Building civil society – starting with the basics

Sustainable community services in Luanda, Angola

ONE WORLD ACTION
FOR A JUST AND EQUAL WORLD

Executive summary

The long-standing war in Angola has forced much of the population into overcrowded cities. At independence in 1975, Luanda, the capital, was home to half a million people. Today it has closer to four million. The vast majority live in shanty towns, where there is an almost complete lack of basic services such as piped water, sanitation facilities, and rubbish removal. The Angolan government has lacked the capacity to deal with the situation.

Development Workshop Angola (DW) – a part of an international network with offices in Canada and France – was established in 1981 and has worked continuously in the country since then. For many years, it was the only foreign non-governmental organisation (NGO) in Angola. Since the early 1990s, DW has implemented a series of successful programmes in the shanty towns to improve access to basic services. To date, DW has built 220 water standpipes, which bring clean and affordable water to around 120,000 people. To address the sanitation problem, DW has helped build close to 10,000 latrines, and pioneered solutions for solid waste removal.

The central strategy is to build partnerships of the stakeholders in a programme and encourage collaboration and trust between them. Typically, such stakeholders are community organisations and local government, and often public or private service providers. DW serves as facilitator, promoter and educator throughout the process. As the institutional and technical capacity of the partners develops, DW gradually passes the responsibility over to them.

The water and sanitation work is being taking forward by DW through the current Sustainable Community Services Programme (SCSP), a part of the Luanda Urban Poverty Programme, funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Models for services delivery are being further developed, and the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in partnerships are being more clearly defined.

DW's work has at least three key implications. Firstly, the success of the programmes and their linking with local and provincial government has had a catalytic effect on official policy for water and sanitation. Secondly, the programmes provide cost-effective ways for developing and testing out models for future scaling-up by the government or international funders. Thirdly, the work has built the organisational skills of the communities and given them practice in engaging with local government. By doing so, the programmes have helped strengthen civil society in Angola, which in turn is a prerequisite for democracy and stability in the country.

Gunnar Aegisson
One World Action

Contents

GUNNAR AEGISSON

One World Action

One World Action is working for a world free from poverty and oppression in which strong democracies safeguard the rights of all people.

To this end, we provide practical help to organisations committed to strengthening the democratic process and improving people's lives in poor and developing countries. Equally, we bring our partners and their concerns to the attention of policy makers in Europe. Crucially we see these goals as indivisible; only by giving people a say in the decisions that affect them can we hope to bring about lasting and positive change.

We believe that through such partnerships for change at a local and global level we work for a just and equal world.

Development Workshop

DW's mission is to improve living conditions for the disadvantaged by:

- empowering communities and organisations to address their development problems and opportunities; and,
- using practical experience to advocate for social justice.

Scope of work: shelter, habitat and environment, settlement planning, water and sanitation, public health, small enterprise, disaster preparedness, information technologies, gender and democracy.

DW works with: communities, grassroots organisations, non-government organisations (NGOs), local and national governments, international institutions and the private sector.

DW's approach:

- Based on a long-term commitment with core programmes in key locations.
- Builds on indigenous knowledge, expertise and existing solidarity mechanisms.
- Adapts traditional ways of working to new requirements and to available resources.
- Maintains development actions in situations of continuing crisis.
- Highly decentralised, locally-responsive programmes where decisions are made on-site.
- Works as a learning organisation which emphasises the links between theory and action and the importance of capacity building.
- Stays up-to-date with current theory and best practice through close ties with academic and professional institutions and civic organisations.

The Luanda Urban Poverty Programme

The Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (LUPP) is a three year programme, launched in July 1999 and funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID).
DFID started supporting urban poverty reduction projects in Angola in the mid-1990s, through grants to NGOs. The LUPP builds on that experience and aims to put in place replicable and sustainable ways of improving economic livelihoods, and access to services, of the urban poor.

Three international NGOs implement the LUPP: Development Workshop Angola (DW), CARE and Save the Children. DW works in partnership with One World Action and has done so since 1989.

The Sustainable Communities Services Programme (SCSP) is a sub-programme of the LUPP, implemented by DW. This report focuses on the SCSP, and on DW's long experience in sustainable community services in Angola.

1 Angola: an introduction

War and urbanisation

Over 30 years of war have devastated Angola, one of Africa's potentially richest countries. The conflict has forced large numbers of people to migrate into overcrowded urban areas, which suffer from some of the worst health and environmental problems in the world. The vast majority live in shanty towns, where basic services are almost completely lacking and people face great difficulties in securing economic livelihoods.

Until recently it was implicitly assumed that at least some of the urbanisation would be reversed with the end of the war. There is now a growing realisation that this is not necessarily the case. The social structures of the rural communities have been shattered along with the economic ones, and people have been dispersed. The inhabitants of the shanty towns, many of whom are of the second or third generation, have built, or are trying to build, their lives there. They are unlikely to uproot themselves again and leave for the devastated countryside from

BOB VAN DER WINDEN

Most inhabitants of the capital's overcrowded shanty towns have arrived from different parts of the country, carried by the ebbs and flows of the war

KATE ASHTON

Harbour view of the capital: the central part of Luanda was built in the colonial years but now the shanty towns stretch for miles beyond the horizon

which many of them fled, and where the clearing of landmines may take decades to accomplish. Thus, the urbanisation, now at over 60 per cent[1], is in all likelihood irreversible.

Despite this realisation, however, there is as yet no strategic view of the future of Angola's urban areas, and the government lacks both the capacity and coherent policies to deal with the problems.

A negotiated settlement seems the only way to bring peace – the international community and the growing civil society in Angola must play key roles.

Economy and politics

The economy has been badly affected by the civil war, and the centralised one-party state model that was pursued from independence in 1975 until the beginning of the 1990s left a legacy of economic mismanagement that still continues. Centralised planning has been replaced in the last decade by a poorly controlled free-market system. This has yet to show results other than increased benefits to the political elite and their business associates. Meanwhile, the state-led formal sector has foundered. Differences in wealth and vulnerability have been strongly accentuated. An informal economic sector has emerged which is unreliable and operates in an ill-defined institutional environment. Largely based on the reselling of imported articles, it produces a very limited range of goods and services.

Towards the end of the colonial period, the country had efficient agricultural and mining sectors, and a small manufacturing sector. These have largely collapsed. Angola is now almost totally dependent on an oil industry that produces about 90 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings. With a current production of 800,000 barrels a day – forecast to rise rapidly – Angola is the second largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, this wealth has brought little or no benefit to ordinary people.

Military expenditures dominate the budget. As the largest arms purchaser in Sub-Saharan Africa, the government has mortgaged the oil income for years to come. With extraction fees from foreign oil operators making up the predominant part of its revenues, the government does not have to depend on a functioning national economy.

While oil provides the government with its income, diamonds have been a key source of revenue for the rebel movement UNITA (the National Union for Total Independance of Angola). The geographic location of these resources has facilitated the warring parties' control of them. The oil is offshore, where it can be protected effectively by the government, which has always had its power base in the coastal areas. The diamonds are primarily found in the remote interior, where UNITA has had its strongholds.

Angola's first multi-party elections were held in 1992, after about a year and a half of cease-fire, which was the only period of peace the country had known since independence. The result was a victory for the ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Although international observers had deemed the elections fair, UNITA contested the results and went back to war. The next two years saw the fiercest fighting yet in the conflict. Following an uneasy peace from 1994-97, disrupted by local fighting, full-scale war flared up again in 1998. After heavy initial setbacks, the government forces gained the upper hand and, by the end of 2000, controlled most of the country.

There are more than a million children orphaned by the civil war.

GUNNAR AEGISSON

The gap between rich and poor has grown rapidly in recent years

The primary income earners in most households in the shanty towns are women working in the informal trading sector.

UNDP-Angola, *Angola: Beyond emergency and rehabilitation*, Luanda, February 2000

UNITA's defeats in the last two years reflect its diminishing revenue base from diamonds and its increasing political isolation. In 1997, the UN Security Council imposed a full package of sanctions on UNITA, including freezing its bank accounts, forbidding foreign travel by its officials and closing its offices abroad. At the time of writing, the international community is being increasingly successful in blocking UNITA's diamond trade. But although UNITA's power appears reduced, it is far from finished and will probably be able to fight a guerrilla war for years to come. A negotiated settlement would seem the only way to bring peace, and in this the international community and the growing civil society in Angola must play key roles.

Today, UNICEF's Child Risk Measure ranks Angola as the country whose children are at the greatest risk of death, malnutrition, abuse and development failure.

UNICHEF, 2000. *A Humanitarian Appeal for Children and Women, January-December 2000 – Angola*

The toll of the civil war

- hundreds of thousands of people killed
- more than a million children orphaned
- about 100,000 war-disabled persons
- an estimated 3.7 million inhabitants internally displaced
- some 300,000 refugees in neighbouring countries

Social development and civil society

The conflict has prevented the development of democracy in Angola. The perpetual emergency of civil war has arguably served as an excuse for the government's lack of transparency and accountability. The polarisation of politics has suppressed the political middle ground and hindered the evolution of democratic institutions. Given this situation, most Angolans take limited interest in public affairs. The government is seen as remote and lacking the will to develop public services. Government structures are chronically underfunded and the lower levels barely function.

Salaries in the public sector have declined to abysmal levels in the past decade, and public salaries are usually paid many months in arrears, when the persistent inflation has further diminished their value. The meagre salaries invite corruption and most civil servants are forced to supplement their wages with earnings from other activities.

The collapse of the formal economy and the social disruption caused by war have brought changes in gender relations. The traditional division of labour, in which women work in the home in food production while men are involved in trade and cash crops, has given way, in the urban context, to a division where women are involved in trading outside the home, whereas men tend to work for the formal sector or are unemployed. The primary income earners in most households in the shanty towns are women working in the informal trading sector.

These changes have given women more independence but also increased their workload. They work long hours in petty trade, which is becoming an increasingly saturated sector. In addition, they are expected to be responsible for childcare



GUNNAR AEGISSON

Well over half of Luanda's working population depends on the informal sector for survival – most are women, working as street vendors

and home management. Meanwhile, men have become increasingly uncertain about their role.

The civil war has also changed social and community organisation. It has often been assumed that traditional community structures have been adapted or transformed when people move to urban areas, and that this has been helped by communities tending to migrate together as a group. New research[2] contradicts this; according to the study, by the time displaced people get to Luanda, they have actually moved three or four times, and such groups as there may have been in the beginning have broken up. The newcomers arrive as families or individuals. Little evidence has been found of traditional community structures, adapted or not, in urban areas. Instead it would seem that they have largely broken down and not been replaced. The result is quite low levels of informal voluntary co-operation and mutual aid. The extended family is by far the most important social structure. Apart from this, churches, many of them aided by sister denominations abroad, have become increasingly important parts of social and community life.

The social structures of the rural communities have been shattered – along with economic ones – and people have dispersed. The conflict and migration have prevented the development of democracy in Angola.

2 Life in the musseques

Urban expansion

A grandmother in the extended family, which is by far the strongest social structure in the musseques

At independance in 1975, Luanda, the capital of Angola, was home to half a million people. It now has nearer to 4 million inhabitants – well over a quarter of the country's population. Little has been added to the infrastructure in those 25 years, and much of what there was has deteriorated. The infrastructure is thus more or less limited to the pre-independence 'Cement City', home to the more affluent sections of society. This area consists of multi-story buildings and larger permanent houses built by the Portuguese settlers, mainly between 1960 and 1974. In this period, the first shanty towns were spreading on the outskirts, built by Angolans pushed from their homes in the central area, and by migrants from the countryside, among them many young men with schooling seeking to escape the colonial authorities' increasing persecution of literate indigenous people in the rural areas.



GUNNAR AEGISSON

The Cement City is now surrounded by vast and densely built shanty towns, known as *musseques*, after a Kimbundu[3] word for the sandy soil they are built on. Stretching for miles from the centre, they present a uniform grey vista of rectangular shacks or simple houses. The building material is sand and cement blocks and the roofs are corrugated iron sheets.

The musseques have grown without planning: the roadways are usually narrow and follow twisted routes. Most are unmade and lack drainage. Such drainage as there is tends to be blocked by refuse so that rainwater collects during the wet season,

which exacerbates health problems, particularly malaria. Public facilities are virtually non-existent and conditions in many places are at or near emergency levels. The environment of the musseques is almost totally degraded: apart from the occasional tree, there is no visible vegetation. Land tenures and leases are unclear and in many cases do not exist.

Most inhabitants of the musseques have arrived from different parts of the country in successive waves, carried by the ebbs and flows of the long war. Upon arrival, newcomers usually search out such relatives as may be living there. The relatives, usually, feel an obligation to receive them. However, this is not easy for either part. The relatives are likely to live in dire poverty and the newcomers are usually destitute and unable to contribute to the cost of living. The joy of being reunited therefore tends to be short lived and relations quickly become strained. For this reason, the stay with the relatives is as short as possible, from a few weeks up to a year. Since the neighbourhood is likely to be overcrowded, the newcomers have to find a place elsewhere. Also, because of the strain on the relationship, people may wish to move away:[4] 'I moved from my cousin's place down there because I thought I should see my cousin only on Sundays'. This tendency for relatives to become dispersed partly explains the lack of community cohesion in the musseques.

Nevertheless, the relatives can provide a crucial entry point for integration and settling, introducing the newcomers to the ways of the city and supplying vital information on how to survive. Sometimes they can loan the newcomers a small sum of money and show them how to enter the informal market: what is a good product, where is the best place to buy it and the best place to sell it. People who do not have access to such information are vulnerable and likely to become marginalised.

Poverty

The most comprehensive study on living conditions and poverty in Angola dates from 1995.[5] Sixty per cent of urban households were below the poverty line (see panel), and there was a wide gap between rich and poor. This gap is growing. According to the 1995 study, the richest tenth of the population earned 10 times more than the poorest tenth. By 1998, this differential had increased to 37 times.[6]

● 60 per cent of urban households are below the poverty line. That is, they cannot afford the minimum calorific intake.

● 12 per cent of the urban population are under the extreme poverty line. This is defined as roughly one-third of average food expenditure.

The poorer families spend 70 per cent of their income on food. Health costs have been rising with increased privatisation of services, and transport costs are high. Only around a third of working age people in Luanda are employed in the formal sector and salaries are abysmally low. The rest, apart from students or the economically inactive, work in the informal sector, which can often mean severe under-employment or unemployment.[7]

A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report from 1999[8] lists some of the causes of poverty and growing inequality: a high inflation rate which erodes real wages, irresponsible neglect in the provision of public services such as health and education, lack of active trade unions, and a high incidence of corruption, which allows a tiny circle of well-connected individuals to rapidly accumulate wealth.

Almost 30 per cent of children will die before they are five, and life expectancy is roughly 46 years.

Health

Even allowing for the lack of accurate information, Angola's health indicators are among the worst in the world. The mortality rate for children under 5 years old is almost 30 per cent, and life expectancy is roughly 46 years. Malaria is the primary cause of mortality and morbidity, followed closely by acute respiratory infection and diarrhoeal disease. There has also been a rise in endemic diseases such as cholera, polio and sleeping sickness, which were previously under control.

In Luanda, insufficient and contaminated water, lack of drainage and inadequate sanitation have resulted in high and steadily rising rates of water-born and excreta-related diseases. Over the last decade, infant and child mortality have increased rapidly owing to diarrhoea. The incidence of diarrhoea is many times higher in some musseque areas than in the Cement City and the rate of malaria is on average twice as high.

State expenditure on health provision is low and has been declining. For example, the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) allocated to the health sector fell from 3.3 per cent in 1985 to 2 per cent in 1994 and to 1.6 per cent in 1996, and the real expenditure in the six years up to 1996 was estimated to be only 75 per cent of the budgeted amount. By 1999 the health expenditures were down to 1.5 per cent of GDP.[9] Through the 1990s, the government increasingly introduced privatisation and public cost-sharing of health services. Over the same period, health care for the poor has deteriorated.[10]

There are 5,000 people per doctor in Luanda. The coverage in the musseques is, however, much poorer than this average, since the medical services in Luanda are largely concentrated in the Cement City. Community participation in basic-level health services has up to now hardly existed. However, NGOs, church organisations and traditional medicine are playing an increasing role.

The musseques rely on some 10,000 water vendors, who mostly buy untreated water from tanker trucks that draw water from the river. A family can spend a quarter of its income on such water.

Health and human development in Angola
Key indicators

Total population	12.1 million
Gross national product (GNP) per capita	US$380
Life expectancy at birth	47 years
Population without access to safe water	69 per cent
Population without access to health services	76 per cent
Population without access to sanitation	60 per cent
Underweight children under age five	42 per cent
Infant mortality rate	170 per 1000
Mortality rate of under-fives	292 per 1000
Human development index	160th out of 174 countries

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2000*

GUNNAR AEGISSON



No train today – no train for the last 25 years, as Angola's railway system has been destroyed by the war, along with most of the other transport infrastructure

Water, sanitation and solid waste disposal

Luanda's water system was built before independence and mainly serves the Cement City. The principal source is the Bengo river, about 20 kilometres from the centre. While wells are not an option in Luanda, as the groundwater is deep and brackish, river water is plentiful. Production plants treat the water and pump it through a pipeline to the city. The water supply system is now in very poor condition and the parastatal operating company, EPAL (Empresa Provincial de Aqua de Luanda), has for long been unable to operate effectively. The main reasons are the lack of capital investment and a tariff system that is very far from reflecting the production costs.

The Cement City thus enjoys a heavily subsidised, albeit rather unreliable, water supply.

The musseques rely on some 10,000 water vendors, the majority of whom buy untreated water from tanker trucks that draw water from the river. The vendors in turn re-sell by the bucket from underground water tanks in their houses. The prices range from US$4 to US$20 per cubic metre; this is up to 10,000 times more than the official price of piped water in the Cement City.[11] A family can spend a quarter of its income on water.

Less than 50 per cent of households in the musseques have on-site excreta disposal. Some of these have pour-flush latrines that do not work properly through the lack of water or overflow owing to lack of facilities

Mountains of waste on the rubbish dumps are a major hazard to health and the environment in the musseques.

to empty them. The flush latrines that do work usually empty out into open ditches and gullies because of the lack of a sewage system, and contribute to the high level of diarrhoeal disease. So do people without latrines, who are forced to defecate in the streets or in rubbish heaps.

Solid waste disposal in Luanda is the responsibility of ELISAL (Empresa de Limpeza e Saneamento de Luanda), a department of the Luanda Provincial Government. In 1997, after years of ineffective service, ELISAL appointed a private-sector contractor, Urbana 2000, to undertake collection and disposal. The operation is largely based on skips and is primarily focused on the Cement City. There is no regular collection in the musseques, and the skip sites that exist are too few and far between to be of much use. Waste tends to be dumped in open spaces in the densely populated areas, where it is left to rot and blow around. The sites are a major health and environmental hazard.

Local government and administration

Historically, the musseques were regarded as transitional settlements destined for replacement, and so not worth government investment. Now, as most of Luanda's population lives in the musseques, it is clear that conditions need to be improved.

This is acknowledged in the Government's National Community Rehabilitation Plan, which underscores specific priority interventions for the musseques in Luanda.

With virtually no rubbish removal service in the musseques, people have no choice but to dump their waste on unofficial heaps where it causes least inconvenience

ELEANOR CURTIS

Likewise, the Provincial Government's programme of 1997 for the development of Luanda stresses the participation of service beneficiaries and the private sector in the process. Technical staff and administrators at the central and provincial levels have formulated plans and proposed policies. However, little political will exists to approve and implement the plans and policies, and the necessary legislative and institutional structures are not in place.

The administration is highly centralised. Luanda is a province headed by a Governor who is appointed by Angola's president. Luanda, in turn, comprises nine *municípios*,[12] or boroughs. Each município is headed by an Administrator, appointed by the Governor. The municípios are further subdivided into a total of 24 *comunas*. This is the lowest level of government administration, and is appointed by the municipal Administrator. The comunas are subdivided into *bairros* (districts), and then sometimes into sectors. These can have up to around 30,000 inhabitants. In turn, the sectors are divided into blocks, each of which may have around 150 families.

The provincial government receives its budget from the central government. In turn, the municípios receive their budgets from the provincial government. The provincial government has little financial autonomy. The local authorities have practically none. They have no tax- or fund-raising powers, and what money is raised locally (for example, from fees for market stalls and fines) is remitted to the provincial level, and from there to the Finance Ministry. The result is that local governments cannot keep revenues and have no disposable resources. The role of the administrators is thus limited to lobbying for work to be done and complaining if necessary.

BOB VAN DER WINDEN

A Cement City highrise flat was often an important benefit for public sector employees and made up for low wages, but in the 1990s many lost their jobs and wages for those remaining have fallen; the buildings have been privatised and are becoming homes for the better-off

Below the institutional administrative structure, there are growing signs of democratic development.

The lowest administrative level – the comuna – barely functions. Salaries are often delayed and there is no allocated budget. Some comunas in the musseques have no administration at all, because population growth surpasses the institutional capacity to deal with it.

Residents' committees

The system of administration, appointed from above and having no financial independence, leaves people little or no say in matters of governance. However, below the administrative structure, signs of a democratic development are showing. Local residents' committees, at the levels of comuna, sector, and block, are in many places becoming increasingly important organs for community action and the articulation of citizen interests.



GUNNAR AEGISSON

Local government is still appointed from above, and with the lack of community organisations, the people of the musseques have little means of influence to push for the provision of basic services

The residents' committees were set up in 1983, by the MPLA one-party government, and were essentially outreach structures of the party. By the end of the 1980s they had more or less withered away and seem to have virtually disappeared around the time of the elections in 1992, when a movement towards a more democratic local government system was expected. Because of the return of war, however, the anticipated reform did not happen.

In the late 1990s the residents' committees were revived again and are now by and large up and running in the musseques. Each residents' committee is unique. In some cases they are selected by the community, by consensus or election. In others, they are appointed by the local government. It is, however, reasonable to assume that such appointments are not made against the will of the community, but that individuals are selected that are trusted by both local people and the local government. Some committees are a mix of selected and appointed members.

The role of the residents' committees is relatively open to the definition of individual communities, but in many cases they are inactive, and neighbourhoods wishing to embark on community activities often make it their first step to sack the dormant committee and select a new one.

Apart from increasing the cohesion of their respective communities and serving as a first exercise in local democracy, the residents' committees are increasingly engaging the local administration in community affairs. This includes, for example, getting help with regulation, security and licences of various kinds. For the comuna administration, previously without a clear role, this may bring practical experience in community affairs and new sense of purpose.

3 Development Workshop Angola

The non-governmental organisation context

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are relatively new to Angola. Very few international NGOs were active in the country before 1990. As for local NGOs, they were first allowed only in 1991, under the Law of Freedom of Association. Before that time, the only independent civil society organisations were church-based ones. Angolan NGOs are now numerous, but still weak. Their main problems are their limited experience and the sheer size of the task they face, but also, arguably, the origins and funding of a great many of them.

The growth of the local NGOs was fuelled by emergency funding from donors, following the violence after the 1992 elections. International agencies and international NGOs financed massive relief operations, which have kept their momentum to the present day. Much of the funding of Angolan NGOs comes from such sources, and many were directly formed in response to the international organisations' need for local partners. This relationship has rarely included measures to provide the institutional growth and sustainability of the local partner. The experience of local NGOs thus tends to be in the implementation of internationally funded relief programmes dealing with the immediate effects of the war. This background does not necessarily transfer easily to development programmes. Also, relief operations have targeted the war-torn provinces much more than the national capital, which has been spared direct warfare but has had to cope with the massive influx of refugees. Very few international organisations have targeted urban problems in Luanda.

Approaches to development

Development Workshop Angola (DW) was established in 1981 and has worked continuously in the country since then. It was for years the only foreign NGO in Angola. It is part of a small, decentralised network of organisations – Development Workshop – which has offices in Canada and France, and currently operates in Angola, the Sahel and Vietnam. DW Angola is the largest unit in the network. It has expanded rapidly in the last decade and now employs around 160 people.

The roots of the Development Workshop network lie in addressing the problem of improving indigenous architecture to provide appropriate and affordable housing for the poor. This focus has been maintained

Very few international NGOs have targeted the urban problems of Luanda.

DW has a long-term approach, extending far beyond the usual funding cycle of two or three years.

in Angola, but the emphasis has moved towards community participation and a holistic development approach to human settlements. The approach is based on the understanding that it is not possible to separate technology from institution- and capacity-building with stakeholders.

Long-term commitment

The overall model, which DW uses when approaching a problem, begins with research, in the field, gathering documentary evidence, and consultation with stakeholders. The next step is experimentation with particular approaches. This is followed by pilot projects, which address the technical issues, social mobilisation and institutional development, and financial sustainability.

The resulting solutions are then demonstrated and replicated to examine their viability, either by DW or by partner organisations. If the replication is successful, DW begins a scaling-up process with local partners. The experiences are then fed back into further research and programme planning.

This is a long-term approach to development, extending well beyond the normal donor funding cycle of two to three years. DW's experience in the urban areas in Angola has shown that there are no quick fixes: sustainable development requires the building of social capacities, which takes time. DW is able to take this approach because of its long-standing presence in the country. There is a low turnover of senior staff, who are Angolans or resident expatriates – some of whom have been in the country since the early 1980s. This is uncommon among international NGOs, where such staff are usually rotated every two or three years.

Community mobilisers

Most of DW's programmes use community mobilisers to reach out to, and work with, the communities and they are a key component of the programmes. The approach has evolved through time.

During the early 1990s, DW relied extensively on a large number of community 'activists', who would implement projects directly. Many were paid through a food-for-work arrangement. However, DW felt that this approach did not involve the communities to a sufficient degree and would not

ELEANOR CURTIS

Street theatre groups work with DW's mobilisers to engage the communities and promote solutions to common problems

PAUL ROBSON

This DW standpipe will provide water for around 500 people, at a fraction of the price charged by water vendors

leave them with sustainable organisational structures. From 1995 onwards, DW moved on to using a smaller corps of professional mobilisers who, rather than implementing projects, motivate and guide the communities to take action and organise themselves.

The training of the mobilisers includes participatory techniques of working, planning, data collection, essential bookkeeping, and health education. Their role is to reach out to all sections of the communities and get involved with them, explaining programmes, feeding information from the communities back into the programmes, and providing opportunities for communities to meet with other groups trying to solve the same problems. Many also have to deal with conflict resolution, as the programmes may alter power relations in the community.[13]

Building partnerships

DW's central strategy is to build partnerships with the stakeholders in a programme and encourage collaboration and trust between them. Typically, such stakeholders are community organisations and local government, and often public or private service providers. DW serves as facilitator, promoter and educator throughout the process. As the institutional and technical capacity of the partners develops, DW gradually passes the responsibility over to them.

While solving problems, activities are also an exercise in community co-operation and organisation – they contribute to the strengthening of civil society.

Community organisations

Most of the community organisations that DW supports are small, and have a well-defined, practical scope of activities. Examples include water committees, which have been set up to organise a water supply service, or parents' committees involved in maintaining or extending the local school. Besides solving a concrete problem, such activities are also an important exercise in community co-operation and organisation, which in turn contributes to the strengthening of civil society.

Community action is crucial to improvements in living conditions in the musseques – and local government involvement is no less vital.

DW also provides support to various small local NGOs, largely in the form of training and capacity-building, and facilitating access to wider networks. A main purpose is to build relationships with organisations that may be able to take over some of DW's projects for scaling-up, after robust models have been developed and tested.

Collaboration between small local organisations and an international NGO always involves the danger of the former becoming dependent on the latter; DW is well aware of this risk and makes efforts to avoid it.

Local government

While community action is crucial to any improvement in living conditions in the musseques, the involvement of government bodies is no less vital. Some services, such as water pipelines, are directly dependent on parastatal companies, and most infrastructure upgrading would not be sustainable without co-ordination and planning by, or in partnership with, local authorities.

Linking community organisations with local government is a fundamental part of DW's strategy. However, this presents its own difficulties, given the weakness of governmental bodies in Angola, particularly at the lower levels. One problem is the lack of consistent funding for local government. Another aspect is that local government is still not elected, but appointed from above, which creates problems of legitimacy. The lack of funds and low legitimacy means that many people see local government as irrelevant, and the situation creates a distance between local government and the citizens – the two do not know what to expect from each other or how to work together.

DW's approach is to keep local government fully informed, seek its involvement, and support it wherever possible. The aim is to build partnerships between local government and communities around concrete activities, whereby both will learn to work together, thus contributing to the building of local democracy.

4 Community-based water and sanitation services

The experience of Development Workshop

Since its beginning in the early 1980s, DW has consistently implemented a varied range of community-based projects in Angola. Throughout the 1990s, there was a strong emphasis on improving water supply, on-site sanitation and waste disposal in the musseques. DW's first major programme in this field, Project Sambizanga, was implemented in two phases between 1989 and 1995 and won a UN-Habitat Best Practice Award in 1996.

Various international donors have supported the work through the years, including the European Commission, the Canadian International Development Agency, UNICEF, the Swedish International Development Agency, Swiss Humanitarian Aid,

The priority problem for the people in the musseques is the lack of clean, affordable water.

GUNNAR AEGISSON



Buying water brought in by a tanker truck: the price is high, as is the cost to health. The water is drawn straight from the river and untreated – people are aware of the health risk but most have no choice

By the start of 2001, Development Workshop has built 220 standpipes, which provide clean water to an estimated 120,000 people in the musseques.

Alternatives (Canada), Comic Relief (UK), One World Action (UK), and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Currently, DFID is funding a three year intervention, Sustainable Community Services Programme (SCSP), through One World Action. The SCSP is part of the DFID-funded Luanda Urban Poverty Programme.

Although the contributions of the various donors are in the form of different projects, they can be seen as parts of a continuous and evolving programme in community-based water and sanitation services. This section gives an overview of DW's cumulative experience in this field. The focus is on Luanda, although DW also has a major programme of a similar nature in Huambo, Angola's second city, in the central highlands.

Access to cool, clean and safe standpipe water

ELEANOR CURTIS

Water services

The priority problem for the people in the musseques is the lack of clean, affordable water. This priority was clearly demonstrated in a DW survey in 1989. The untreated river water sold by private vendors was a recognised health risk. It was expensive – the costs of it consumed a large part of the average family budget. The supply was irregular; to get water, women had to spend a great deal of time and effort in walking and waiting.

DW began studying the available options at the beginning of the 1990s. It was clear that a system based on individual water connections would be prohibitively expensive. Also, unlimited usage by individual connections would be far beyond the capacity of the city's aged supply pipes. The most realistic solution would be water standpipes, connected to the city pipelines. Each standpipe would serve a community of between 50 and 100 families.

Standpipes had existed previously in some of the older parts of the musseques. However, they had fallen into disrepair and could no longer be used. The public water company, EPAL, which was responsible for the service, had not been able to maintain the standpipes, owing to lack of resources. EPAL was unable to charge for the service and thus did not have funds or incentives to keep it up. Neither was it able to prevent illegal individual connections to pipelines, which drained off considerable amounts of the limited water supply.

EPAL's inability to recover the costs for operating the standpipes relates to the absence of a clear policy and legal framework and, very likely, lack of political will to charge the poor for public water, on the assumption that they cannot or should not pay.

GUNNAR AEGISSON

A new mains pipeline, being built to serve the SCSP project area: costs are shared by DFID and the public water company, EPAL. Luanda's aged and inadequate water system is a major constraint on further expansion of the standpipe network

Participation in partnerships

DW's view was that the standpipes could only work if they were the responsibility of the users themselves. Only the people in the community would know who used the standpipe and be able to collect fees on that basis. They would have the incentive to maintain the standpipe, and be able to monitor careless use and illegal connections.

The first pilot project started in 1992, in the municipality of Sambizanga, linking an unserved area to a main water pipe. This was done in co-ordination with EPAL, the water company. DW mobilisers helped the communities to organise, and to elect water committees for each standpipe. The committees were then trained in basic technical and financial management, and given the responsibility for collecting fees from users and maintaining the standpipe.

The standpipe pilot project proved successful. Before embarking on an expansion in other areas, DW made an extensive survey in the musseques of people's preferences, which confirmed the validity of the approach.[14] The survey showed that people thought the community-managed standpipe model was the best and most viable solution. Also, that they were willing to pay for the operational costs of the service and contribute to the initial investment costs. However, the majority felt that the responsibility for major capital investment in the Luanda water system lay with the government.

DW's standpipe projects have expanded steadily and successfully. To date, 220 standpipes have been built, which provide clean water to an estimated 120,000 people in the musseques. The technologies and the institutional arrangements are continually modified and improved, and as experience is gained, the model is further developed. Most importantly, effective partnerships have been built between the water committees, EPAL, and local authorities. EPAL has proved to be a keen and capable partner, despite having few resources. Local authorities, particularly since 1998, have become actively involved. From 1999 onwards, DW has increasingly been able to take a

monitoring role, as the partnership model has evolved and signed agreements between the water committees, EPAL and local authorities have defined the responsibility of each.

Water fees

In their details, the arrangements for standpipe management vary between different communities – what suits one may not suit another. In particular, this applies to the system for fees collection and to the structure of the water committees.

The share of revenues from standpipes

- 30% EPAL
- 20% local government
- 25% maintenance fund
- 25% water committee

In some communities, the users pay on a monthly basis. In others, especially in areas where the water pressure is low and the supply therefore irregular, payment per day, or per bucket, is preferred. In all cases, however, the users buy registered tickets or vouchers. The water committees present the receipts to the local government, usually all together once every month, and this also gives them an opportunity to meet and discuss matters of common interest.

Digging trenches for a standpipe pipeline: DW provides technical assistance while the communities supply the labour and will manage and maintain the finished standpipes

BOB VAN DER WINDEN

Water committees

The standard structure of the water committees is three persons. As a rule, one is responsible for monitoring access to the standpipe, another takes care of keeping it clean, and the third is the treasurer. In many cases, however – particularly, it seems, in the older musseques where the system has been up and running for some years – the committees have been reduced to two persons, or even one; who then more properly might be called a caretaker.[15] Arguably, such a development could be seen as a sign of the standpipe service becoming well established. With the establishment of routine, the system can be simplified, needing fewer people; also, if the share of the revenue to the committee remains constant, fewer members would mean a more worthwhile wage for those making the effort, conceivably adding up to a full-time job, and providing a strong incentive to keep up a committed service.

The system for choosing committees or caretakers varies between communities. Sometimes they are formally elected by a

Water services – who does what?

Community / Service users	• select water committee • decide on fees • monitor performance of committee; select a new one if necessary • at construction, supply labour for digging trenches
Water committee	• collect fees • keep accounts • remit share to EPAL and local government • keep standpipe in hygienic and working order • undertake preventive maintenance and minor repairs • monitor illegal connections to pipe
Service provider	• provide access to, and maintain, water mains • provide part of construction team for standpipe • undertake larger repairs
Local government	• help identify construction site • grant credentials to water committees and issue permits • print tickets, verify fee collections • investigate and act against illegal connections and vandalism
Community mobilisers	• introduce ideas in the community • provide information on how public companies and institutions work • help communities move from plans to actions • help residents select standpipe sites • help organise and train water committees • facilitate discussion and negotiation, resolve conflicts • provide follow-up support • gather information and monitor progress for feedback to programme
Development Workshop	• promote the standpipe model • facilitate contact and co-operation between parties • provide community mobilisers • provide materials and part of construction teams • provide technical, management and logistics support to EPAL • undertake research and advocacy

DW is the facilitator for a partnership between the community water committees, the public water company and local government.

majority vote in a public community meeting. Often, however, elections in the conventional sense are not held. Angolan tradition emphasises consensus-building; people are less familiar with the concept of majority vote decisions. For example, if 60 per cent vote for a particular issue and 40 per cent vote against, it may mean that

Consultation shows that people in the musseques strongly favour community-managed water services – a private franchise would be unworkable, due to the lack of any regulatory systems.

the latter will not go with the majority and dissent remains in the community. In practice, what happens is that dialogue and negotiations continue until most people are in agreement. The end result is the election or selection of people approved of by the community. Selection by recommendation also appears to be rather common when it comes to replacing members of committees. A member who retires may often suggest a person who is known to her or him and who has taken an interest or assisted voluntarily in the work. This may well be accepted by the community.

Regardless of the method of selection, the communities appear to follow closely the performance of their standpipe representatives, and do not hesitate to replace them if the job is not done properly. The fact that the standpipe communities are so small means that everyone knows each other, which makes such monitoring relatively easy, as does the open access to the standardised accounts, which are delivered to the local government. This ensures a high degree of transparency and accountability.

Benefits: affordability and hygiene

The programme has demonstrated that users are willing and able to pay for the water service. The price of the standpipe water is about 12 per cent of the price charged by private vendors. Thus, the standpipe water represents a significant saving for the families. These savings are likely to have a direct impact on food consumption. The health benefits of clean standpipe water are also very substantial, although hard to quantify since the high rates of disease in the musseques are caused not only by contaminated water but also by the lack of sanitation services.

Improving Luanda's water supply system

The standpipe model is by now well-proven and replicable. The current constraint for further expansion is the critical state of the main water pipes serving Luanda – a problem which cannot be solved without adding new pipelines and treatment plants. A large water project is currently being implemented by a Brazilian contractor, financed by an oil barter deal between Angola and Brazil. This project will serve parts of south Luanda.

A long-awaited intervention is a proposed US$70 million project to be financed by the World Bank. This project should have been completed at the end of 1999 but has been postponed owing to protracted negotiations between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Angolan Government. Also, reportedly, there has been a disagreement between the Government and the World Bank on the model to be used.

The World Bank has insisted on private-sector management of the system and a tariff system based on full cost recovery. It appears that the Angolan Government has been reluctant to accept these conditions. The Government's misgivings are related to experiences with water infrastructure projects, financed by the World Bank, in two towns in the south of the country. In these projects, the World Bank used a private franchise model with minimal involvement of the users or local government structures. Around 80 per cent of the revenue was considered the agent's profit. These projects have been fraught with problems.

A comprehensive survey in 1998 showed that the opinions of the people in the musseques were strongly in favour of community-managed water service systems,[16] as contrasted to a private franchise model. The main reason for peoples' scepticism towards the private franchise was that in order for it to work fairly and efficiently, it would have to be well regulated, and that such a regulatory system was not in place in Angola and would not be in the foreseeable future. The franchises would most likely be given on the basis of nepotism and political ties, and that if users did not get the service they were paying for, they would have no redress. In contrast, people felt that the community-managed model would be likely to work in their interest, and that they would have a decisive influence over the course of events. People's second preference was for a model managed by the authorities, since then they might at least have some access to the decision-making.

Next steps

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) is supporting the current phase of the DW water programme, under the three year Sustainable Community Services Programme (SCSP) that started in 1999 as part of the Luanda Urban Poverty Programme. Sixty standpipes are to be built in an area of very high need. It was expected that the proposed World Bank financed intervention would be in place at the start of the project, but this has not materialised. However, it was found that considerable improvements could be made by replacing faulty parts of the existing mains pipeline to the project area, which has been losing up to 60 per cent of its water. This replacement of the mains is currently being carried out, with DFID and EPAL sharing the costs equally. It is expected that the first SCSP standpipes will be constructed in spring 2001.

BOB VAN DER WINDEN

Sanitation services

The patchy provision and poor quality of latrines are a major cause of the high rate of diseases in the musseques. DW has built and promoted dry-pit family latrines in the musseques since 1992. Technical solutions have been continually developed through a series of projects. To date, DW has helped construct nearly 10,000 latrines.
DW has also constantly promoted health education and community mobilisation in

DW has helped construct nearly 10,000 latrines, of which around 1,800 have been built under the current SCSP project; the aim is for at least 80 per cent coverage in a given area, in order to achieve significant health benefits

The current programme is building 100 family latrines every month for three years.

this respect. Community mobilisers carry out health education campaigns in targeted areas, promoting the concept of dry-pit latrines. They assess the level of interest with residents' committees and such small local NGOs and church groups that may exist. As the programme has evolved, in particular under the current SCSP, the residents' committees have become a key factor in the work.

When mobilisation begins, the residents' committees accompany the mobilisers and introduce them to the area and use their influence to promote installation of the latrines. Families are contacted and a distribution plan agreed upon.

Materials are distributed to a group of six families at a time. These families are responsible for digging the pits and building the latrine. This is to be done within 15 days from receiving the materials, otherwise they are passed on to the next group of families. The mobilisers follow the construction, to ensure that the pits are correctly built.

DW's approach is that of 'saturation' of a specific area – ensuring at least 80 per cent latrine coverage for an area before moving on to the next one. Only at this coverage can full health benefits be reaped. This is well understood by the communities. Family groups put pressure on their neighbours to construct latrines, as do the residents' committees.

The continued decline in economic conditions has made it necessary to assist families in meeting the costs of the latrines. DW has opted for subsidies – currently around 45 per cent – on the grounds of significant health benefits accruing only when almost full coverage is achieved and

Sanitation services – who does what?

Community / Service users	• build the latrines within 15 days of receiving construction materials (if a group do not build on time, the materials pass on to the next selected group of six families)
Residents' committee	• assist in mobilising the community • organise and plan latrine distribution and construction process • provide follow-up health education
Community mobilisers	• identify specific areas and assess interest in the programme • mobilise the community • involve residents' committees, and other local groups that may exist • carry out health education • monitor latrine construction • gather information and monitor progress for feedback to programme
Development Workshop	• promote the sanitation services model • facilitate contact and co-operation between parties • provide community mobilisers • provide construction materials and technical assistance • undertake research and advocacy

if families choose not to opt for latrines because of prohibitive costs, the health benefits to the community would be reduced. It is expected that the subsidy can be brought down to around 35 per cent during the SCSP project period by improving the design and production methods of the latrines.

The SCSP aims to build 100 family latrines a month over three years. By February 2001, around 1800 latrines had been constructed under the programme. The SCSP is also piloting a system for emptying the dry-pit latrines, which has to be done every eight to 10 years. The method being tested involves a suction tank, using a tractor or trailer. Once this has been developed, this could become a suitable activity for local entrepreneurs.

There is a great need for improved sanitation facilities in the schools in the musseques – less than one per cent of the schools in the SCSP area has any form on on-site sanitation. The SCSP is testing out low-cost robust models for school latrines, with hand washing facilities. So far, around eight have been constructed.

Solid waste services

Residents of the musseques usually keep their yards scrupulously clean, and dump their rubbish on unofficial dumps where they cause least inconvenience. However, Luanda's solid waste authority, ELISAL, has largely been unable to remove rubbish from the dumps, due to lack of resources and inefficient management.

Throughout the 1990s, DW ran several pilot projects for rubbish removal, but the main obstacle has been the inefficiency of ELISAL as a collaborating partner. However, some valuable experiences have been gained. A waste composition study was carried out in 1996 which showed that over 50 per cent of the rubbish was sand, bricks or rocks. Eliminating this portion of the waste would greatly reduce the volume of the dumps and increase the feasibility of removal. The project successfully tested out the separation of rubbish heaps, using the sand and rocks for road improvements – road erosion during the rainy season is a significant problem for musseque dwellers.

Since 1998, DW has been carrying out a pilot project in partnership with the private waste disposal contractor Urbana 2000, based on community management, with the company making equipment available on specified weekends.

The pilot project encourages residents to separate their rubbish at the household level. The sand is used as infill in the immediate surrounding areas and the much-reduced rubbish is deposited at an agreed

The SCSP project will be testing out cross-subsidies, where water charges will help to fund the rubbish collections.

GUNNAR AEGISSON

A concrete latrine slab: design and production methods are constantly improving, bringing down the unit cost

BOB VAN DER WINDEN

Community members helping to clear a rubbish dump; DW has pioneered solutions in solid waste disposal in the musseques

local site. Urbana 2000 comes by once every two weeks to remove the rubbish, with assistance from local community members. The continuation of this initiative is largely being managed by members of the residents' committees.

DW is continuing, through the SCSP, to develop waste removal approaches by means of partnership arrangements between the resident committees of the communities, local authorities, and Urbana 2000. Furthermore, the project will test out cross-subsidies between water and solid waste management, namely, the possibility of paying for rubbish removal by a charge on water sales.

Solid waste services – who does what?

Community / Service users	• separate sand from waste at household level • take waste to agreed disposal site • assist service provider in removing rubbish from site
Residents' committee	• assist in mobilising the community • help select disposal site • identify sites for road improvement • manage the work performed by the community • liaise with local government and service providers
Service provider	• remove rubbish from disposal site and transfer to city's landfill
Local government	• select disposal site • arrange traffic control at disposal site on pick up days
Community mobilisers	• educate users on waste reduction strategies • liaise with residents' committees and local authorities • liaise with road construction team • gather information and monitor progress for feedback to programme
Development Workshop	• promote the solid waste services model • facilitate contact and co-operation between parties • provide community mobilisers • provide technical assistance • undertake research and advocacy

5 Lessons and challenges

Community structures

There are significant differences between the community structures utilised across DW's programme, namely, that the water component uses water committees as a core structure, whereas the sanitation and solid waste components use residents' committees. Each of these structures has their particular strengths and weaknesses.

The water committees have been set up explicitly for their role. Given this, they have, perhaps not unexpectedly, remained single focus organisations and not expanded into other activities. On the whole, they have functioned well, concentrating on issues related to the payment for water and the maintenance of the standpipe.

The main difficulty has been a reliable supply of water in the mains in the programme areas – for which the committees are in no way to blame. However, when faced with this problem and others, such as illegal connections, the committees have sometimes proved fragile structures, dissolving when challenged. This weakness appears to be related to their lack of integration into a larger institutional structure. It seems that the committee members sometimes feel isolated and lacking a base of legitimacy from which they can negotiate and solve problems.

In contrast, the residents' committees do not suffer from lack of official legitimacy, having their basis in law (see page 14). This gives them a more solid base to act from, and makes linking up with local government easier. And instead of being single focus, their role is highly flexible; they can in principle get involved in any initiative that might be of benefit to the community. However, this lack of defined focus can also lead to uncertainty about what role to play.

There may sometimes be a case of uncertain legitimacy in the community; a good many of the residents' committees are appointed by local authorities and not by the communities, and may be perceived as representatives of the government. This perception may be strengthened by the fact that their roots are in the early 1980s outreach structures of the then MPLA one-party government.

Another problem is that the residents' committees have a tradition of accounting upwards in the past (and current) top-down approach to local governance. There is little tradition of accounting to the community and so residents' committees have tended to solve problems by invoking the authorities, rather than by consulting at the community level. However, the involvement in DW's programme has given the residents' committees a concrete issue to work around,

The DW programmes are a cost-effective way of testing and developing models for sustainable service provision.

GUNNAR AEGISSON

The environment of the musseques is almost totally degraded – but the lack of effective community structures has been no less a problem for the inhabitants

and a valuable experience in community initiatives. In many cases, the programme work appears to have galvanised the committees and has sometimes triggered other initiatives, such as getting the residents to clean up the neighbourhood or to organise an electricity service. Another effect of the involvement in the programmes is that the increased activity of the residents' committee makes it more visible in the community and raises expectations, and thereby pressure on the committee to perform. If not, there is the option of sacking it, which is now increasingly used by communities which are dissatisfied with their committees.

In spite of the weaknesses discussed, both the water committees and the residents' committees have been crucial to the success of the programmes. The work has also without doubt augmented the general organisational capacity of their communities, and has thus contributed to the growth of a functioning civil society. It can, however, be argued that this aspect of DW's work has been better effected through the wider-scope residents' committees, strengthening their emerging role as democratic institutions and giving them skills that can be used in other contexts. The experience of working with the residents' committees over the last two or

The water committees and the residents' committees have been crucial to the success of the programmes – they also provide organisational skills and an exercise in democracy.

three years has led DW to conclude that they are the most sustainable community structures in the musseques and future work will increasingly build on them.

DW will attempt to integrate the water committees into the residents' committees in the SCSP areas. This would lead to improvements (see panel).

These arrangements can be expected to reduce the current weaknesses of the respective types of committees and strengthen the role of the communities. At the same time, DW feels it is necessary to promote horizontal relationships between committees in different communities. At present, such relationships hardly exist. By joining up in horizontal structures, communities and user groups would be far more able to lobby for better service provision and present a network to engage in dialogue with the authorities at different levels – contributing to the growth of local democracy.

● Integrating the water committees into a larger existing structure can solve the problem of low legitimacy and relative isolation.

● At the same time, this will give the residents' committees an expanded role and valuable experience. By being involved in concrete and vital community issues, their visibility will be heightened, with raised demands for performance. They will increasingly have to be accountable to the community which they represent, instead of being focused on upward accountability to the local authorities.

The key to a better future for children in the musseques is increased influence in the processes that shape their lives; communities need skills to organise themselves effectively and DW's programme work aims to provide them with such skills

GUNNAR AEGISSON

A strong civil society is a prerequisite to future peace and stability.

DW will continue its policy of distancing itself from active involvement as soon as strong and viable partnerships have been built between the communities, local government, and service providers. In the areas where DW has already implemented its programmes, roles and responsibilities in the existing partnerships are being carefully analysed under the current SCSP project, and the results will be used to develop them further in the focus area of the SCSP.

Models for service delivery

DW's long-term programmes within water and sanitation have had a catalytic effect on the relationship of communities, local government and service provider. For example, prior to the water programme, local authorities and the parastatal water company did not believe that the communities were capable of looking after water standpipes. The communities, for their part, had little faith in the willingness of the authorities to help them. The experience of successful collaboration has built up mutual trust.

DW has not only built up the organisational capacity of the communities – as many NGOs will aim for – but also that of local government and service providers. This is important in the Angolan context, where governmental institutions are critically weak. The programmes have supported and strengthened the relevant institutions and, in the process, changed the way in which they work. DW has won respect at all levels of local government and is now able to influence the agenda, for example by participation in the meetings of the National Directorate for Water, which is currently preparing a law on water. The law covers, among other things, decentralisation of the operation of standpipes and wells, and the setting of tariffs for them; issues which have been brought to the fore by DW's programmes.

In the near future, funders such as the World Bank, and private sector firms, are expected to be involved in water provision in Angola. Costly mistakes can be avoided if proven models are in place for scaling up and DW's work has provided such models. In this context, the private franchise model proposed by the World Bank should be viewed with caution. As voiced by respondents in a 1998 survey in the musseques (see page 25), a private franchise would have to be well-regulated in order to work properly and for the benefit of the service users. Such a regulatory system is not in place and is unlikely to materialise in the near future, given the limited capacity of the government and the general conditions in Angola.

While developing viable models for service delivery, DW's community organisation work, which is the backbone of its approach, contributes to the growth of civil society. A strong civil society is a prerequisite for the development of democracy, which in turn is the key to future peace and stability in Angola and in the region.

The effects of DW's work should, however, not be overstated. It has brought concrete improvements to the lives of large numbers of people and changed community organisation and relations with authorities in the programme areas, but the scale of Angola's problems is vast. These problems cannot, and should not, be solved by NGOs alone. Development and social justice need efficient governmental institutions and a strong civil society to go hand in hand. DW's long-term, holistic approach in building partnerships between communities and the authorities is a clear demonstration of how Angola can move forward towards a more democratic society.

Notes

1 UN, 1999. *United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola*, p.43. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, November 1999. The urbanisation figure of 60 per cent includes people defined as internally displaced, now living in urban areas.

2 Paul Robson, Sandra Roque, Ana Maria de Carvalho: *Pesquisa sobre as formas organizativas para a acçao colectiva*. ADRA-Development Workshop, May 2000.

3 Kimbundu is the language of the Mbundu people, Angola's second largest ethnolinguistic group, inhabiting Luanda and its neighbouring provinces.

4 G. Aegisson, interview with Paul Robson, DW, Luanda, February 2001, reporting the findings of an ongoing community research project in the musseques.

5 Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 1995: *Perfil da pobreza em Angola*.

6 Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 1998: *Dados do inquérito sobre a disposiçao e capacidade para pagar serviços*.

7 UNDP, 2000: *Poverty Alleviation Policy in Angola, Pursuing Equity and Efficiency*.

8 UNDP, 1999: *Human Development Report Angola*.

9 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2000. *Angola: Recent Economic Developments*. IMF Staff Country Report No 00 /111, Washington.

10 UNDP, 2000: *Angola: Beyond emergency and rehabilitation*, Luanda.

11 Based on a 1996 study by Development Workshop: average price of water was US$9.46 per cubic metre.

12 An administrative reform is now underway in Luanda. Seven of the nine *municípios* will be joined to form the 'Greater City of Luanda', while two, which are partly rural, will remain as before. The details of the reform are yet to be finalised, but it would seem that the new structures will have increased independence in their financial affairs.

13 Paul Robson, 1996. *A Profile of Development Workshop Angola*. One World Action.

14 Development Workshop Angola, 1995. *Water Supply and Sanitation and its Urban Constraints: Beneficiary Assessment for Luanda*. Draft submission, prepared for the World Bank.

15 G. Aegisson and Dores de Almeida Maria Campos, interviews with water committees, Luanda, July 2000, indicating that the more established standpipes' communities had tended to simplify the management arrangements in the manner described.

16 Louis Berger International, 1998. *Reabilitação de Abastecimento de Água de Luanda*.

Acknowledgements

One World Action would like to thank the following Development Workshop staff who have helped with this publication: Allan Cain, Mary Daly, Santinho Salvador Ferreira, Paul Robson, Mark Evans, Dores de Almeida Maria Campos and Luzia Miranda Bonifacio.

Written by Gunnar Aegisson

Edited by Mandy Macdonald

Designed by Gill Mouqué

Published by One World Action

March 2001

COVER PHOTOS: A clean, safe water supply from the standpipe (top, photo by ELEANOR CURTIS). The musseques of Luanda, Angola – vast areas of unplanned housing, built by the residents themselves (photo by BOB VAN DER WINDEN)

Community organisation work is the backbone of Development Workshop's approach and it contributes to the growth of civil society.
A strong civil society is a prerequisite for the development of democracy, which in turn is the key to future peace and stability in Angola.

ONE WORLD ACTION
Bradley's Close
White Lion Street
London N1 9PF
Tel 020 7833 4075
Fax 020 7833 4102
Email owa@oneworldaction.org
Web www.oneworldaction.org
Charity Reg No 1022298

ONE WORLD ACTION
FOR A JUST AND EQUAL WORLD



ISBN 1 898 776 25 3