this. During the colonial period communities were frequently displaced from their land and villages and relocated to roads while their land was abandoned or converted into large *fazendas*. This land may in some cases be rehabilitated for cultivation, as may land that was part of UNITA bases and areas during the war. These areas are frequently difficult to reach so rehabilitation of access routes and infrastructures would be necessary. However, some of this land may be part of concessions granted by Government, their ownership status would need to be carefully verified if conflict is to be avoided.

✍ DEMINING. The scale of the landmine problem as it affects agriculture in Huambo is hard to estimate. Landmines were not mentioned as a constraint to agriculture in any of the communities where the research was conducted. However, this does not mean it is not a problem. Demining may open up formerly inaccessible areas for cultivation and would certainly enable greater access by Government, NGOs, and facilitate safer trade and market access especially during the rainy season. In terms of cultivated land landmines are considered the greatest problem around Huambo city where population density is highest and virtually every roadside is being cultivated. The city is in certain areas ringed by landmines.

5.4.2 Investment in developing non-farm rural employment activities

In the longer-term, the research findings suggest that in addition to agriculture, other economic reintegration strategies will be required for ex-combatants. Pressures for land and the poor quality of soil in much of Huambo Province limit its ability to absorb increased numbers of people, and do not offer a high future growth potential. Furthermore, as noted above, it seems that the range of occupations of ex-combatants in this area is less diverse now than it was before they joined UNITA. More thought must therefore go into alternative options, which may at once match more closely the skill set of demobilized soldiers and the opportunities available in the Angolan economy.

Many ex-combatants claim they would prefer some other of employment besides agriculture, and some would be willing to relocate to this end. Some ex-combatants interviewed in focus groups said that they were farming, but only because they were waiting for training courses, and that afterwards they hoped to enter their chosen field of work. They cited major barriers to gaining employment in other sectors of the Angolan economy besides agriculture. In Huambo city it is common to have to pay in order to be employed formally. The informal sector presents its own barriers in terms of the lack of capital and investment needed to begin work (e.g. tools for a mechanic, a vehicle for a *candongeiro*,³³ loans to be able to buy goods to start retail trading).

Some priorities for future rural development will be the following:

✍ RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Approximately 80 percent of the province's schools were destroyed in the war as well as rural health and other social infrastructure. Development Workshop's own experience in school reconstruction in three provinces, Huambo among them, shows that labour costs account for about a third of the total school costs while building materials account for close to half of the total costs (2001 prices). A significant number of ex-combatants and former IDPs can be employed in the construction sector if construction technologies are carefully selected to use building materials that are locally produced and labour-intensive, and if construction processes used are also labour-intensive. In most developing countries the construction sector is the second most important employer after agricultural labour. Construction employment can also be readily adapted to the seasonal availability of labour linked to agricultural demands.

³³ A *candongeiro* may be an informal market trader or a driver of commercial transport, usually a minibus.

Projects promoting the development and demonstration of building technologies, which maximise the use of local materials and labour, should be undertaken along with training programmes to develop the required skills. Government policies such as design and construction standards for public facilities and infrastructure should also be in support of technologies that have a higher local income and employment.

✍ REHABILITATION OF RURAL TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE. The rehabilitation of key roads and bridges is crucial to a revitalized rural economy. This will allow farmers access to inputs to grow their own food as well as transport their surplus for sale to markets. Road building should employ a significant amount of ex-combatant and IDP labour, especially if labour intensive road construction techniques are employed. Reconstruction of damaged bridges throughout the region must be prioritised in order to link isolated agricultural communities to the markets. Skill training and the management of labour for low cost road building and repair will be a key to creating significant employment in this sector as well as policy decisions to invest in job creation rather than investment in capital equipment.

✍ RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AND NETWORKS. Agricultural markets and networks need to be reestablished. An improved road system will stimulate the agriculture market but developing economic linkages between rural producers and the market places is equally important. Many IDPs and female family members of ex-combatants entered the informal market economy in provincial towns as a survival strategy during the war years. These existing market linkages should be reinforced and strengthened in the post-war period. Hygienic and efficient municipal market places, easily accessible from farming areas need to be constructed and means of transport for agricultural commodities needs to be made available for small scale and peasant farmers.

✍ MICRO-CREDIT. Creation of small businesses and even entry into the informal sector require access to cash and credit which ex-combatants will likely find difficult to access. Access to rural credit through micro-finance programmes and other forms of loans will be crucial to develop rural farm and non-farm enterprises of ex-combatants and former IDPs. Credit should be adapted in various forms to promote the:

- ✍ Purchase of agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, tools, purchase of land, animal traction and agricultural machinery etc.
- ✍ Transformation or processing of agricultural commodities, milling, drying etc.
- ✍ Non-farm enterprises, rural construction and service provision such as transport.
- ✍ Promotion of marketing enterprises, associations or cooperatives including commodity transportation.

5.4.3 Implications of the New Land Law

Apart from changes in traditional mechanisms of land inheritance, the proposed new Land Law may have important implications for land acquisition and tenure in rural areas. While the proposed draft Land Law recognises traditional and communal land ownership, it leaves intact the concession system established in the colonial period. Very little land in Huambo falls under the exclusive influence of traditional authorities or could be considered communally held. Peasant and family holdings were the pattern even before the colonial settlers started accumulating large land concessions by appropriating African farmers' lands and forcibly relocating them to other, often poorer land in the years before independence. It is anticipated that as resettlement progresses and competition for good lands increases, conflicts will emerge over lands with multiple claimants. As previously mentioned the land registry is obsolete and disorganised. The judicial system is extremely weak and municipal courts almost non-existent in provinces such as Huambo. The judicial system is presently incapable of dealing with land conflict cases on a large scale. It is important for the new Land Law to clarify its policy on the rights of the small scale and peasant farming sector, which, as described above, will provide security and subsistence to most of the ex-combatant families and former IDPs.

Under the proposed new Land Law, those IDPs and families of ex-combatants who have settled in peri-urban areas around the provincial centres or capital, run the risk of losing their occupation rights. Most of these populations have been unable to secure land titles for the land on which they may have lived for many years. In rural areas the implications are less clear, but the renewed cultivation of abandoned *fazendas* may displace people who have been cultivating these areas during the war. One case of this was found in communities where research was conducted but more are known to exist in Huambo Province. It was generally felt that this problem would increase. The new Land Law will provide the Government with increased powers of expropriation but does not in turn articulate guidelines on compensation. Rights of small-scale farmers must therefore be protected in the law. NGOs and other civil society institutions may have an additional role in

supporting negotiations with large landowners to reach an acceptable solution for all.

5.4.4 Civic Education and Peace-building

Delays in the implementation of the DDR programme may have increased the risks of local conflict between demobilized soldiers and local communities that they have settled in. Frustrated ex-combatants, disappointed with the immediate returns of resettlement and sensing that they do not benefit from the rights of full citizenship present a risk of local level conflict. On the other hand selective targeting of demobilized for handouts of goods may also increase this risk by making returned IDPs and resident community members feel penalised. Implementation of projects so far has not sufficiently taken this into consideration – in the report on the “Special Project” for instance it is acknowledged that some demobilized may have received seeds and tools once, several times or not at all and there is no way to know. This may cause conflicts between the demobilized in addition, who do not feel they have been treated equally.

This is in a country where hundreds of thousands of arms are not accounted for and with a history of violence and conflict. An extensive programme of “Civic Education” is crucial. Both IRSEM and the Ministry of Education have incorporated civic education into their national programmes. Civil society and church organisations are also being incorporated into the civic education movement with a broad approach of outreach to ex-combatants, their families, returning IDPs but also the community at large. The programme (with support from the Canadian Peacebuilding Fund) makes available didactic and informative materials on civic education in the form of micro-library kits as well as support from a network of “peace promoters” to implement an intensive programme of community level civic education in the areas of return and the residual “ex-quartering areas”. The civic education programme promotes the dissemination of information about basic citizen rights, land tenure, access to services such as education and health and democracy.

Civic education programmes should be promoted through both Government and civil society and religious institutions and should eventually tackle the serious issue of residual disarmament of both civilians and ex-combatants who may still have knowledge of hidden arms caches.

6 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusions

The disarmament and demobilization of over 100 000 former UNITA combatants undertaken single-handedly by the Government of Angola was completed relatively quickly and almost without incident. The number of conflicts appears low and the situation is generally more stable than many had feared. However, effective and sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants remains a long way off.

Family networks – the previous relationship of a person to the community and their family ties there – appear to be key to gaining access to land of a reasonable quantity and quality. The majority of respondents opted to return to places they had previously lived in with 84 percent returning to their place of birth. Most of the demobilized did gain access to land but the amount and quality of land they have secured is cause for concern. Only around half have access to over two hectares of land – the minimum needed to establish a sustainable economic livelihood for a family over the medium to long-term. An even smaller proportion actually cultivates this amount, primarily due to the lack of animal traction that would enable them to clear abandoned land and work larger areas. The average (mean) area of land actually cultivated by ex-combatants was 0.75 hectare (the median was even lower, 0.5 hectare). Overall, it seems that only 30 percent of those surveyed have access to land that is both of reasonable size and reasonable quality.

The majority of the demobilized therefore remain dependent on food aid from the WFP and NGOs; this situation is unlikely to change in the near future. Impending revisions of food aid criteria may have an impact on this, however, potentially cutting ties of ex-combatants and former IDPs to cities where they had received support and encouraging return to rural areas, or else forcing the invention of new survival strategies. The process will need to be closely monitored.

Among demobilized soldiers in areas surveyed, there are subgroups whose livelihoods may be said to be more precarious. There are those who have not returned to their birthplace or areas where they have previous ties, either because they cannot or do not wish to. Without family connections in their chosen return location, they are particularly vulnerable. They now live on temporary loans of land and housing, a situation like that of IDPs during the war (some of whom may also still be living in such conditions). There may be an additional group of these people who were not covered by the survey in and around the provincial capital and some municipal capitals (Caála and Bailundo in particular) that appear to have

attracted higher than expected numbers of people. It is not clear what will happen to this group since at present alternative areas for their resettlement does not appear to have been allocated.

Women appear to be particularly vulnerable. Reintegration options only target the man of the family, not their wives. Since so few women (0.4 percent) were registered combatants, currently they will only really benefit if they have remained in a family unit with a demobilized UNITA combatant. Women's roles in agriculture and other economic activities largely go unrecognised. Traditions that deprive women the right to directly own or inherit land persist in Huambo. If single, widowed, separated or abandoned, they are particularly vulnerable in the land allocation and inheritance process. More often they seem to be the target of abuses and hostility in communities where they resettle. In addition some women may have been forced into relationships with combatants during the war and may prefer to separate.

The disabled and underaged are potentially among the most disadvantaged groups of ex-combatants but very little data is available on these groups. Assistance to the disabled is provided through existing Government and NGO support mechanisms. The Government's DDR process makes no provision for those aged below 20 years. Furthermore, the duration of the war meant that most returning child ex-soldiers have now reached the age of majority. Having little education or civilian job skills and possibly psychologically traumatised by their war experience, many could have added difficulties in rejoining community life.

The agricultural sector does not appear to currently have the capacity to absorb large numbers of new arrivals without significant investment to increase productivity on existing cultivated areas as well as to increase the amount of arable land. The reoccupation of *fazendas* (large farms, commercial concessions) and competition for land as resettlement progresses can put small-scale and peasant farmers at risk and provoke conflicts over occupation rights. Many conflicts that have occurred so far have been resolved often by traditional local authorities (*sobas*), and/or expressed themselves in other ways – accusations of witchcraft rather than outright violence. These patterns may either intensify (e.g. witchcraft may remain a proxy for other tensions) or there may be a shift towards more open conflict. Long standing social and political tensions may further exacerbate community level reintegration and the consolidation of peace. Local conflict resolution mechanisms are not always able to resolve these conflicts while the judiciary's capacity to deal with a large number of land conflicts is currently non-existent. More work will be needed in strengthening and supporting local conflict resolution mechanisms and in educating the returnees about their occupation rights and the implications of the new Land Law.

Given an overall lack of formal sector opportunities and the presence of barriers to entry into the informal economy, few alternatives currently exist for reintegration outside the agricultural sector. If data from this study are indicative of an emerging trend, agriculture will be a common denominator for many, even if only as a survival strategy for the short term for some returnees. However, given the limited absorptive capacity in agriculture, it must be acknowledged that livelihoods for ex-combatants will depend on a combination of strategies. At the very least, there is a need for programs that will combine targeted intensive agricultural support and extension on the one hand, and on the other, programs for the diversification of vocational training opportunities coupled with access to support, credit and materials over the medium-term. Effective and sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants and other returnees will require the creation of non-farm rural employment opportunities to absorb surplus labour, particularly in the off-season.

Increasing agricultural output will be critical in terms of food security at the household level. In this regard, the farming systems approach may be useful in identifying elements that can raise overall productivity (e.g., improved tillage practices, fertilizers and soil fertility, cropping systems, crop-livestock combinations, irrigation and drainage, animal traction, etc.).

The provision of credit can, at this time, play a catalytic role in stimulating the rural economy since viable farm and non-farm enterprises can only be established to the extent that capital is available for the purchase of critical inputs. Current microfinance programs in Angola –mostly in urban and peri-urban areas – have demonstrated innovative and sustainable ways of providing credit and related business development services to those who are otherwise excluded from the conventional banking institutions and moneylenders. The adaptation of similar programmes to rural areas should be a priority.

6.2 Recommendations

The recommendations from the study will need to be complemented by a broader agricultural and rural development policy that strikes a balance between the support for the subsistence farmers, small landholders, and rural communities on the one hand and the development of the commercial sector, on the other. Without significant increase in investment in the rural areas sustainable livelihoods will be difficult to achieve.

6.2.1 Policies & Programmes

14. Monitor resettlement of demobilized soldiers and systematically collect information on their means of support and coping strategies in order to identify factors that facilitate/restrict their progress towards reintegration. This information will allow more effective and focused program development.
15. Allow ex-combatants more flexibility in the choice of reintegration options since agriculture has limited absorptive capacity. Those who are unable to support themselves over the medium to long term in agriculture – whether because of access to, quantity or quality of land, or inability to cultivate it, should be given flexibility to choose other reintegration options.
16. Redesign reintegration programmes to address the needs of vulnerable subgroups – women, those with ‘nowhere to go,’ underage and disabled ex-combatants – who are currently either underserved or do not qualify in existing programmes. In some cases some of their problems are not acknowledged. Work needs to be done to raise awareness about the particular vulnerabilities of these subgroups.
 - ✍ Extend access to reintegration programmes to women regardless of whether they were registered as combatants. DDR programmes should give priority support to women’s livelihood activities to reinforce their existing roles in rural and urban marketing.
 - ✍ Identify ways of facilitating the social support and reintegration of the former child soldiers and the disabled. Priority should be given to supporting/enhancing community based support mechanisms where they already exist.
 - ✍ Where appropriate, identify areas for resettlement of demobilized and other returnees who may be unable to access land in rural areas and ‘have nowhere to go.’

17. Design strategies to influence public policies that affect the vulnerable groups for example, policies the rights of women to own land, children protection.

18. Agriculture based reintegration programmes need to diversify beyond the distribution of seeds and tools.

- ✍ Increase availability of farm power particularly animal traction.
- ✍ Provide fertilizers for smaller, poorer quality plots. Reactivation of traditional means of fertilizer production is preferable to commercial inputs.
- ✍ Establish simple, gravity-fed irrigation systems to counteract erratic rainfall. In some areas larger scale projects including damming of rivers, may be feasible and appropriate.
- ✍ Initiate community rehabilitation of the remains of irrigation systems in former *fazendas*, if these are not privately owned.
- ✍ Make the development of drought tolerant low-input crop varieties a research priority.
- ✍ Re-establish agricultural markets and networks by developing economic linkages between rural producers and the market places.
- ✍ Improve capacity to provide agricultural extension services.
- ✍ Revitalize the Huambo Agricultural College as an agricultural and rural development college.

19. Establish rural credit programmes targeted to help small landholders and small-scale producers to increase agricultural productivity as well as to develop rural farm and non-farm enterprises. There are ongoing microfinance programs (mostly urban or peri-urban based) that can provide useful lessons. Credit should promote:

- ✍ Purchase of agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, tools, purchase of land, animal traction and agricultural machinery etc.
- ✍ Transformation or processing of agricultural commodities, milling, drying etc.

- ✍ Non-farm enterprises, rural construction and service provision such as transport.
 - ✍ Marketing enterprises, associations or cooperatives including commodity transportation.
20. Provide related financial, business development, and training services to assist the establishment of farm and non-farm enterprises.
21. Develop a non-farm rural employment strategy linked to the massive reconstruction and rehabilitation needs in the provinces, these can include:
22. Formulate design and construction standards for public facilities and infrastructure that utilize technologies, which generate higher local income and employment benefits and implement demonstration projects that utilize these technologies.
- ✍ Rehabilitation of schools and clinics, public buildings & markets
 - ✍ Labour-intensive rural road construction and maintenance especially of farm- to- market roads
 - ✍ Construction of water supply systems and hand dug wells
 - ✍ Vocational training in support of the above mentioned activities. Training programmes should incorporate development of functional literacy given the very low levels of education of the population.
23. Provide support to/strengthen local conflict resolution mechanisms and monitor closely the progress of reintegration and reconciliation within communities. NGOs and civil society organisations should not undertake projects seen to privilege ex-combatants, but must also ensure they are not excluded from projects and associations.
24. Promote civic education programmes through Government, civil society and religious institutions, including generating awareness about the proposed Land Law.

6.2.2 Access to Land

1. Continue to monitor the means by which land is inherited and passed on, and the implications of the new land law in the light of this.
2. Protect and promote the rights of small scale and peasant farming sector in the proposed Land Law.
3. Articulate guidelines on compensation when properties are expropriated.
4. Allocate resources to update the system of land registration, including development of a *simple* means of regularisation of rural land titles accessible to all.
5. Support Government and relevant institutions in the process of delimitation and regularisation of communities' land, with involvement of local traditional leaders.
6. Ensure national/Provincial land and agricultural policies do not increase pressure on land in Huambo.
7. Where appropriate, identify areas for resettlement of demobilized and other returnees who may be unable to access land in rural areas and 'have nowhere to go.'
8. Monitor the development and growth of the commercial farming sector and its implications for communities' land access and tenure.
9. Improve access routes to enable communities to cultivate more fertile areas of land located further from villages.

6.2.3 Areas for Further Research

1. Monitor and evaluate the impact of distribution/withdrawal of food aid by WFP.
2. Research on the functioning of communities, local power structures and conflict resolution mechanisms to determine the impact of projects and programmes on communities as a whole.
3. Research on the demobilized who have not chosen to return to rural areas.

7 POSTSCRIPT

After presentation of preliminary findings of this study to the ARDP partners, IRSEM, MINARS and the World Bank, Government authorities requested Development Workshop to develop a plan to extend the study geographically to cover a further four provinces in order to get a national perspective on the issues of land and demobilization. They further asked DW to develop a monitoring system to track the evolution of the resettlement and land access using this study as a base line and returning periodically to follow changes.