

UCAH
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
COORDINATION UNIT
UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA



**DEMOBILIZATION
AND REINTEGRATION
OFFICE**

**The Identification of
Social and Economic Expectations
of Soldiers to be demobilized**

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations Coordinating Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (UCAH) in Angola is involved in planning the demobilization of soldiers from the two armies (following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol) and the subsequent reintegration of those ex-soldiers into postwar Angolan society. To support this planning process, UCAH's Office of Demobilization and Reintegration (DRO) designed a series of studies. This report presents the findings of a team conducting one of those studies. The work of UCAH's Office of Demobilization and Reintegration (DRO), including this particular study, was funded by the Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through a contract with a consulting firm (Creative Associates International, Inc.) that has extensive experience with demobilization and reintegration programmes in several countries. The interdisciplinary team members were consultants hired expressly to conduct this study.

This report begins by stating the five objectives of the study, the first two of which are the focus of this report. This is followed by an overview of the history of war and the peace process in Angola. Different agendas for demobilization are noted, including the agendas of two United Nations agencies, the FAA, and UNITA. The next section, which is the heart of this report, presents the social profiles and social and economic expectations of active FAA and UNITA troops. The last section presents a hypothetical socio-psychological progression of soldiers through the transition from wartime through demobilization to reintegration.

In addition to this report, the team prepared two other reports. One, entitled "Collection and Management of Information During Demobilization and Reintegration of Angolan Troops," notes the continuing need for information during the demobilization and reintegration process, and analyzes strategies for collecting and managing that information. The proposed questionnaire to be used during demobilization is presented, with its ancillary instructions on training staff and processing and analyzing the information received from the questionnaire. The report satisfies the third and fourth objectives of the study.

The team also prepared another report, entitled "Contextual Factors and Recommended Programmes for Reintegration Occurring Consequent to the Lusaka Protocol". That report provides more background information on Angola's economic and demographic situation and prospects, and contains recommendations for actions to be taken by UN agencies, the Government of Angola (GOA), NGOs, etc. during various periods of the peace process. The report satisfies the fifth objective of the study.

1.1. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND METHODS EMPLOYED

This particular study (October-December 1994 and April-May 1995) focused on learning more about certain war-affected populations (especially the soldiers to be demobilized) in order to include their perspectives in the planning and implementation of demobilization and reintegration programmes. The terms of reference for the study may be restated as five objectives. The first two objectives are the focus of this report. The other three objectives are addressed in two other reports by this team.

The primary objective was to develop a psychosocial profile of soldiers who will be demobilized after the Lusaka Protocol. The profile was developed by interviewing soldiers in the FAA and with UNITA and also ex-soldiers who were demobilized from FAPLA (the earlier governmental army) in 1991-91, after the Bicesse Accord. FAA troops were interviewed in Luanda, Lubango, Luena, and Menongue. UNITA troops were interviewed in Bailundo, Mavinga, and Negage. Demobilized ex-soldiers were interviewed in Benguela, Lobito, Luanda, and Malange.

The second objective was to define and analyze the social promotion and assistance strategy UCAH should use when UNITA soldiers are in the quartering areas (QAs) and FAA soldiers are in their barracks during the demobilization period. This objective was achieved by analyzing programmes and experiences from other countries and from the previous Angolan experience during 1991-92.

The third objective was to develop a questionnaire to be used in the QAs (and possibly in the barracks) to register soldiers and identify their immediate destinations after the QAs and other features of their socio-economic background and expectations that will help UCAH, other UN agencies, and NGOs develop reintegration strategies and programmes. This form was developed and pretested and is in the report entitled "Collection and Management of Information During Demobilization and Reintegration of Angolan Troops." That report addresses the third and fourth objectives of this study.

The fourth objective was to help develop ways to codify and rapidly process the information that will be collected from soldiers in the QAs (and barracks). The focus was on clarifying the conceptual context for codifying and utilizing the collected information. A DRO staff member is responsible for developing the computer software for this processing.

The final objective was to learn how other sectors of the war-affected population (especially the internally displaced and those dependent on relief food) will behave during the immediate postwar period. This was important because the operation and success of immediate and long-term reintegration programmes for demobilized soldiers will be strongly influenced by what happens to the general society and economy. Demobilization and the reintegration of demobilized soldiers will not occur in isolation from, but will be interlinked with and dependent on, general processes of socioeconomic readjustment and resettlement. Information on these other sectors was obtained through interviews with key informants and with groups representing a variety of socioeconomic positions and is presented in the report entitled "Contextual Factors and Recommended Programmes for Reintegration Occurring Consequent to the Lusaka Protocol."

A variety of informal and formal methods were used during the study. A wide range of people were interviewed, including active soldiers in seven sites around the country, demobilized soldiers, provincial and municipal administrators, farmers, displaced people, women's and youth groups, social scientists, and representatives of UN agencies, NGOs, FAA, UNITA, and foreign embassies. Key individuals and groups were interviewed in Luanda, Benguela, Lobito, Malange, and Lubango. Documents and projects relating to the Bicesse period, demobilized soldiers, and relevant experiences in other countries were reviewed, and formal questionnaires were administered.

1.2. WAR, PEACE, AND AGENDAS FOR DEMOBILIZATION

This section presents an overview of the history of recent wars and the peace process in Angola, outlines various possible future scenarios, including the outbreak of another war and various ways in which the peace process and demobilization could occur, and then describes the different objectives and agendas for demobilization of various actors (the UN, the FAA, and UNITA) who are involved in planning and implementing demobilization and reintegration.

The Bicesse Accord in 1991 was successful for almost 1.5 years, but then the latest war began. Although previous periods of warfare had caused a lot of suffering and social disruption, the war that began in 1992 was the most violent and caused massive displacements. Because this last war included the coastal and other major cities, the war affected directly many Angolans who had not been directly involved before. The current period of peace began in November 1994 and remains tentative.

The future was uncertain at the time that this report was written. Major actors (UN agencies, the GOA, the FAA, and UNITA) have different goals and perspectives. The UN wants peace and is concerned about a set of issues (demobilization, demilitarization, reintegration, and national reconciliation) that are related to ending the war, diminishing the military presence in Angolan life, and strengthening the peace process. Even though they may be intent on achieving a durable peace, high-level FAA leaders have stated clearly that their emphasis is not on demobilization, but on preparing a better, more well-qualified FAA. In their plans, demobilization of FAA soldiers will occur, but as a by-product of selecting the best-qualified soldiers to remain in the FAA.

The FAA has suggested two possible programmes that would affect demobilization - the creation of an active reserve and of some type of quasi-military reconstruction programme to employ large numbers of active or demobilized soldiers. Placing FAA soldiers in a reserve would delay their full demobilization, while the creation of a quasi-military civic action programme would provide employment, but also delay the demilitarization of those soldiers. UCAH demobilization and reintegration programmes assume that soldiers will leave the QAs and barracks as individuals entering civilian life. FAA plans seem to favor the maintenance of military or quasi-military units and orientation. These alternative plans express significant differences in the role of the military in postwar Angolan society.

The United Nations agenda for the peace process establishes one sequence (or rather two closely related sets) of time periods, while the FAA and UNITA timetables may be quite different. (Ideas about UNITA's possible plans are more speculative.) In fact, though for opposed objectives, the leaders of both the FAA and UNITA may prefer to delay their demobilization.

1.3. SOCIAL PROFILES AND EXPECTATIONS OF FAA AND UNITA SOLDIERS WHO MIGHT BE DEMOBILIZED

This section presents a social profile and a sense of the expectations of men who are actively serving with the FAA and with UNITA in 1995. Data come from a survey conducted in April

1995, as well as previous studies in 1992 and 1994 with ex-soldiers demobilized post-Bicesse. The 1995 survey interviewed 595 active combatants (295 from the FAA, 300 from UNITA) in seven sites around the country (Luanda, Lubango, Luena, and Menongue for the FAA; Bailundo, Mavinga, and Negage for UNITA) using both a formal questionnaire and informal focus group conversations. The sample of 595 questionnaires was reduced to 500 (250 from each army) for intensive statistical analysis. The following paragraphs address only the highlights of the survey's findings. An appendix contains a detailed statistical analysis.

In addition to collecting data, the research trip was important for other reasons. UNITA officials emphasized the political aspects and considered this an important expression of interest by the UN in what UNITA soldiers really thought and wanted. FAA officials emphasized the economic aspects and how this related to donor interest in the process of national reconstruction.

The April 1995 survey provides insights into the troops' perspectives and expectations, as well as revealing different categories of soldiers with different resources and orientations. The existence of this heterogeneity demonstrates the necessity of planning a variety of programs for demobilization and reintegration. What the survey cannot reveal, because of the problem of not being demonstrably representative, is the proportions of these different categories of soldiers in the two military populations. What percentage of FAA and UNITA troops prefer one or the other type of reintegration program? What percentage of troops will desire to live in rural areas or larger cities? Acquiring this information requires a complete census of the troops or a larger random stratified sample. Therefore, the reader of this report should remember that most of the following statements about the social profiles and expectations of troops are hypotheses rather than conclusions. Hypotheses are statements of belief that should be tested further, as compared with conclusions that are more definitive because they are based on adequate testing. The team has a general sense of confidence about its knowledge of the soldiers in the samples, but less confidence that those samples represent accurately the larger armies.

The importance of understanding the social profiles and socio-economic expectations of soldiers can be clarified by noting the importance of some assumptions about UNITA's troops. Most observers believe that the majority of UNITA's soldiers are living with or near their immediate family and are more rural and farming oriented than FAA's soldiers. This would mean that UNITA's soldiers could resume fairly easily a stable family and farming life after demobilization. In programme terms, this implies that agricultural programmes are appropriate for the economic reintegration of most UNITA soldiers, and that there will be less demand for occupational training by UNITA soldiers. These estimates appear to be seriously misleading in terms of the profile of UNITA troops revealed by our survey.

The sampled soldiers in the FAA and with UNITA were diverse in many ways, but most of them had spent all or almost all of their adult years in the army. When they were recruited one-half of the FAA and two-thirds of the UNITA troops were students, and two-thirds of the FAA and three-quarters of the UNITA troops were living with their parents. This means these troops had no experience as independent working adults before joining the military. These are key factors to consider in planning demobilization and reintegration programs.

The two samples differed in terms of military rank. Although half of each were soldiers, almost 40 per cent of the FAA sample were sergeants, while almost the same percentage of the UNITA sample were officers. The UNITA sample was also older and had served more years in the military. These three factors may well be related, with the officers being older and having served longer.

Both samples included about the same percentage of illiterates, but the general educational level of the FAA sample was higher. Illiteracy was restricted in the FAA sample to soldiers, while there were also illiterate sergeants and officers in the UNITA sample. In fact, surprisingly, there was no significant relationship between education and rank among the UNITA troops sampled. almost all of the troops could speak Portuguese, but there were some monolingual non-Portuguese-speaking troops (usually Ovimbundu) in both samples.

The majority of both samples agreed that it would be easy or at least possible to live together peacefully with ex-soldiers demobilized from the other army. UNITA troops were more optimistic in that one-third of them thought it would be easy. A belief in one's own ethnic advantage was common in both samples, although more intensely among UNITA troops.

The troops in both samples are very similar in terms of mobility, experience with living in different provinces during their military careers, and urban orientation. Almost the same percentage of FAA and UNITA troops were born in rural municipalities. In terms of where the troops wanted to live after being demobilized, almost the same percentage of FAA and UNITA troops (slightly more than half) wanted to live in an urban area. The major difference between the two forces was in the distribution between large cities and smaller provincial capitals. For the FAA troops, about one-quarter wanted to live in the five large cities, and about the same percentage in the smaller provincial capitals. One-third of the UNITA troops wanted to live in the five large cities, and only about one-tenth wanted to live in the smaller cities.

In terms of their mobility while in the military, the UNITA troops have travelled more, living in more provinces. This might be correlated with the longer military service of the sample of UNITA troops and the presence of more officers. Almost twice as many of the FAA troops have served in only one province, most probably the province where they were born and recruited.

About three-quarters of the troops in both armies wanted to demobilize, even in the face of considerable uncertainty about their future as civilians. The decision to demobilize did seem somewhat more tentative among UNITA troops, who insisted that their decision was contingent on the presence of programmes to support their reintegration into civilian life. The FAA troops who wanted to demobilize were more definitive about demobilizing in any case, even if there were few or no support programmes. Focus groups revealed that even the troops who want to remain in the army are split between those who want to be in the military and those who do not want to remain in the army for a long time, but hope to receive some training or education in the army before they demobilize. A number of FAA soldiers who reported that they wanted to remain in the FAA said that they wanted to remain only during the first phase, which they expected to last a year or so, and during which they anticipated receiving training. Thus, the number who want to demobilize fairly soon is really greater than three-quarters.

The intensity of the desire to demobilize is a fact to be considered if the GOA or the FAA want all or most of these troops to remain in the military (global incorporation) for perhaps several years. That might result in a lot of desertion (auto-desmobilization), such as what happened after the Bicesse Accord.

The relationship between the decision to demobilize and military rank differed between the two samples. For the UNITA troops, there was a strong, obvious, and inverse trend - the higher the rank, the less likely to want to demobilize. The opposite was true for the FAA sample, where the officers were the most desirous of demobilizing. One hypothesis to explain this important difference is that UNITA might be having difficulties in mobilizing enough soldiers to provide its half (as per the terms of the Lusaka Protocol) of the reconstituted FAA, and there may be more pressure on the UNITA troops to stay in the army, which would be expressed most in the officer levels.

In terms of priorities for reintegration programmes, the troops were forced to choose among help with immediate employment, education or training, housing, and receiving tool kits. This was a very difficult choice for them, and most complained that they wanted help in more than one area. The troops on both sides emphasized training, with the second choice being help in finding employment. Help with housing was third, and receiving tool kits was a distant fourth. The emphasis on education and training was similar in both samples. The UNITA emphasis contradicted the widely-held assumption that most UNITA troops were rural-oriented and primarily wanted help in re-establishing themselves as farmers. Of course, the samples were not necessarily representative of the total population of either army, especially of the UNITA militia.

As the focus group dialogues made clear, there is a strong relationship between the decision to demobilize and the expectation of finding programs to help demobilizing soldiers reintegrate. The decision to demobilize is surrounded by uncertainty, worry, and concern about being able to make a living (or a good living) in civilian life. The soldiers are uncertain about their future and their capabilities in the civilian world. Most of them do not have a good idea of what to expect or of what to do. Therefore, their decision to demobilize or remain in the army is an uncertain one and may change as they receive new information, and as the political and economic environment changes. The emphasis on training and education reflects the soldiers' worries. They are seeking something that could give them an advantage in civilian life. In this sense, the importance of training and education programs is as much emotional as financial.

The existence of so much uncertainty means that civilian reintegration programmes will not only help ex-soldiers adapt to civilian life, but will help attract them out of the army. The soldiers can be attracted to civilian life (demobilizing) or to military life (remaining in the army for a while) by the existence of training and general education programmes. If there are programmes to help them adapt to civilian life, more soldiers will likely demobilize. On the other hand, if the FAA starts training programmes, and there are no places for soldiers in the civilian programmes, there is more likelihood that a larger number of soldiers will voluntarily stay longer in the army to take advantage of the FAA training programmes. Perhaps such a military training program could be related to the proposed involvement of troops in the physical reconstruction of Angolan infrastructure. Eventual demobilization could be facilitated by developing training programmes

in the military; this would diminish soldiers' anxiety about competing for civilian employment and increase the chances of long-term successful reintegration.

The relationship between reintegration programme priorities and soldiers' educational level was significant for both the FAA and UNITA samples. The relationship is clear, understandable, and linear for most of the troops. Those with less education (illiterates through those who completed primary school) are most concerned about getting immediate employment. Those with more education (middle school and up) are most concerned about getting more education.

Probably the biggest surprise in terms of the future occupations that the troops desire is the unpopularity of farming. Only one-eighth of the FAA troops wanted to be farmers, and the UNITA percentage was half of that. This may reflect the purposeful selection of the sample (more politically aware, more urban-oriented) by the two armies, or may reflect a generally widespread disinclination among troops to go to rural areas to farm.

Both sides favor becoming mechanics and drivers, but UNITA troops also favor becoming health workers and teachers. There are family precedents for the latter careers, as many of the UNITA troops' fathers were health workers and teachers when their sons entered the military. A highly unrealistic ambition is that one-quarter of the UNITA troops want to become high-level professionals, such as physicians or engineers. This ambition requires a lot of formal schooling, which the UNITA troops lack. On the other hand, one-quarter of the FAA troops favor more accessible occupations, such as businessmen or middle-level professionals (accountants, journalists, telecommunications technicians, etc.). Few UNITA troops chose business or middle-level professions as occupations.

Another important variable that was studied was where soldiers thought that they wanted to live and work after leaving the army. This has many implications for demobilization and reintegration programs, from the immediate - how much transport is needed from the QAs, and how long will be the trips? - to the longer-term concerns of where reintegration programs need to be located to service demobilized troops, and whether there is a good fit between where the troops want to live and the economic opportunities that will become available in postwar Angola.

There was almost complete agreement between FAA and UNITA troops in that two-thirds wanted to return to their home province to live. However, there was a big difference between the samples in terms of their remaining where they were currently located. Whereas one-fourth of the FAA troops will remain in their current province after demobilization, almost all of the UNITA troops will leave. This discrepancy is largely explained by understanding that two-thirds of the FAA troops who want to stay in their current location are now stationed in their home province, so the number of FAA troops willing to remain in the current province is largely explained by the fact that they are serving now in their natal province. This is contrary to the hypothesis that UNITA troops are more likely to be serving in their home province. Of course, the samples are not necessarily representative of the whole populations.

1.4. PROCESS, PSYCHOSOCIAL CHANGES, AND SOLDIERS' VIEWPOINTS

The preceding section analyzed the profile and expectations of FAA and UNITA troops as of April 1995. These ideas and anticipations will change as the national picture evolves, and as more information becomes available. This section presents ideas about social and psychological changes that may occur as troops go through the processes of demobilization and reintegration. The key concepts emphasized here are social dynamics, uncertainty, and heterogeneity.

Social dynamics refers to the fact that people are active and make decisions; they are not merely passive pawns in a game played by organizations. Uncertainty is a key element affecting these decisions and must be taken into account in planning programmes. Demobilization, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction are processes in which human beings confront changing situations and have to make decisions that can have major impacts on their lives and futures. Conditions change through time, and each decision has to be made with inadequate information, so there is always uncertainty and risk. Heterogeneity is another key concept because all soldiers are not alike. One important difference is in rank and the differential expectations of officers and soldiers of lower rank. There are many other differences in terms of soldiers' interests, capabilities, skills, and access to important resources, including information. Organizations should not anticipate a uniform response by any group, no matter how "well-disciplined" its members might be.

2. INTRODUCTION, GOALS, AND METHODS OF THE STUDY

2.1. GOALS OF THE STUDY

The United Nations Coordinating Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (UCAH) in Angola is involved in planning the demobilization of soldiers from the two armies (following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol) and the subsequent reintegration of those ex-soldiers into postwar Angolan society. To support this planning process, UCAH's Office of Demobilization and Reintegration (DRO) designed a series of studies. This particular study focused on learning more about certain war-affected populations (especially the soldiers to be demobilized) in order to improve the planning and implementation of demobilization and reintegration programmes.

2.2. OBJECTIVES AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

Perhaps the clearest way to present the terms of reference that guided the team in its work is to restate them in terms of five objectives and priorities. This report addresses the first two objectives. Two other reports written by the team address the other three objectives.

2.2.1. First Objective. The primary objective was to develop a psychosocial profile of soldiers who will be demobilized after the Lusaka Protocol. This profile identifies soldiers' social and economic expectations after their demobilization. The purpose is to improve demobilization and reintegration programmes (and diminish ex-soldier frustration and anger that could delay social

reintegration and reconciliation). The profile was developed by interviewing active troops serving in the FAA and with UNITA and also ex-soldiers who were demobilized from FAPLA (the earlier governmental army) in 1991-91, after the Bicesse Accord. FAA troops were interviewed in Luanda, Lubango, Luena, and Menongue. UNITA troops were interviewed in Bailundo, Mavinga, and Negage. Demobilized ex-soldiers were interviewed in Benguela, Luanda, and Malange.

2.2.2. Second Objective. The second objective was to define and analyze the social promotion and assistance strategy UCAH should use when UNITA soldiers are in the quartering areas (QAs) and FAA soldiers are in their barracks during the demobilization period. UCAH anticipates that a two-way exchange of information between soldiers and UCAH during this time could facilitate successful reintegration. This objective was achieved by analyzing programmes and experiences from other countries and from the previous Angolan experience during 1991-92.

2.2.3. Third Objective. The third objective was to develop an instrument or questionnaire to be used in the QAs (and possibly in the barracks). In addition to identifying (registering) soldiers, the form identifies their immediate destinations after the QAs (or barracks) and other features of their socio-economic background and expectations that will help UCAH, other UN agencies, the GOA, and NGOs develop reintegration strategies and programmes. This form was developed and pretested in interviews with active and demobilized (1991-92) soldiers. The third and fourth objectives are addressed in a separate report entitled "Collection and Management of Information During Demobilization and Reintegration of Angolan Troops."

2.2.4. Fourth Objective. The fourth objective was to help develop ways to codify and rapidly process the information that will be collected from soldiers in the QAs (and barracks). The focus was on clarifying the conceptual context for codifying and utilizing the collected information. DRO staff are responsible for developing the actual computer software for this processing.

2.2.5. Fifth Objective. The final objective was to learn how other sectors of the war-affected population (especially the internally displaced and those dependent on relief food) will behave during the immediate postwar period. The operation and success of immediate and long-term reintegration programmes will be strongly influenced by what happens to the general society and economy. Demobilization and the reintegration of demobilized soldiers will not occur in isolation from, but will be interlinked with and dependent on, general processes of socioeconomic readjustment and resettlement. Information on these other sectors was obtained through interviews with key informants and with groups representing a variety of socioeconomic positions in Benguela, Lobito, Luanda, Lubango, and Malanje. This information is presented in another report entitled "Contextual Factors and Recommended Programmes for Reintegration Occurring Consequent to the Lusaka Protocol."

2.3. SCHEDULE AND ITINERARY (A detailed schedule is in Appendix 7.1.2.)

The team made two trips to Angola to conduct this study. During the first trip (October-December 1994) the team was unable to interview active soldiers and concentrated on

interviewing demobilized ex-soldiers and other war-affected sectors of Angolan society in Benguela, Lobito, Luanda, Lubango, and Malanje. UNITA was not willing at that time to have their active soldiers be interviewed, and the FAA only agreed as the team was leaving the country. During the second trip (April-May 1995) the team was able to travel to UNITA bases in three cities (Bailundo, Mavinga, and Negage) and FAA bases in four cities (Luanda, Lubango, Luena, and Menongue) and interview active soldiers.

2.4. FORMAL AND INFORMAL METHODOLOGIES

A variety of informal and formal methods were used during the study. A wide range of people were interviewed, including active soldiers, demobilized ex-soldiers, provincial and municipal administrators, farmers, displaced people, women's and youth groups, social scientists, and representatives of UN agencies, NGOs, FAA, UNITA, and foreign embassies. Active soldiers and demobilized ex-soldiers were surveyed using both formal questionnaires and informal focus group dialogue. Other key individuals and groups were interviewed informally, and documents and projects relating to the Bicesse period, demobilized soldiers, and relevant experiences in other countries were reviewed.

The team's explanation of the rationale for a combination of informal and formal methods might help other groups who might be planning future studies. The formality of interviewing (ranging from administering formal questionnaires to informal dialogues) is related to the amount of information that the investigator already has and to the degree of control that the investigator wishes to exert. More formal methods are most appropriate when the investigator begins by knowing a lot about the subject, including the relationships among variables and the existence and reasons for variability. Informal methods are most appropriate when the investigators start by knowing less and need to learn about the overall relationships and existence of variability. Formal methods give the investigator more control; he or she can limit and fix the number and range of variation possible, while informal methods give more control to the subjects (people who are being interviewed) and are more exploratory.

There is a general absence of hard (tested) information about the social and economic features and expectations of Angolan soldiers (active and demobilized), though there are several important prior studies (Ministerio da Defesa 1992; Tavares 1993, 1994; see section 5) and a lot of unproven, although widely circulated, assumptions. The same paucity of information is true for displaced people and other special groups (street children, etc.) in Angola. In situations like these, an informal exploratory method is most appropriate. This is especially true when a survey team is expected to provide general ideas or a synthesis in a hurry.

The informal survey (sometimes called rapid appraisal) method used in this study involved semi-structured group discussions in which the team utilized a list of important topics to probe for group consensus and disagreement. This meant in practice that the team had open-ended conversations with a series of different focus groups, each of which was relatively homogeneous. The reason why each group (of 5-15 people) was relatively homogeneous (composed only of ex-soldiers, or displaced people, or women heads of households, or local administrators, et al.) was to facilitate the search for possible consensus or synthesis within a stratum. The set of groups

interviewed represented different strata so that a broad spectrum of the population was searched. Other interviews were with key individuals (called key informants) rather than with groups. These were people such as provincial administrators (Vice-Governors), UN and NGO representatives, and other people who were noted as having special insights or experience.

Team members were guided in these interviews by a list of topics, but different interviews focused on different areas, depending on the expertise and interest of the subjects, and not all topics were covered in all interviews. Each group had a lot of freedom to answer and to introduce ideas and topics that were not on the team's original list. This allowed the study to learn about new issues that had not been anticipated originally, which was a major advantage of the exploratory informal method.

Most questions were open-ended, giving the subjects more freedom to choose what factors they considered important. Being open-ended does not have to mean being vague. Many Angolans found it difficult to answer general questions, but were very informative when used about specifics. A group of displaced municipal administrators were asked how many months it would take them to reopen their municipal offices and get them functioning once they were given the word to return. Instead of asking displaced people whether they were going to wait until mines were cleared before returning home, we asked them how long they were going to wait after a cease-fire before returning home, and what needed to be done to facilitate their return. Asking people to specify how much time was needed to do something forced them to confront future action scenarios and resulted in good information.

Concerning the formal method, the study used two different questionnaires, one for the active soldiers and another for the demobilized ex-soldiers. These questionnaires were pre-tested before being administered; this means that each of the questions was given to small groups to find out if they had any problems with the question, or if there were any ambiguities. The written questionnaire was read and answered individually by all of the members of each group that was interviewed. Illiterate soldiers were worked with individually by one of the team, who read each question and wrote the soldier's oral answer.

There were four reasons why the team used a formal questionnaire. First, it was a way of analyzing the profile and expectations of demobilized soldiers. Second, giving questionnaires to individuals checks for heterogeneity within the stratum, while the informal dialogue commonly provides a sense of homogeneity and synthesis, or consensus. Rapid appraisal group interview methods often include individual questioning for exactly this reason. Third, the team hoped the questionnaires would stimulate dialogue. Sometimes the act of completing questionnaires focuses the group on topics and induces people to transform themselves from passive subject or informant into active co-investigator. Fourth, the questionnaire was a way to test (or pretest) the utility of various questions, some of which were then included in the formal instrument to be used in the registration of soldiers during demobilization (see the third objective in section 2.2.3.).

3. WAR, PEACE, AND AGENDAS FOR DEMOBILIZATION

3.1. A HISTORY OF WAR AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Angola has been more or less continually at war for more than thirty years (since 1961). Before that, there was a series of intermittent wars between African groups and the Portuguese during the colonial period, but then a period of relative peace (broken by involvement in the Second World War) lasted until the more recent wars began in 1961. The majority of the Angolan population is less than 30 years old, which means that the majority have never really lived through a protracted period of peace. For them, war somewhere in the country is normal life. The recent wars may be divided into three major periods.

The first war (1961-74) was an anti-colonial war (or war of national liberation) fought by three major African groups (MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA) against the Portuguese government (and against each other). This first war lasted 13 years, during which many people were killed and many others displaced, including the forced movement of many rural people into fortified towns and cities and of almost half a million Angolan refugees into Zaire and Zambia. The pattern of governmental control of urban areas and guerrilla control of rural areas between cities was established, as was the consequent need for armed road convoys or travel by air between many cities. Major Portuguese immigration into Angola occurred during this period, and many programmes were initiated to make Angola more a part of Portugal (Lusoization). Although many people were killed, displaced, and suffered hardship, this war was relatively small-scale in terms of military engagements. This war stopped because of the military coup and subsequent change of government in Portugal. There was a short period of relative peace in Angola in 1974-75 that included the establishment of state independence from Portugal and massive Portuguese emigration.

The second war (1975-91) was a civil war that evolved, after the dissolution of FNLA, into a long war between MPLA (or the Government) and UNITA. Instead of remaining a guerrilla war with relatively small military engagements, this second war assumed major proportions and escalated rapidly in military and international terms as both South Africa and Cuba became directly involved. During the 1975-88 period there were a number of major military engagements, some involving South African incursions and protracted occupation of areas of southern Angola.

This second war became smaller in size and intensity after 1988-89 for various reasons, including defeats suffered by the South African forces and the end of the "Cold War" confrontation between the USA and USSR. Both South African and Cuban forces were withdrawn, and international support for the warring sides began to cool. Namibia became independent in 1989, thus eliminating another factor in the hostile Angolan-South African relationship. Several peace initiatives were attempted.

Finally, the Bicesse Accord (named after the suburb of Lisbon where the Accord was signed) was signed in May 1991. This called for peace, a cease-fire, national elections, demobilization

of the warring armies (FAPLA for the government, FALA for UNITA), and creation of a new army (FAA) that would contain people from both previous armies. Instead of focusing only on its eventual rupture, observers should note as well that the Bicesse Accord worked for almost a year and a half. This was the longest period of relative peace in 20 years and lasted until after the elections (September 1992), which were won by the Government.

Having lost the elections, UNITA contested the electoral results by returning to war. There were a number of factors that led to the resumption of fighting, including the inadequate and unbalanced demobilization that occurred as a result of the implementation of the Bicesse Accord. During the 1991-92 period of peace, the strategic balance between FAPLA and UNITA's troops changed, making a military victory by UNITA appear more possible. One important factor was the difference in discipline between the two armies. FAPLA largely disintegrated ("auto-demobilization") through neglect, while UNITA's troops demobilized only slightly and remained a disciplined force. Another factor was that some FALA quartering areas (QAs) were established closer to cities, which put UNITA's troops in better positions in 1992 to attack and occupy those cities.

The third war (November 1992 to November 1994) was the shortest and was ended by the signing of the Lusaka Protocol and the subsequent cease-fire in November 1994. Although brief, the third war caused high casualties and massive displacements. The first and second wars were usually fought away from the coastal cities, with many of the conflicts being fought in the more sparsely populated eastern or southern regions. During the third war, for almost the first time (excepting the 1961 attack in Luanda and scattered attacks, such as the one on Luena in 1991), there were major engagements in, and contests for, important cities. UNITA occupied several cities (Huambo, Uige, Kuito, etc.) and besieged many provincial capitals for long periods. The different placement of warfare and the disruption of cities affected directly the lives of many Angolans who had remained rather isolated from the direct impacts of the previous two periods of warfare. At the same time the occupation of cities by UNITA may have meant new experiences for many UNITA soldiers, which may have affected their postwar career and residential interests.

During the two years of the third war, there was a dramatic shift in military power between the Government (FAA) and UNITA. FAPLA had largely disintegrated at the end of the second war, and FAA was only in the process of being formed. When the third war started, UNITA was the dominant military power in many tactical situations, as demonstrated by its ability to occupy a major city, other provincial capitals, and most of the municipalities and rural areas. By 1994, especially during the latter part of the year, the Government had clearly become the dominant power, as shown by its almost-simultaneous occupation of Soyo, the diamond fields, Huambo, and most of Uige. The dramatic surge in FAA's dominance, or the dramatic collapse of UNITA's military power, has major implications for the future of the peace process.

3.2. POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS

The terms of reference and objectives for this team, and the analysis and recommendations in this report, are based on the assumptions that the terms of the Lusaka Protocol (and Bicesse

Accord) will be successfully implemented, that the cease-fire will continue to hold, in spite of scattered incidents, and that demobilization and reintegration will begin sometime in 1995.

These are only assumptions and may not be accurate predictions. There is no certainty (as of July 1995) about the future of peace in Angola. The team thought that it would be remiss in not questioning these assumptions, so several alternative possible future scenarios are also presented below. These scenarios are presented to alert readers to the existence of these assumptions and to prepare readers to respond to what may occur in the unpredictable future. When the first draft of this report was written (early December 1994), the cease-fire that was established as a result of the Lusaka Protocol seemed to be generally holding, with only scattered incidents. Important progress had occurred by July 1995, when the revised final report was written, but the UN timetable for demobilization was behind schedule.

The alternative possible scenarios outlined below include: (1) outbreak of the fourth war, (2) peaceful demobilization in a context of parity (equal treatment) between FAA and UNITA's troops, (3) peaceful demobilization in a context of UNITA surrendering to FAA, and (4) partial peace with multiple demobilization of UNITA's troops. The second scenario (peace with parity) was the aim of the UN plans (as of early December 1994).

3.2.1. The Fourth War. One possibility is that UNITA or FAA will decide to return to war because one or both sides do not like the terms or progress of peace, or due to mutual distrust. If demobilization had already started or taken place by that time, that would make a return to war more difficult. If war starts again, it will absorb the resources that could have made reintegration a success.

3.2.2. Peace and Demobilization with Parity. The United Nations plans call for peace and parity, with the soldiers from both armies receiving equal treatment. This would mean that both FAA and UNITA's troops would disarm under UNAVEM supervision, and that the reintegration programmes for both would be the same. This might have been a possibility at one time, but the following scenario seemed more likely at the time that this report was written.

3.2.3. Peace and Demobilization as a Surrender. Changes in the military situation of the two armies during 1994 meant that FAA could take a dominant position in the relationship with UNITA. The two sides were not equal, and the inequality was growing when the cease-fire took effect. This empirical disparity in power strengthened the FAA's argument (expressed in terms of national sovereignty and the Bicesse Accord) that FAA should be treated differently than UNITA's troops. The Bicesse Accord, which is still in effect according to the Lusaka Protocol, stipulated the formation of a single new army in 1991-92. The FAA is the force that was created because of the Bicesse Accord. According to this scenario, the FAA is the Angolan army, must remain strong to defend the country and, therefore, will not disarm, while UNITA's troops will.

The UN is concerned about a set of issues such as demobilization, demilitarization, reintegration, and national reconciliation, which are related to ending the war, diminishing the military presence in Angolan life, and strengthening the peace process. The FAA has another orientation.

Even though they may be intent on achieving a durable peace, high-level FAA leaders have stated clearly that their emphasis is not on demobilization, but on preparing a better, more well-qualified FAA. In their plans, demobilization of FAA soldiers will occur, but as a by-product of selecting the best-qualified soldiers to remain in the FAA. There are two possible sequences for demobilization in this scenario.

(1) In one, UNITA's soldiers demobilize under separate programmes than FAA soldiers. UNITA's troops would demobilize from QAs under UNAVEM supervision, while FAA (or the Ministry of Defense) would supervise itself. Similarly, those soldiers demobilized from FAA would stay under the jurisdiction of regular Ministry of Defense programmes (such as GIAMDA), leaving only UNITA's troops under the jurisdiction and supervision of UNAVEM and UCAH demobilization and reintegration programmes. This would change greatly the scale and scope of UN and NGO programmes for demobilized soldiers.

(2) The other alternative has soldiers from both UNITA and the FAA going through the same programmes, but as members of the FAA. Since the FAA is the only army, according to the Bicesse Accord, this scenario proposes that the officers and soldiers serving on UNITA's side will become members of the FAA when they arrive in the QAs, after which the demobilization (or reintegration into the FAA) will be an internal FAA matter that could take years. All demobilized soldiers would be demobilized from the FAA, and all would supposedly be eligible for both Ministry of Defense and UCAH reintegration programmes.

The FAA has suggested two other possible programmes that would also affect any demobilization. These are the possible creation of an active reserve and of some type of quasi-military reconstruction programme to employ large numbers of active or demobilized soldiers. Whatever the military or other reasons for these programmes, they would delay and cushion the loss of employment and income suffered by soldiers leaving the army because both programmes would continue to pay the demobilized a salary. Placing an as-yet-undetermined number of FAA soldiers in a reserve would delay their full demobilization, while the creation of a quasi-military-civic action programme would provide employment, but also delay demilitarization.

UCAH demobilization and reintegration programmes assume that soldiers will leave the QAs and barracks as individuals entering civilian life. FAA plans seem to favor the maintenance of military or quasi-military units and orientation. These alternative plans express significant differences in the role of the military in postwar Angolan society. The UN anticipates a major reduction in the size and importance of the army. The FAA anticipates a continued strong military presence (and influence) and a smaller and delayed reduction in the size of the army (counting all soldiers and those in quasi-military formations).

3.2.4. Partial Peace and Multiple Demobilizations. This scenario differs from the first alternative (outbreak of the fourth war) because the partial peace scenario assumes that some or all of the high-level UNITA leaders choose peace. The first three scenarios assume that UNITA retains a disciplined control of UNITA's troops and that high-level UNITA leaders can make the decision of war or peace for their troops. This discipline was noted during the second war and the short period of peace during 1991-92. There is the possibility that UNITA has changed

during 1994 (and early 1995), and that high-level UNITA leaders, even though they agree to the peace process, might not be able to deliver all of UNITA's troops to the QAs, i.e., all UNITA troops do not appear at the QAs, even though they have been ordered to do so. This could result in the need to negotiate with a number of mid-level UNITA troop commanders and to attract them and their soldiers to the QAs. This would mean that much more time would be needed to conclude the demobilization of UNITA's troops.

A variant of this scenario is that the two components of UNITA's force (standing army and militia) respond differently to the peace process. Troops serving in the standing army may follow orders, appear at the QAs, enter the FAA, and either remain as UNITA's component of the postwar FAA or demobilize. Troops serving in the more loosely-organized militia may not normally be mobilized for long periods of time. They may first have to be mobilized before going to the QAs, and they may not respond well to the thought of having to join the FAA for an indefinite period of time before being allowed to demobilize again. These militia troops may have to be attracted to the QAs by demobilization and reintegration programs.

3.3. TIME AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AGENDA

Demobilization and reintegration are two processes for which different actors have planned different agendas. The UN is primarily concerned about achieving peace and helping people through the difficult times of warfare, displacement, and readjustment. The UCAH strategy paper noted the importance of various time periods in the processes of demobilizing soldiers from the two armies and reintegrating these ex-soldiers into Angolan society. This section shows how two UN agencies (UNAVEM and UCAH) allocate time according to their objectives. There is a difference between the two agendas that should be recognized. The following utilizes the agendas as proposed in November-December 1994. Later events have caused changes.

UNAVEM proposed to divide time into three overall periods. This framework put demobilization and reintegration into a larger context that included the preconditions. The three UNAVEM periods may be categorized by residence as pre-QA (or pre-barracks), QA (or barracks), and post-QA (or post-barracks). Although the QA term is used in many UN plans, the current plans are that only UNITA's troops will go to QAs, while FAA troops will be in their regular barracks.

The first period, called the take-off stage (T_t), was to last 120 days (until around the end of February 1995). This was subdivided into two major subperiods, which were to last for 30 and 90 days, respectively. The first subperiod (T_{td}+) recognized different preconditions for demobilization, such as signing the Lusaka Protocol, establishing a cease-fire, and approving UNAVEM III. This last action ended the first and started the second subperiod (T_{ts}), which was to last for 90 days, during which time the quartering areas (QAs) were to be established.

The second period, called the demobilization stage (T_d), was to last another 90 days (until around the end of May). During this period the UNITA troops were to be quartered (in QAs); some were to be selected to enter the FAA; and the others were to be demobilized. Nothing was said about what was supposed to be occurring at this time to the FAA troops.

TIME PERIODS UNAVEM NAMES AND SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1st (Tt)	Take-off
- Ttd+	Lusaka Accord to Establishing UNAVEM III
- Tts+	UNAVEM III Established to QAs Established
2nd (Td)	Demobilization
	Quarterming, Selecting, and Demobilizing UNITA's troops
3rd (Tr)	Resettlement
- Trs	Resettlement Transportation from QAs
- Trh	Rehabilitation Establish Community-Based Programmes
- Trd	Reconstruction and Development Establish Longer-Term Programmes

The third period, called the resettlement stage (Tr), was to last an indefinite time and was subdivided into three subperiods. The first subperiod, called the resettlement stage (Trs), was the physical transportation of the demobilized ex-soldiers away from the QAs.

The second subperiod was called the rehabilitation stage (Trh), when community-based programs were to be started to stabilize the ex-soldier population and reintegrate them into the community. The beginning of this stage was called the social adjustment period to recognize the high degree of instability during this time. The prototypical programmes established during this period were to be Quick Impact Programmes (QIP), which are defined and described in another report.

The third subperiod was called the reconstruction and development stage (Trd). This recognized a transition away from rapidly-implemented programmes that emphasized rapid impact to stabilize the situation and toward programmes that may be slower to implement but have longer-term goals and impacts.

Because of its interest in education and personal orientation, the Demobilization and Reintegration Office (DRO) of UCAH had a slightly different way of dividing time into periods. There were no differences in conceptualizing the first two periods (take-off and demobilization). The difference occurred with the third period and the extent to which it was to be separated from the second. DRO/UCAH called the third period the reintegration (rather than resettlement) period, and it was subdivided into three stages: social promotion and assistance, rehabilitation, and development. The latter two stages were essentially the same as in the UNAVEM model.

TIME PERIODS DRO/UCAH NAMES AND SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1st (Tt)	Take-off
2nd (Td)	Demobilization
3rd (Tr)	Reintegration
- Trsp	Social Promotion and Assistance
- Trh	Rehabilitation
- Trd	Development

The major differences between the UNAVEM and DRO/UCAH models were that two periods (2nd and 3rd) overlapped in the DRO/UCAH model, and the DRO/UCAH model emphasized education and information more than simply transportation. In the DRO/UCAH model, social promotion and assistance (SPA) programmes began in the QAs (before demobilization ended) and continued after the ex-soldiers had left the QAs and moved into civilian areas.

The UNAVEM periods emphasize the distinction between military and civilian in terms of time, residence, and status. This separation makes a clear distinction between the time of demobilization, when soldiers are in the QAs and in the process of disarming and leaving the army, and the time of resettlement, when ex-soldiers are moved away from the QAs to civilian areas. This separation is logical, but assumes that soldiers know where to go and what to do after leaving the army. This would be true if all demobilizing soldiers were confident about their future and were returning to their original provinces and homes to be farmers, or to continue whatever trade they practiced before entering the army. However, this will not be happening for many demobilizing soldiers, who will have to make choices about their resettlement. Many soldiers will be trying to make decisions about where to go and what to do after leaving the QAs.

The DRO/UCAH model does not use residence (QA versus non-QA) to separate the processes of demobilization and social promotion. The DRO/UCAH model accelerates the social and psychological processes of demilitarization and demobilization by utilizing some of the time in the QA to assist the demobilizing soldier to re-orient himself to some of the opportunities and parameters of civilian life. The SPA programmes can provide information about current conditions in various regions of the country, the existence and requirements for various reintegration programmes, and other subjects. The SPA programmes can also initiate the process of national reconciliation by emphasizing the need for all ex-soldiers to live and work peacefully together in reconstructing their lives and country.

The authors of this report strongly support creating various SPA programmes for the QAs (see detailed recommendations in another report), but want to emphasize the tentative nature of commitments and plans that soldiers will be making at that time. Although the UN may have a firm agenda (D plus 30 days, S plus 180 days, etc.) with clearly defined objectives, the soldiers will not. The UN is building on its experiences from many countries and many demobilization and reintegration exercises. Soldiers will be inexperienced, uncertain, and tentative. Many or most soldiers will be facing this experience for the first time, though some (perhaps many) will be demobilizing for the second time (having been re-mobilized in 1992). Angola has gone through the demobilization and reintegration experience once before in 1991-92, but that experience has made people more uncertain and less confident of what this peace might mean for their lives. Also, many other factors in Angola will be changing at the same time that demobilization and reintegration are occurring.

The UN, NGOs, et al. should anticipate that demobilized soldiers will be going through a long process of decision-making that will continue for months (or even years) after leaving the QAs. While going through the demobilization process in the QAs, soldiers will lack a lot of critical information and should not be forced to make decisions that will limit their ability to modify

their plans after leaving the QAs. The SPA programmes should open discussions about, and facilitate, the decision-making process, but not prematurely close the process. This means that the SPA programmes should not establish tracks (for example, forcing soldiers to choose whether to enter a training program or be a farmer) that prevent demobilized soldiers from changing their minds after learning more about what is happening in their communities.

Both military and civilian planners should appreciate another contribution of the SPA programme in the QAs. Soldiers in the QAs will have a lot of "free" (unstructured) time. Sometimes too much free time can be dangerous (resulting in fights) in situations of social and psychological instability. A by-product of the SPA educational process is that the soldiers in the QAs will have more activities to occupy their time. In this regard, the team recommends that each QA have sporting facilities, at least a football field and basketball court, and that sporting activities be established to allow soldiers some diversion and exercise.

3.4. TIME AND OBJECTIVES OF THE FAA

The UN agenda and its divisions of time focus on the process of achieving peace. Although also interested in peace, the FAA has other objectives and priorities, such as victory and national security. At times the resulting schedules clash, as when the FAA attack on Huambo in November 1994 was seen as a threat to the Lusaka peace process. These differences continue into this immediately-postwar phase. While the UN emphasizes rapid and thorough demobilization and demilitarization, and is more focused on the problems of civil society, the FAA is more concerned about the future (and future composition) of the military force that will continue to exist after the war.

This means that the FAA has different fundamental interests in what happens during this time. Leaders of the FAA may think that rapid demobilization is not in the army's best interests. If the current FAA-UNITA military relationship means that UNITA does not represent a present danger, then the FAA's lesson from the Bicesse experience might be to delay its own demobilization until any future threat (from UNITA) has been eliminated. This could mean that the FAA will (or will try to) delay demobilizing until after UNITA forces have been disarmed, and some UNITA soldiers dispersed, while others have been integrated into the FAA.

A slower demobilization also allows the FAA more time to census both armies and select the soldiers it wants to keep. In terms of programs, this would mean more emphasis on the military census of UNITA soldiers in the QAs and on a FAA census of its own troops. Then, on the basis of those censuses, the FAA could select more accurately the FAA and UNITA soldiers that it wants to keep. The others could then be classified as "excess personnel" (Lusaka Protocol) and demobilized. Demobilization, from FAA's point of view, is the result of troops not being selected into the continuing FAA.

Even that demobilization may be partial if the plans for an active reserve and for "civic action" programmes are carried out. Both of these plans are other ways to plan for (or alternatives to) reintegration. The creation and filling of an active reserve would mean that soldiers leaving the FAA only leave part-way; they become part-time soldiers and would continue to receive a salary

as soldiers. Civic action programmes feature campaigns in which troops (active soldiers or groups of demobilized or reserve soldiers) work on public projects, such as repairing roads and public buildings (schools, clinics, etc.), or in vaccination or mass literacy programmes. With civic action programmes, soldiers do not demobilize and reintegrate as individuals, but remain in military or quasi-military units that continue to work together, usually under military direction.

Creating a reserve and civic action programmes are alternative ways to address two central concerns of reintegration programmes: (1) providing employment for demobilizing soldiers so that they do not become frustrated at finding themselves unemployed, and (2) finding existing (or creating new) organizations that have the management capacity to establish major employment-generating programmes right now. Since the FAA already exists and has the ability to handle large numbers of workers, using the FAA means that programmes could be implemented quickly without needing to start new organizations or find and hire staff, rent space, etc.

The major problem from the UN point of view is that the reserve and civic action programmes limit and delay demilitarization. Instead of dismantling military units and re-orienting people (ex-soldiers) away from military ways, these programmes maintain soldier, or soldier-like, positions and units. Instead of reducing the FAA and expanding the importance of civil (non-military) society in Angola, these programmes expand the role of the FAA into postwar civil society.

3.5 TIME AND OBJECTIVES OF UNITA

Although the terms of the Lusaka Protocol may offer UNITA a number of concessions (positions at various levels of government, etc.), leaders of UNITA may think that rapid demobilization is not in their best interests. The reasoning parallels that of the FAA to some extent. At the moment the military advantage lies with the FAA, which diminishes the leverage that UNITA can exert. Also, although assistance has been promised to demobilizing soldiers, those programmes are not yet in place.

The current military advantage that FAA enjoys has been purchased at a high price; arms and supplies cost a lot. For how long will the Government be able to maintain such an expense after the cease-fire, even if the pace of demobilization is slow? If UNITA delays and maintains its force intact, the Government may cut some of the FAA's funding, or the FAA may auto-demobilize to a degree, which will increase UNITA's leverage. Delaying will also increase the likelihood that promised programmes will be functioning by the time that UNITA's soldiers demobilize and try to reintegrate.

The danger to delay is that both sides (FAA and UNITA) are making the same calculations, and there is a danger of renewed military engagements. If leaders of the FAA believe that it was their military advantage and success on the ground that convinced UNITA to sign the Lusaka Protocol, then they will probably want to continue using that might-is-right approach. It is expensive to maintain the current military advantage of the FAA, especially in "peacetime."

After waiting in vain for some time to see if UNITA is going to demobilize, the leaders of FAA might be tempted to increase the military pressure on UNITA.

4. SOCIAL PROFILES AND EXPECTATIONS OF FAA AND UNITA SOLDIERS WHO MIGHT BE DEMOBILIZED

4.1. SOURCES FOR THE SOCIAL PROFILE

The qualitative and quantitative data that the team collected during April 1995 by surveying active troops serving with the FAA and with UNITA are the primary source of our hypotheses and conclusions in this report about the social profile and socio-economic expectations of the troops currently serving with the FAA and with UNITA. The team also utilized information from three previous studies that concerned Angolan ex-soldiers who were demobilized in 1991-92 (post-Bicesse). Two of these studies were conducted at that time (1992), while the third study was conducted by our team in late 1994. These three studies are:

1) A census conducted in 1992 by the Angolan Ministry of Defense of the troops who were at that time in FAPLA, the previous national army. This census was very large (80,800 returned questionnaires). The objective was to provide general features of the troops to be demobilized. It is difficult to evaluate the reliability of the data in this study because the report does not explain what happened to the rest of the 133,161 questionnaires that were distributed. The unexplained absence of 52,361 questionnaires leaves much room for bias in the findings.

2) A 1992 study conducted by two NGOs, OIKOS and ADRA Angolana, to discover the social profile, general features, and expectations of 604 post-Bicesse demobilized ex-soldiers who were interested in participating in agricultural development projects that the NGOs were planning in Huambo, Huila, and Malanje Provinces. These data obviously represent only one segment of the demobilized population, i.e., those who were interested in farming in these provinces.

3) A 1994 study sponsored by UCAH and conducted by our team that interviewed 200 post-Bicesse demobilized ex-soldiers who were relatively urbanized in character. The survey did not claim to be representative of the population of all post-Bicesse demobilized ex-soldiers. This was an exploratory survey to complement the earlier studies and pretest formal and informal data-collection methods to be used in a later survey of active soldiers and during the registration of troops in the QAs (third objective of this study). Groups of ex-soldiers with different characteristics were surveyed in four urban areas: Benguela, Luanda, Lubango, and Malanje. Both a formal questionnaire and informal focus groups were used. The study was conducted because neither the FAA nor UNITA were willing at that time to allow us to interview active soldiers. Information from this study was an important part of the first draft of this report (December 1994), but is relegated to a supporting role in this report, which is based primarily on the April 1995 survey of active troops.

4) The April 1995 survey utilized both formal and informal methods (see section 2.4 for more information on our methodology). Troops were surveyed at seven sites, four FAA bases

(Luanda, Lubango, Luena, and Menongue) and three UNITA bases (Bailundo, Mavinga, and Negage). A questionnaire was administered to 595 troops (295 from the FAA and 300 from UNITA). This questionnaire utilized some questions from the earlier studies, plus some new questions, and was pretested before being administered. Informal focus group dialogues were also conducted at each site, each group consisting of 5-10 soldiers. The sample of 595 questionnaires was reduced later to 500 (250 from each group) for more intensive statistical analysis.

This report utilizes both the formal (quantitative) and informal (qualitative) data from the April 1995 survey to generate hypotheses and conclusions about the social profile and expectations of active soldiers, but the body of the report does not contain many statistics. A detailed statistical analysis of data from the 500 questionnaires is attached (see Appendix 6.2).

4.2. IMPORTANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE APRIL 1995 SURVEY

The primary objective of this study was to develop a social profile of soldiers who will be demobilized after the Lusaka Protocol, including an understanding of those soldiers' expectations for reintegration. This study advances this objective significantly with a controlled set of data collected from varying sets of troops from both sides of the conflict who were stationed in various provinces of the country.

Although this report concentrates on the findings of our research, it is useful to recognize that the study already has had another important impact. Conducting the April 1995 survey of active troops had a strong impact on the people (and armed forces) who were interviewed. High officials of each side personally accompanied the team during its fieldwork ("trabalho de campo"). The most-often heard expression was that "Now, yes, the United Nations is getting close to the protagonists and getting concerned about our perspectives" ("Agora, sim, as Nacoes Unidas esta perto dos protagonistas, preocupando-se com as suas expectativas"). A high-ranking UNITA official in Negage said that there were two phenomena that gave UNITA more confidence in the peace process: the arrival of the "blue helmets" and this study about what the troops were thinking.

There were important differences between how the FAA and UNITA perceived the importance of the study. For UNITA, the emphasis was political and connected to the UN role in observing, verifying, and managing the peace process. There were many references to Bicesse and about how the UN had to be impartial and neutral. There was a great emphasis on the role of the blue helmets, demonstrating indirectly the high levels of distrust about the GOA. The UNITA officials valued the survey because it expressed an image that the UN was being "close" to ("proximidade") the UNITA-controlled population, as well as expressing interest and respect for the opinions of the UNITA troops. An official in Negage said that they did not have this type of experience during the Bicesse period.

For the FAA, the emphasis was on the role of the UN in assisting the process of national reconstruction. The value was seen as more socio-economic. Officials emphasized the relationship between the UN and the international donor community, and the possibility of

receiving financial aid for reintegration programs. Some mentioned the importance of the UN being able to convince UNITA that the only alternative was peace ("possa convencer a UNITA de que a unica alternativa e a paz").

These immediate impacts are important, but the most important outcome of this research should be better planning and implementation of demobilization and reintegration programs. This study brings out new insights and ideas that should help focus these programs to better serve their intended clientele. The April 1995 survey provides insights into the troops' perspectives and expectations, as well as revealing different categories of soldiers with different resources and orientations. The existence of this heterogeneity demonstrates the necessity of planning a variety of programs for demobilization and reintegration. What the survey cannot reveal, because of the problem of not being demonstrably representative, is the proportions of these different categories of soldiers in the two military populations. What percentage of FAA and UNITA troops prefer one or the other type of reintegration program? What percentage of troops will desire to live in rural areas or larger cities? Acquiring this information requires a complete census of the troops or a larger random stratified sample. Therefore, the reader of this report should remember that most of the following statements about the social profiles and expectations of troops who might be demobilized are hypotheses rather than conclusions. Hypotheses are statements of belief that should be tested further, as compared with conclusions that are more definitive because they are based on adequate testing.

The data collected in April 1975 are valuable and insightful and were collected by social scientists who tried to manage the data-collection process to maximize its validity and reliability while minimizing any bias. However, the resulting social profile would be more accurate (and the team would have more confidence in our analysis) if it were based on interviews with a demonstrably representative sample of active soldiers in both armies. Representativeness refers to the relationship between a population and a sample of that population. The issue is the extent to which the sample is an accurate expression of the features and variation of the larger population from which the sample was drawn.

Instead of being selected by the team or another unbiased observer in a random or stratified way, the samples were selected by the two armies. The team does not know the criteria that the two sides used, but it is logical to assume that they wanted us to observe and interview their better and more educated troops. Also, it is logical to assume that the two sides wanted the team to report on the troops in ways that would favor the two armies and their political positions. This is perhaps more true for UNITA than for the FAA. This means that the sides may have chosen to show the team a sample of troops who were more politically aware, and it is also certain that the troops were briefed before the interviews on some of the implications of the study, thus introducing some degree of bias.

The importance of the question of representativeness depends on the extent to which the differences between the samples and their populations (FAA and UNITA troops) differ in social, psychological, and economic features. There may be important differences between the samples that are analyzed in this report and the larger populations of troops in terms of key indicators such as education, urban versus rural orientation, preferences for training programs versus help

with employment, etc. Similarly, the 1994 sample of ex-soldiers who were demobilized two to three years ago (1991-92) is biased toward those with a preference for living in large cities, since that is where our interviews of ex-soldiers were conducted. The forces of UNITA apparently consist of two components, a standing army similar to the FAA and a more loosely-organized militia that is mobilized when needed. The sample of UNITA troops was drawn from the standing army component. To the extent that there are significant differences between the soldiers in the two components, the sample does not represent the militia members.

There is also a problem with confidentiality. The interviews were deliberately conducted in an open ("transparent") manner. Officials of the army whose troops were being interviewed were present during the interviews, often listening to the informal focus group dialogues and the explanations that the team gave to people who were filling out the questionnaires, even assisting the troops to fill out the questionnaires if there were problems in understanding the questions. This transparency was purposeful, so that everyone realized the open agenda of the research and the neutrality of the questions and orientation, but this also means that the troops did not have any confidentiality in answering. This would obviously diminish the possibility that any of the respondents would voice opinions that their officers might criticize.

Even given these problems of representativeness and confidentiality, the team is confident that the data collected allows us to gain valuable insights into the socio-economic features and expectations of FAA and UNITA troops as they begin to confront the possibility of demobilization. This confidence is based on our control of the data-management process, the team's analysis of prior research in Angola, and team members' general expertise and experience with similar socioeconomic situations in other countries.

The survey also reflects the geographic and military heterogeneity of Angola. The seven sites that were visited vary geographically, socially, culturally, economically, and in terms of the historic and current military situation. FAA troops were visited in three sites:

1. Luanda, the capital, an northern urban region with no recent warfare.
2. Lubango, a southern urban area traditionally isolated from active warfare.
3. Luena, a city with rural features in the central interior in a region characterized by warfare, and the 1991 site of a major battle.
4. Menongue, a city with rural features in the southeastern interior, also in a region characterized by constant warfare.

UNITA troops were visited in three sites:

1. Bailundo, the current capital for UNITA, a village that falls between being urban and rural, located in the central region.
2. Mavinga, a rural zone in the far southeastern interior, in an area traditionally marked by warfare, but with no recent activity.
3. Negage, a northern area with partially urbanized characteristics, in a zone marked by recent warfare and existing tensions.

The importance of our findings may be recognized by confronting a common set of assumptions about UNITA troops that were not confirmed by our data. Most observers believe that the majority of UNITA's soldiers are living with or near their immediate family and are more rural

and farming oriented than FAA's soldiers (see section 4.4 where these speculations are projected over different time periods). The UNITA troops are seen as carriers of a typically rural culture, with strong ties to family, agriculture, and land. The soldiers are believed to have less geographic mobility and less contact with people of other ethnicities, being Ovimbundu in an Ovimbundu territory. Their perspectives are assumed to be those of village farmers ("camponeses"). This means that UNITA's soldiers can resume fairly easily a stable family and farming life after demobilization. In programme terms, this implies that agricultural programmes are appropriate for the economic reintegration of most UNITA soldiers, and that there will be less demand for occupational training by UNITA soldiers.

These assumptions are not supported by our findings. To the contrary, our data suggest that these estimates are seriously misleading, although, as noted earlier, our data do not include the perspectives of the militia component of UNITA's forces. As will be detailed in the following section, the UNITA troops we interviewed are as urban-oriented as the FAA troops. The pre-military backgrounds of both forces are similar in many ways. In addition, whatever the pre-military difference in orientation, many UNITA soldiers lived in and experienced urban life during the 1992-94 period. Similarly, many UNITA soldiers have become familiar during their years of military service with practicing more skilled occupations (mechanic, driver, etc.), and many may believe that they can expect to be rewarded with higher-status and higher-paying work because of their years of wartime service. Aside from the obvious fact that long years of warfare can significantly change people's socio-economic horizons, UNITA as a political movement may also be demanding that its ex-soldiers have an equal opportunity to benefit from whatever training programmes are established.

This research and report ignore another important category of soldiers, those who fall within the general category of vulnerable groups. Most visible and noteworthy in Angola are the physically disadvantaged, particularly those who have been mutilated (losing feet, legs, and arms) by land mines and other explosives. Other sub-populations include those who are too old, sick, or otherwise afflicted to support themselves, and those who are so occupied in caring for others (for example, single mothers or widows with young children) that they cannot support themselves and their families without longer-term assistance. This team did not study vulnerable groups because UCAH established another team to study this category, and that team has made its own recommendations for appropriate registration and programmes (see their report).

4.3. PROFILE AND EXPECTATIONS OF FAA AND UNITA SOLDIERS

Presentation of the profile and expectations, based primarily on the April 1995 survey, are divided into sections. The first section addresses basic social and demographic features: relating the length of military service to pre-military experiences, and comparing the two samples in terms of military rank, length of service, age, education, literacy, ability to speak Portuguese, attitudes toward co-existence with ex-soldiers from the other army, and the importance of ethnic differences. The second section looks at personal mobility and urban versus rural orientation, issues of fundamental importance in planning reintegration programs. The third section examines decisions about whether to demobilize, priorities for help with reintegration, and desired

occupations and places to live after demobilization; this section most closely addresses the primary objectives of the study.

4.3.1. Basic Social and Demographic Features. The sampled soldiers were diverse in many ways, but most of them had spent all or almost all of their adult years (after 18 years of age) in the army. When they were recruited one-half of the FAA and two-thirds of the UNITA troops were students, and two-thirds of the FAA and three-quarters of the UNITA troops were living with their parents. This means these troops had no experience as independent working adults before joining the military. These are key factors to consider in planning demobilization and reintegration programs. Only about one-seventh of the troops in both samples had been married before being recruited, and about the same percentage had been farmers.

The two samples were very different in the representation of military ranks, although almost half of each sample consisted of soldiers. Almost 40 per cent of the FAA sample were sergeants, while almost 40 per cent of the UNITA sample were officers. This disproportionate presence of sergeants and officers reveals clearly that we cannot simply assume that the samples accurately represent the proportional composition of the populations of the two armed forces. This disparity in rank will also influence other variables.

The two samples were different in terms of the number of years the troops had served. Only a small percentage of FAA troops had served more than 15 years, whereas more than one-quarter of UNITA troops had served that long. Both sides had a large set (one-quarter to one-third) of soldiers who have been in the army from two to five years. Both samples had a small set (less than 10 per cent) of soldiers serving less than two years.

The UNITA soldiers were older on average; the average age of the UNITA troops was 30 years old, whereas the FAA were only 25. More than one-fifth of UNITA troops were older than 35, whereas almost none of the FAA sample were that old. Only a few child soldiers (younger than 18) were interviewed (all of them in the FAA). Neither army admitted having any women serving as soldiers.

Probably the differences in age and length of military service represent real differences in the two armed forces. UNITA troops may be older and have served longer on average than FAA troops. To some extent these two variables may be related; the older men have been in the military longer. Both of these variables may be related as well to military rank. The disproportionate number of officers in the UNITA sample may account for both the greater age and the longer period of service.

The education of people in both samples ranged from illiteracy (no schooling) into secondary school, but there were significant differences in the general level of education between the samples. The UNITA troops were distributed fairly evenly from illiteracy through primary into middle school, while the FAA troops were concentrated in the higher grades. About one-third of the UNITA troops, compared to almost three-quarters of the FAA troops, had reached middle or secondary school. Three times as many FAA troops had attended secondary school.

Both samples had about the same degree of illiteracy (one-seventh to one-fifth of the samples), which was surprising. Among the FAA troops, this was concentrated almost exclusively among the soldiers (brazos); very few sergeants and no officers were illiterate. Among the UNITA troops, however, illiteracy extended across the ranks; more than one-third of the sergeants and one-eighth of the officers were illiterate. There was a statistically significant relationship between education and military rank in the FAA sample; more education and higher rank were strongly correlated among the FAA troops. This was not true for the UNITA troops; education and rank were not strongly correlated. This is a surprising finding, as one would normally expect higher ranks to have more education.

Illiteracy was masked, or hidden, during the interviews. People were ashamed to admit that they could not read or write; this was especially evident among the FAA troops. Although everyone was asked before administering the questionnaire whether they could read and write, or whether they wanted some assistance, no one in the FAA, and only a few among UNITA, admitted at the beginning that they were illiterate. Only during the formal survey, when the soldiers had to read and fill out the written questionnaire, did it become obvious that certain people were having major problems with the questionnaire, or were only sitting and staring.

The finding of large-scale illiteracy among FAA soldiers is a surprise because the earlier census conducted in 1991-1992 showed very high levels of literacy among FAPLA soldiers. This discrepancy may be partially explained by the fact that the earlier study conducted by the Ministry of Defense only reported on some of the troops. It is highly likely that illiterates who were trying to disguise that fact had become good at explaining ways to be absent when writing was going to be required. Also, if the troops were only asked whether they could read and write, the illiterates would have replied in the affirmative.

More than 90 per cent of both samples could speak and understand spoken Portuguese, which means that the two sides were relatively similar. Even though a larger proportion (96 per cent) of FAA troops speak Portuguese (compared to 91 per cent of UNITA troops), it was more surprising to find any non-Portuguese-speakers in the FAA. Almost all of these monolingual (only an African language) people were Ovimbundu in both armed forces.

The troops on both sides agree in several respects about the possibility of living together (co-existence) peacefully after demobilization. One-fourth to one-fifth believe that it will be easy. Two-thirds to three-quarters believe that it will be possible or easy. Only a few people on both sides think that it will be impossible. However, the UNITA troops are more optimistic than the FAA; almost one-third of the FAA troops (compared with one-tenth of UNITA) believe that living together will be difficult. Comparing these percentages with studies conducted in 1992 shows that there is less confidence now (after the failure of the Bicesse peace process and its bloody aftermath) in the ease of co-existence, but there is still a strong majority opinion that it is at least possible. This agrees with the team's findings from interviewing post-Bicesse demobilized ex-soldiers in 1994. They did not have a loyalty to FAPLA, but thought that all soldiers on both sides did not want war and had been forced to fight. Once the soldiers were out of the army, and the war over, the ex-soldiers would want to forget about war and fighting and get on with civilian life.

Concerning ethnicity, the two sides agree in that about three-quarters of both samples believe that their ethnicity has some advantages over other ethnicities; only about one-quarter believe that their ethnicity does not have any advantages. This is in spite of the common refrain that "We are all Angolans" ("Todos somos Angolanos"). The two sides disagree in the intensity of their belief. Half of the UNITA troops believe their ethnicity has many advantages, whereas this is true for only one-quarter of the FAA troops. However, beliefs about ethnic differences do not mean that people cannot live together peacefully. This general statement is supported in the Angolan case by the existence of many Ovimbundu troops in both armed forces.

The relationship between these beliefs about ethnicity and educational level is statistically significant only for the UNITA sample. There is no clear relationship for the FAA troops. In the UNITA sample the only obvious major difference is between the people who are illiterate and the others. Three-fourths of the illiterates think that there is no advantage to their ethnicity, whereas only one-quarter or less of people in the other educational categories think so. Similarly, fewer than one-tenth of the illiterates think that there are many advantages, while more than half of the others think that there are many advantages. If the illiterates are not counted, there is no relationship between educational level and the perception of ethnic advantage. The hypothesis that more highly educated people will be less oriented toward ethnicity is not supported by these data. There is also a methodological concern here about a factor that might have distorted the responses of the illiterate. The people who were illiterate could not complete their questionnaires on their own, but had to be orally asked each question, to which they made oral responses. To what extent were the illiterates' answers distorted by the fact that they had to verbally communicate their answers to a European non-Mbundu interviewer representing the UN? The other troops were able to answer in private and were perhaps able to better express a feeling that was repressed in the orally-communicated illiterates' responses.

4.3.2. Mobility and Rural Versus Urban Orientation. A common and often-voiced assumption in Angola is that UNITA troops are less mobile, have travelled less, and are more attached to rural areas than are FAA troops. The data from this study do not confirm this assumption. Instead, the samples are very similar in orientations, mobility, and in the trend toward an urban residence.

In this study, we distinguished rural and urban in terms of municipalities. Urban municipalities were those that were the sites for provincial capitals or large cities; all other municipalities were considered rural. We distinguished three different urban sites: smaller provincial capitals, five large cities (Benguela, Huambo, Lobito, Lubango, and Malanje), and the city of Luanda. Mobility was expressed in two ways. One was a shift in residence between birth and recruitment, or recruitment and the proposed post-demobilization location. Another was noting the number of provinces in which the men had lived during their military service. One hypothesis is that the troops who have travelled more during their military service will be more likely to live in cities, while the troops who have travelled less will be more likely to return to the province here they were born and raised and have more family.

Almost the same percentage of FAA and UNITA troops were born in rural municipalities (69 and 76 per cent, respectively), and there had been a small trend away from these municipalities

in both samples before the men were recruited into the military. The major shift from rural to urban occurred while the men were in the military. In terms of where the troops wanted to live after being demobilized, almost the same percentage of FAA and UNITA troops (slightly less than half, 49 and 47 per cent, respectively) wanted to live in a rural municipality. This trend of moving from rural to urban is general throughout the world and has been exaggerated in Angola during the past two years of more intense warfare and population displacement.

Slightly more than half (52 per cent in both samples) of the troops wanted to live in an urban area after demobilization. The major difference between the two forces was in the distribution between large cities and smaller provincial capitals. For the FAA troops, about one-quarter wanted to live in the five large cities, and about the same percentage in the smaller provincial capitals. Very few wanted to live in Luanda. One-third of the UNITA troops, on the other hand, wanted to live in the five large cities. About one-tenth wanted to live in the smaller cities, and the same percentage in Luanda.

In terms of their mobility while in the military, the UNITA troops have travelled more, living in more provinces. This might be correlated with the longer military service of the sample of UNITA troops and the presence of more officers. Comparing the two samples, almost twice as many of the FAA troops have served in only one province, which is most probably the province where they were born and recruited.

4.3.3. Information about Demobilization and Reintegration. This section consists of highlights concerning the decision to demobilize, troop priorities about help with reintegration, and the choice of where to live after leaving the military.

The Demobilization Decision. The troops want out of the army. About three-quarters of the troops in both armies wanted to demobilize, even in the face of considerable uncertainty about their future as civilians. The decision to demobilize did seem somewhat more tentative among UNITA troops, who insisted that their decision was contingent on the presence of programmes to support their reintegration into civilian life. The FAA troops who wanted to demobilize were more definitive about demobilizing in any case, even if there were few or no support programmes. We also learned through the focus group dialogues that even the one-quarter of the troops who want to remain in the army are split between those who want to be in the military (to defend the country, because they like the military life, etc.) and those who do not want to remain in the army for a long time, but hope to receive some training ("formacao professional") or education in the army before they demobilize. A number of FAA soldiers who reported that they wanted to remain in the FAA said that they wanted to remain only during the first phase ("primer fase"), which they expected to last a year or so, and during which they anticipated receiving training. Thus, the number who want to demobilize fairly soon is really greater than three-quarters.

The intensity of the desire to demobilize is a fact to be considered if the GOA or the FAA want all or most of these troops to remain in the military (global incorporation) for perhaps several years. That might result in a lot of desertion (auto-desmobilization), such as what happened after the Bicesse Accord.

Since the strength of the desire to demobilize is very important in planning demobilization and reintegration, the team analyzed this decision closely. There was a lot of variation in the decision to demobilize, much of it strong enough to be statistically significant. This included variation from one site to another for both the FAA and UNITA samples. For the FAA troops there were also significant relationships between the decision to demobilize and age, pre-military occupation, and where the person lived (rural or types of urban areas) before being recruited. For the UNITA troops there were also significant relationships between the decision to demobilize and rank, mobility during military service, and whether the person thought that he had learned a skill or trade in the army that he could use in civilian life. These relationships are described below.

In terms of the difference among sites, this is most obvious for Cuando Cubango Province, where a significantly larger proportion of troops want to leave the army (90 per cent from the FAA in Menongue, 100 per cent from UNITA in Mavinga). This may be due to the physical isolation of the area from the rest of the country, the chronic warfare and rural character, or because fewer of the troops were recruited from there, so they felt more socially isolated. Negage is also an anomaly in that only one-half of the UNITA forces want to demobilize. This may be due to heightened political awareness that UNITA needed to maintain enough troops to provide half of the continuing FAA, and the awareness of impressing the team with their need for reintegration programs, especially education and training.

This is related to the relationship between the decision to demobilize and military rank, which is statistically significant for the UNITA sample (but not for the FAA sample). For the UNITA troops, there is a strong, obvious, and inverse trend - the higher the rank, the less likely to want to demobilize. Almost 90 per cent of the soldiers want to demobilize, but only about 75 per cent of the sergeants and 65 per cent of the officers. This is the opposite of the weaker relationship in the FAA sample, where the officers are the most desirous of demobilizing and sergeants the least desirous.

This important difference needs to be explained. One hypothesis is that this difference between the two samples is based on the strength of political leadership, in which the UNITA officers are more strongly bound to stay in military service. It seems as if UNITA might have difficulties in mobilizing enough soldiers to provide its half (as per the terms of the Lusaka Protocol) of the reconstituted FAA. There may be more pressure on the UNITA troops to stay in the army, which would be expressed most in the officer levels.

The relationship between age and the demobilization decision is statistically significant only for the FAA sample, not for the UNITA sample. Among the FAA troops, the oldest (more than 35 years old) are the most reluctant to demobilize. This is probably because they are the most concerned about their ability to earn a living in civilian life. A number of older soldiers commented during the informal interviews that they did not know what they could do outside the military, and they felt too old to start looking for new employment. Surprisingly, the youngest FAA soldiers (less than 18 years old) are fairly reluctant to leave, while the troops who are between 18 and 35 years old are the most eager to get out of the army. The UNITA sample

is different, and the distribution between those deciding to stay in the army or leave is almost even among age categories.

The relationship between pre-military residence and the demobilization decision is only significant for the FAA troops and shows up most strongly in comparing those who were recruited from rural municipalities. Those recruited from rural municipalities in the province of interview (implying that they remained close to the sites where they were originally recruited) are the least desirous of demobilizing; more than 40 per cent want to remain in the army. On the other hand, only 20 per cent of those recruited from rural municipalities in other provinces (implying that they are now far away from the sites where they were originally recruited) want to remain in the army. This relationship may be related to the strongly-expressed desire by many troops during the informal focus groups to locate and re-unite with their family. The soldiers who remain in the province where they were recruited may be able to satisfy that desire now because they remain close to their families.

This may explain an anomaly. Whereas the above relationship exists for the FAA troops, an apparently contradictory relationship exists for the UNITA sample, where the relationship between the demobilization decision and mobility is statistically significant. Those who have served in only one province (where they are currently) are the most desirous to demobilize. This could be explained by a strong relationship between unbroken ties to the pre-military life and society and the desire to return to that life, or between serving in only one province and feeling less uncertain about the economic future. This explanation can fit with the opposed relationship for FAA troops by realizing that millions of Angolans have fled the countryside to take refuge in the cities and that UNITA troops have limited access to their families living in FAA-controlled cities. Whereas FAA troops living in their home province may be able to readily communicate with their families, this may not be true for UNITA troops.

The relationship between the soldier's pre-military occupation and the demobilization decision is statistically significant for only the FAA sample. Among the FAA troops, there is a clear and strong relationship, which agrees with the qualitative information gathered from focus groups about the importance of the soldiers' worry and uncertainty about their ability to earn a good living outside of the military life. Hypothetically, those who already established themselves in an occupation before entering the military should be much more likely to be willing to demobilize and enter civilian life. Soldiers who were farmers before entering the army are very likely to want to demobilize. This probably reflects their belief that they can be re-absorbed easily into farming. Those who were students before being recruited are puzzling. Although they agree with the norm (about three-quarters want to demobilize), they were among the most vociferous in the informal interviews in explaining their need for further education before agreeing to demobilize, i.e., they attached conditions to their agreement to demobilize.

The relationship between learning a useful skill or trade in the army and the demobilization decision is statistically significant only for the UNITA sample. During the informal focus group interviews, it seemed that people who had learned a skill or trade were more likely to demobilize because they had less uncertainty about entering the civilian economy. They had learned a useful skill or trade that they could depend on in civilian life. This may be true as well for the FAA

troops. In informal focus group interviews with them, some of those who intended to remain in the military really intended to remain only until they received some training. This meant that training would not keep them in the military for a long time, only until the training was completed. Unfortunately, less than one-half of the FAA and less than one-third of the UNITA samples thought that they had learned such a skill or trade in the military.

This area of teaching troops skills or trades that they could use in civilian life is critically related to planning reintegration programs. Although reintegration assumes a prior demobilization, the data strongly suggest that demobilization could be facilitated by prior training while in the military that would diminish soldiers' anxiety about competing for employment and increase the chances of long-term successful reintegration. Perhaps such a military training program could be related to the proposed involvement of troops in the physical reconstruction of Angolan infrastructure. Troops (even UNITA militia) might be more inclined to participate in the FAA, i.e., delay full demobilization, if they thought they were going to learn a skill or trade.

Priorities for Reintegration Programs. The troops were forced to choose among help with immediate employment, education or training, housing, and receiving tool kits. This was a very difficult choice for them, and most complained that they wanted help in more than one area. We explained that decisions had to be made about allocating funds to one program or another, and they reluctantly agreed to choose. Even so, a number of people marked more than one program on the questionnaire, and their answers could not be used in our final calculations.

The troops on both sides emphasized training, with the second choice being help in finding employment. Help with housing was third, and receiving tool kits was a distant fourth. The emphasis on education and training was similar in both samples. This emphasis was anticipated among the FAA troops, based on interviews with troops that were demobilized during the Bicesse period. The UNITA emphasis contradicted the widely-held assumption that most UNITA troops were rural-oriented and primarily wanted help in re-establishing themselves as farmers. Of course, the samples were not necessarily representative of the total population of either army, especially of the UNITA militia.

As the focus group dialogues made clear, there is a strong relationship between the decision to demobilize and the expectation of finding programs to help demobilizing soldiers reintegrate. The decision to demobilize is surrounded by uncertainty, worry, and concern about being able to make a living (or a good living) in civilian life. The soldiers are uncertain about their future and their capabilities in the civilian world. Most of them do not have a good idea of what to expect or of what to do. Therefore, their decision to demobilize or remain in the army is an uncertain one and may change as they receive new information, and as the political and economic environment changes.

Since their adult years have been spent in the army, and most of the soldiers had never earned their own living before becoming soldiers, almost all of the soldiers interviewed were uncertain about how they could earn a living outside of the military and felt unprepared for civilian life. The emphasis on "formacao" (training) and education reflects the soldiers' worries. They are

seeking something that could give them an advantage in civilian life. In this sense, the importance of training and education programs is as much emotional as financial.

The existence of so much uncertainty means that civilian reintegration programmes will not only help ex-soldiers adapt to civilian life, but will help attract them out of the army. The soldiers can be attracted to civilian life (demobilizing) or to military life (remaining in the army for a while) by the existence of training and general education programmes. If there are some programmes that will help them adapt to civilian life, more soldiers will likely demobilize. On the other hand, if the FAA starts training programmes, and there are no places for soldiers in the civilian programmes, there is more likelihood that a larger number of soldiers will stay longer in the army to take advantage of the FAA training programmes.

Since the troops' interest in different types of reintegration program is very important in planning demobilization and reintegration, the team analyzed this decision closely. There was a lot of variation in the decision about priorities for reintegration programs, much of it strong enough to be statistically significant. This included variation by education and desired future occupation for both the FAA and UNITA samples. For only the FAA troops there were also significant relationships between the priorities for reintegration programs and rank and where the troops desired to live post-demobilization. For only the UNITA troops there were also significant relationships between the priorities for reintegration programs and whether troops thought they had learned a useful skill or trade and their pre-military occupation.

The relationship with education was significant for both the FAA and UNITA samples. The relationship is clear, understandable, and linear for the FAA troops, with some discrepancies for the UNITA sample. Those with less education (illiterates up through those who completed primary school) are most concerned about getting immediate employment. Those with more education (middle school and up) are most concerned about getting more education. The more educated are aware of their opportunities for better employment with more training. Based on this relationship, it looks as if the less well educated have lower aspirations for their future. The higher aspirations of the more well educated among the FAA troops seem to be more realistic than among the UNITA troops, where many seeking further education have unrealistic aspirations (becoming physicians or engineers, etc.). Among the FAA troops, there is more emphasis on middle-level or technical positions or becoming drivers or businessmen.

Probably the biggest surprise in the future occupations that the troops desire is the unpopularity of farming, which is even more unpopular among UNITA troops. Only one-eighth of the FAA troops wanted to be farmers, and the UNITA percentage was half of that. This may reflect the purposeful selection of the sample (more politically aware, more urban-oriented) by the two armies, or may reflect a generally widespread disinclination among troops to go to rural areas to farm.

Both sides favor becoming mechanics and drivers, but the similarities stop there. UNITA troops (but not FAA) favor becoming health workers and teachers. Both careers can utilize military-related experience or training, and there are also family precedents for these careers, as many of the UNITA troops' fathers were health workers and teachers when their sons entered the

military. A highly unrealistic ambition is that one-quarter of the UNITA troops want to become high-level professionals, such as physicians or engineers. This ambition requires a lot of formal schooling, which the UNITA troops lack. On the other hand, one-quarter of the FAA troops favor more accessible occupations, such as businessmen or middle-level professionals (accountants, journalists, telecommunications technicians, etc.). Few UNITA troops chose business or middle-level professions as occupations.

The relationship between priorities for reintegration programs and desired future (post-demobilization) occupation was significant for both samples. Looking only at those occupations for which there is a lot of demand, the only ones that give highest priority to help with employment over training are farmers and mechanics for the FAA troops and drivers and mechanics for the UNITA troops. A similar relationship between priorities for reintegration programs and pre-military occupations was significant only for the UNITA sample. The only occupation that gave a higher priority to help with employment over training was farming. In the FAA sample troops who had been farmers and mechanics preferred employment programs.

The relationship between priorities for reintegration programs and military rank was significant and obvious only for the FAA sample. Education and employment programs are the most important for all ranks. Employment programs are the most important to soldiers, while training programs are the most important to both sergeants and officers. While this relationship was not significant for the UNITA sample, sergeants were the only rank to prefer employment programs over education, while two-thirds of the officers chose education as their top priority.

The relationship between priorities for reintegration programs and whether the troops thought that they had learned a useful skill or trade was significant only for the UNITA sample, where the relationship is obvious and understandable. Those people who think that they have learned a useful skill want help finding employment; more than half chose this type of program as their priority. Those who do not think that they already have learned a useful skill are more likely (70% and higher) to want programs that focus on training, housing, or tool kits.

The relationship between priorities for reintegration programs and the desired location after demobilization is significant only for the FAA sample, where the relationship is clear, linear, and understandable. Either variable can be assumed to be influencing the other. Troops who wish to return to rural areas are most concerned about finding employment, or, restated, troops who are most concerned about immediate employment wish to go to rural municipalities or areas. Troops who wish to go to urban areas are most concerned about receiving more education or training, or, restated, those who want more education or training wish to go to urban areas (where such programs are more likely to be found or started). For FAA troops this relationship is similar to the relationship between education and the priorities for reintegration programs. This probably means that higher education and the desire to go to urban areas are related.

Post-demobilization Residence. Another important variable is where soldiers think that they want to live and work after leaving the army. This has many implications for demobilization and reintegration programs, from the immediate - how much transport is needed from the QAs, and how long will be the trips? - to the longer-term concerns of where reintegration programs need

to be located to service demobilized troops, and whether there is a good fit between where the troops want to live and the economic opportunities that will become available in postwar Angola. Two specific alternatives that were considered were whether the troops would return to their home (natal) province, or whether they would choose to remain in the province where they were currently located (and interviewed). Since the troops' decision about their post-demobilization destination is very important in planning demobilization and reintegration, the team analyzed this decision and these two alternatives closely.

The issue of where the troops wanted to live after being demobilized was noted earlier in the section on mobility and rural-urban preferences. Almost the same percentage (slightly less than one-half) of FAA and UNITA troops wanted to live in a rural municipality, and slightly more than half in both samples wanted to live in an urban area after demobilization. The major difference between the two forces was in the distribution between large cities and smaller provincial capitals. For the FAA troops, about one-quarter wanted to live in the five large cities, and about the same percentage in the smaller provincial capitals. Very few wanted to live in Luanda. One-third of the UNITA troops, on the other hand, wanted to live in the five large cities. About one-tenth wanted to live in the smaller cities, and the same percentage in Luanda.

There was a lot of variation within the samples concerning the alternative post-demobilization destinations (home or current province), much of it strong enough to be statistically significant. The relationship between the desire to return home and three variables was significant for both samples; these variables were the current location, military rank, and the desire to remain living in the current province. There was also a significant relationship between the desire to return home and educational level for the FAA troops and mobility for the UNITA troops.

The relationship between the desire to remain in the current province and the current location of the troops was significant for both samples. There was also a significant relationship between the desire to remain in the current location and military rank and mobility for UNITA troops.

There was almost complete agreement between FAA and UNITA troops in that two-thirds wanted to return to their home province to live. However, there was a big difference between the samples in terms of their remaining where they were currently located. Whereas one-fourth of the FAA troops will remain in their current province after demobilization, almost all of the UNITA troops will leave. This discrepancy is largely explained by understanding that two-thirds of the FAA troops who want to stay in their current location are now stationed in their home province. Many more of the FAA troops in the sample are serving in their natal province than are the UNITA troops sampled, so the number of FAA troops willing to remain in the current province is largely explained by the fact that they are serving now in their natal province. This is contrary to the hypothesis that UNITA troops are more likely to be serving in their home province. Of course, the samples are not necessarily representative of the whole populations.

The differences among troops by the sites where they were stationed was significant for both alternatives and both samples. In the FAA sample the desire to return home to live was fairly stable across the four sites where the FAA troops were surveyed. This stability is understandable and would be explained in terms of a general cultural attachment to family and a general

uncertainty about living in an unfamiliar location. However, this stability runs counter to the hypothesis that troops staying in the biggest cities (Luanda and Lubango) will be most likely to remain there and not return home. There was approximately the same amount of variation among the four sites for the FAA sample in terms of the troops' interest in remaining in their current province (where interviewed) after demobilization. For the UNITA sample, Mavinga (Cuando Cubango Province) was strikingly different than the other two sites. Almost all of the troops in Mavinga wanted to return home, and almost none wanted to stay there. This difference between Cuando Cubango and other provinces was not as marked in the FAA sample, where both Cuando Cubango and Luanda Provinces were disfavored by FAA troops in terms of living there after being demobilized.

For both the UNITA and FAA samples the relationship between the desire to return home to live and military rank is significant. For the FAA sample the relationship is obvious and inverse. As rank increases, the men are less likely to desire to return to their natal province to live after demobilization. About four of every five soldiers want to return to their home province, about three of every five sergeants, and about half of the officers. The relationship is not as obvious for the UNITA sample. Both soldiers and officers are about the same in their desire to return home. The sergeants are less desirous, but any differences may be due to the small size of the sergeant category.

The relationship between the desire to return to live at home and education is significant only for the FAA sample, but in both samples the relationship is similar - those with less education are more likely to want to return home to live. As education increases, the desire to return home to live decreases.

Similarly, the relationship between the desire to return to live at home and mobility is significant only for the UNITA sample, but in both samples the relationship is similar - those with less mobility are more likely to want to return home to live. As mobility increases, the desire to return home to live decreases. Although this same trend is evident in the FAA sample, it is not as strongly pronounced.

The relationships between the desire to continue living in the current province and military rank and mobility are statistically significant only for the UNITA sample and are not obviously linear. Among the UNITA troops, sergeants are twice as likely (as soldiers or officers) to want to remain where they are currently stationed. Both soldiers and officers are about the same in their desire to leave the current province. This relationship, which also exists less pronounced in the FAA sample, cannot be easily explained now. Similarly, there is no obvious linearity in the relationship with mobility in either sample. Those with the least and the most mobility are more likely to remain in their current province after demobilization. This probably reflects an underlying combination of factors. Some of those who have served in only one province are recently recruited and are still stationed in their home province. Staying for them means staying home. Perhaps some of those with the most experience have been able to return to their home province, or have in some other way attached themselves in their current location.

4.3.4. Implications for Global Incorporation. The findings of this research have implications for the planning and success or failure of the proposed programme of global incorporation. The concept of global incorporation means that UNITA troops are transformed into FAA troops when they arrive at the quartering areas. Currently, there is some discussion about the length of time that this expanded FAA (containing all current troops of both armies) will exist before anyone is demobilized. In one version, soldiers who wish to demobilize will start doing so within a matter of months, or within a year. In another version, demobilization will not start for more than one year, and could last as long as three years.

The findings of this survey cast doubt on whether the FAA can afford to wait a long time before starting demobilization or, restated, whether soldiers will wait that long to demobilize. Even if soldiers are ordered to remain in the army, there is a real possibility of massive "auto-desmobilizacão" (self-directed demobilization, or desertion) if all of the soldiers are required to remain in the army after the war is over.

The extent of auto-desmobilizacão may vary between the two armies. Soldiers in the FAA are more definite about wanting out, even without reintegration programmes, and they may repeat the major desertions that occurred from FAPLA in 1991-92. This is especially likely if the FAA does not start an active large-scale training program for soldiers to attract them to remain.

On the other hand, what may happen to UNITA is more complex. UNITA troops are apparently composed of both a standing army component and a militia component. This latter is a set of soldiers who are not continually mobilized as a military unit, but who can be mobilized when they are needed. UNITA soldiers are not likely to be pleased when they learn that they are expected to remain within the FAA for some indefinite period of time. It is entirely possible that soldiers in the militia component will be less likely to respond to the request to appear at quartering areas. After all, these troops have to be mobilized in order to then be demobilized. Similarly, although the UNITA troops sampled (part of the standing army component) were more insistent on their need to have help before they agreed to demobilize, they were not asked about their reaction to being ordered to remain within the FAA for years.

The team believes, based on its study of the troops in Angola and relevant experience elsewhere, that delaying demobilization for a long time (more than a year), in the absence of a strong training programme in the FAA, will result in fewer UNITA troops coming to quartering areas and higher rates of self-directed demobilization among FAA troops.

The presence of a strong training programme in the FAA is likely to attract soldiers to remain in the army, but only until they have completed the training. One of the interesting findings among UNITA troops is the correlation between having learned a useful trade in the army and the decision to demobilize. Those who have learned a useful trade or skill (that they can apply in civilian life) are more likely to demobilize than those who have not learned anything useful. The projection from this finding is that training programmes in the FAA are likely to encourage demobilization among the graduates, because they will feel better qualified to earn a living outside of the army.

5. PROCESS, PSYCHOSOCIAL CHANGES, AND SOLDIERS' VIEWPOINTS

The preceding section analyzed the profile and expectations of FAA and UNITA troops as of April 1995. The UN and other organizations should not assume that the profile and expectations will continue as they were; ideas and anticipations will change as the national picture evolves, and as more information becomes available. This section presents ideas about psychosocial changes that may occur as troops go through the processes of demobilization and reintegration. The key concepts emphasized here are social dynamics, uncertainty, and heterogeneity.

Social dynamics refers to the fact that people are decision-makers, not merely passive pawns in a game played by organizations. The organizations control important resources and will attempt to shape people's activities to satisfy organizational objectives. Plans made by the UN and FAA (and donor countries and NGOs) form an important part of the environment in which people have to make decisions, just as the weather is very important in farmers' decisions and lives, but farmers make plans based on more than just the weather. The soldiers will be affected by the plans of organizations, but the soldiers as individuals and members of groups are also trying to make their own decisions about what is best for them and their families. Their decisions will express their values and motivation for welfare, employment, personal safety, and happiness.

Uncertainty is a key element affecting these decisions and must be taken into account in planning programmes. Demobilization, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction are processes in which human beings confront changing situations and have to make decisions that can have major impacts on their lives and futures. Conditions change through time, so people are always making decisions based on their knowledge of the past, and some expectation of the degree to which the future will resemble the past. Each decision has to be made with inadequate information, so there is always uncertainty and risk. For instance, many active soldiers are aware that the FAPLA soldiers who were demobilized post-Bicesse were ill-treated and feel "abandonado" (abandoned or forgotten). Yet the UN and FAA are going to promise better conditions this time. Which is to be believed, and how can people plan their reintegration when they do not know whether they will also be "abandonado?"

Heterogeneity is a key concept in making better plans because all soldiers are not alike. One important difference is in rank and the differential expectations of officers and soldiers of lower rank. There are many other differences in terms of soldiers' interests, capabilities, skills, and access to important resources, including information. Organizations should not anticipate a uniform response by any group, no matter how "well-disciplined" its members are. For this reason, this report does not portray a single and uniform soldiers' situation and response. Instead, the variation in possible soldiers' conditions is presented, along with the variety of soldiers' possible attitudes (including fear, pessimism, skepticism, and optimism) and responses.

The previous sections outlined agendas proposed by the UN, the FAA, or UNITA. This section presents a conceptual calendar (time periods T1 - T5) that concentrates on possible changes in soldiers' psychosocial status and residential location. The proposed set of soldier-based time

periods begins in wartime and ends after the demobilized soldiers have begun to stabilize their lives and careers after demobilization. These theoretical periods are based on the situations of lower-ranking soldiers and would have to be modified to reflect perspectives of officers with higher ranks. The information about UNITA's militia soldiers is more tentative than the ideas about other soldiers. Note that this overall scenario assumes the successful continuation of the peace process.

These periods may not represent the actual conditions of any specific individual, but provide a general idea of soldiers' changing conditions and perspectives. Since there are important differences among soldiers, different scenarios have to be established (through empirical research) for different soldiers. Also, soldiers' experiences during the periods have to be adjusted to reflect differences and ongoing changes in the military situation and residence of different soldiers, such as the movement of UNITA troops out of Huambo and much of UIGE during November 1994, and the movement of FAA troops into these locations. There may be fewer changes during this time for soldiers who are residentially stable, such as FAA troops stationed in Luanda and other major cities. The same may be true for UNITA's troops who are stationed near their families, since the movement into QAs for these soldiers may not entail any actual or major change of residence, and residential stability may have facilitated their already making post-demobilization plans.

5.4.1 T1 (Wartime). Soldiers are combat-ready. Many are prepared to be in combat, although only some are actually intermittently engaged in combat. There may be differences between the two armies in the extent to which FAA or UNITA's soldiers are more often personally engaged in operations. All of these soldiers are obeying direct orders and living in military units under military discipline of their officers. The primary occupation and preoccupation is war. Soldiers may think about life after the war, but without making firm plans. Regarding this, there will be important differences between the standing army and militia components of UNITA's forces. The military-orientation of all of these soldiers may be low. There are few volunteers on either side; almost all soldiers are serving as an obligation. Many soldiers were forcibly recruited and have little loyalty to their army, although this may vary between the two armies.

Most FAA soldiers are living in urban areas (major cities and provincial capitals). Most or all FAA soldiers are housed in military housing and spend most of their time in military units with other soldiers. Many FAA soldiers are isolated from their families (parents, siblings, et al.) and are probably unsure about their families' current whereabouts, health, and living conditions. (In the Angolan context, a person's family means that person's lineage and does not mean the spouse.) Many FAA soldiers will be married, and sometimes their wives will be living nearby.

Very few of UNITA's soldiers (after leaving Huambo and Uige) are living now in major cities. Almost all are living in municipal centers and rural areas. There will be important differences between those serving in the standing army and those in the militia components of UNITA's forces. Some UNITA soldiers are housed with and spend most of their time in military units with other soldiers, but many UNITA soldiers may be living with their wives and children. These UNITA soldiers may be living in household units in what could be called "military villages" with their wives and children, or could be living with other soldiers, but near their

wives and children with the opportunity for frequent visits. Many UNITA soldiers are unsure about their families' current whereabouts, health, and living conditions, but some or many soldiers may be stationed near their families, who are also living in municipal centers or rural areas that are controlled by UNITA (or in the cities of Huambo and Uige, which were controlled until recently by UNITA).

5.4.2 T2 (Cease-fire). Soldiers continue to live in military housing and in military units with other soldiers and to obey orders from their officers. Scattered fighting continues for awhile, but soldiers "step-down" a little in terms of combat readiness (note the assumption that the peace process continues to develop successfully). Those in positions of command (officers of various ranks) may not diminish their combat-readiness, or combat-orientation, because this is a time of great uncertainty. As the period of cease-fire continues, and fighting slows and more or less stops (scattered incidents probably continue), soldiers begin to be less ready for combat and to think more about postwar life. There may be troop movements, and soldiers might be moved to more permanent, less field-oriented quarters ("limited disengagement" in Lusaka Protocol) as both armies become more confident that the cease-fire will work.

Many soldiers will become impatient and frustrated at the pace of the peace and demobilization process, especially because they remain uncertain whether they will continue in the army or be among the soldiers to be demobilized. Although some soldiers have enjoyed the army life for different reasons, they are a minority. Most soldiers have hoped for a long time that the war would end, and they could leave the army, go home or to the city, have a normal family life, etc. However, as demobilization becomes more possible, there is increasing ambiguity about whether they would be better off remaining in the army. After hoping for a long time to get out, soldiers begin to think better about the army (its security of housing, food, etc.) when they get closer to the uncertainties of civilian life. The soldiers demobilized after Bicesse emphasized this point when they referred to demobilization as the equivalent of losing their employment and facing permanent unemployment. Even with this economic incentive (security), the majority of soldiers will want to leave the army. Some of UNITA's soldiers may be more reluctant to leave their military units because of UNITA's need to mobilize enough men to provide half of the troops of the continuing FAA.

Most of the soldiers in both armies really know very little about surviving outside of the army. Many were students before being recruited and only know about being either a student or a soldier. Many soldiers have been mobile during their army service, being moved from one province to another, so they learn about different places, but may not establish stable relationships anywhere. Soldiers may get married during their service, or form temporary relationships with women in different locations, but this does not help orient the soldiers to what might be future civilian livelihoods.

Troops in the two components of UNITA's forces may be very different. The survey in April 1995 revealed many insights into troops in UNITA's stinging army, but soldiers in UNITA's militia may have been less mobile and have spent much of their army service near or in their home province. Many UNITA soldiers may have maintained or established marriages during their army service, and their wives may be cultivating while their husbands are serving nearby

in the army. UNITA's soldiers in the militia may be already established as agriculturists, at least through their wives, and would not be as uncertain about their plans after leaving the army. Many of UNITA's soldiers may be intending to settle with their wives and continue as agriculturalists. Clearly these ideas about UNITA's militia are speculative.

Countering this is the recognition that: (1) many of UNITA's soldiers in its standing army have spent the 1993-94 period in cities and may have become more urban-oriented; and (2) UNITA's leadership may not want their soldiers to demobilize to rural areas, may want to continue or strengthen UNITA's urban presence, and may want its ex-soldiers to receive all of the possible training (professional formation) that might be offered by postwar programmes. The soldiers in the standing army component of UNITA may be very similar to the soldiers in the FAA.

Since soldiers are still restricted in their movements in this period, and the general population has not yet started readjusting from its wartime displacement, there is little or no improvement in soldiers' knowledge about the location and current conditions of their families. Social and residential differences among soldiers and between soldiers in the two armies continue, and some FAA and UNITA soldiers might be able to begin spending more time with their wives and children.

The impending movement of UNITA's troops to QAs, which will be new locations under UN (and perhaps some FAA) supervision or control, will accentuate uncertainty among UNITA's troops. Some or all of the soldiers serving with UNITA may be integrated into FAA at some time, but the exact nature and chronology of that integration is not clear to the authors of this report and must be a source of uncertainty to UNITA's soldiers. FAA soldiers will be remaining in established barracks, and there may be very little change in their immediate supervisors (depending on the degree to which UNAVEM exercises any obvious control), so the "move to QAs" might involve little if any immediate change for them.

The UN plans anticipate that the move to QAs will occur at least 90 days after the establishment of UNAVEM 111. This timetable depends on several factors, including the time needed for the physical construction of necessary facilities at the cantons for UNITA's soldiers. As noted earlier, neither the FAA nor UNITA may be interested in accelerating this transition. (From the perspective of July 1995, it is obvious that events have moved much slower than envisaged in the UN plans.)

5.4.3 T3 (Movement to, and Stay in, Quartering Areas). The actual move to QAs (for UNITA's troops) or to barracks (for FAA soldiers) will be an important change for some soldiers, and will signal the beginning of a time of important changes for many more soldiers. The importance of the time in the QAs, and the changes there, depend on the demobilization policy that will be followed by the FAA and UCAH/UNAVEM (see section 3.2.3). Will a few or many be deselected; will that process be quick or slow; will demobilization be completely out of the army or only partway (into the reserve or civic action programmes); and what other programmes for demobilization and reintegration will be functioning by that time?

The importance of this move depends a lot on whether the soldier is with the FAA or with UNITA. UNITA's troops are supposed to move to QAs, while most of the FAA troops will be remaining in their quarters (barracks), or will be withdrawing from field positions to established and familiar quarters. To minimize as much as possible the movement of its troops, UNITA will probably attempt to establish the QAs as close as possible to the troops' current locations. Alternatively, UNITA may want its QAs to be relatively close to major cities. In any case, UNITA's soldiers will be more dislocated by the move than will FAA troops. It remains to be seen whether UNITA can mobilize its soldiers in the militia to come to the QAs and then move into the FAA for an indefinite time. The militia soldiers are probably accustomed to looser discipline and short periods of mobilization.

The quarters (barracks) for FAA troops will include soldiers who will be demobilized, as well as those who will remain in the army. The QAs (cantons) for UNITA's troops will include people who will transfer to the FAA or the police, as well as those who will be demobilized. Perhaps all of UNITA's troops in the QAs will be moving to the FAA (or police) for some time until the demobilization of some of them is arranged. In any event, both the barracks and QAs could be relatively chaotic places; some people will be staying, others leaving (sooner or later), and nobody will know for some time whether he will be staying or leaving.

The FAA is planning to use demobilization as an opportunity to prune the least capable and poorest trained soldiers. It is unclear how long this process of selection will take, or how long it might delay demobilization (weeks or months). If FAA intends to administratively demobilize soldiers from only some locations, this probably would mean moving some deselected FAA soldiers from their current quarters to the quarters that would be designated as demobilization areas. Another alternative is that the FAA may decide to demobilize soldiers in their home provinces. That would mean more pre-demobilization travel when soldiers are transferred to their provinces, but post-demobilization travel (when soldiers might be burdened with take-home materials) would be shorter.

According to the UN plans, soldiers are supposed to undergo significant changes while in the QAs and barracks. First of all, they are supposed to come under the overall control of UNAVEM supervisors in a location visibly identified with the UN. The customary line of command and identification with an army would change. For those soldiers over whom UNAVEM actually assumes control, or a close supervisory position, there will be a new ambivalence about their position. This might happen only with UNITA troops, and not with FAA troops, if the FAA asserts its state sovereignty claims. Alternatively, the FAA position might be that only those soldiers to be demobilized come under UN supervision. This would mean a delay in the change of control until the FAA had completed its process of selection. This process and turnover to the UN may be one that will be decided in Luanda by the Joint Political-Military Commission (according to the terms of the Lusaka Protocol).

If the UN timetable had been followed, soldiers would have gone into their QAs or barracks three or more months after the cease-fire went into effect. In that time, the siege of cities would have been lifted, roads would have been opened, and many displaced people would have begun their movements to different locations. Many political and institutional changes would have been

announced, and some implemented or started. Soldiers will be curious, suspicious, skeptical, probably hopeful about what is happening outside the army to their families and country.

Impatience, frustration, uncertainty, and ambivalence (as well as boredom) will characterize most soldiers during this time. They will be in limbo, uncertain whether the peace process is going well, whether they will be selected or demobilized, and uncertain about what demobilization implies. In the absence of frequent news bulletins that are trustworthy, soldiers will be believing and passing on many rumors about what is happening in the country and what will happen to them. These rumors will inflame people with more suspicions and fears.

This prediction about rumors and the necessity of establishing a source of reliable news is not just a possible scenario, but a reliable prediction based on wide experience with these sorts of situations. Rumors will dominate the QAs and barracks unless some organization (probably the UN) establishes a widely-distributed source of information that is trustworthy. Soldiers (especially those with UNITA) would distrust news coming from the government or FAA.

Soldiers with UNITA are supposed to be disarmed by UNAVEM upon entering the QAs, while the FAA troops will continue to be armed, or to be living in quarters with access to their weapons. Loss of their weapons will increase UNITA soldiers' anxiety about their personal safety and increase the rumors. All soldiers will still be living in military residential units (probably satellite camps around a UNAVEM camp in UNITA cantons) with other soldiers under more-or-less control of their officers.

This situation will be variable because it is uncertain how long it will take to identify and then administratively process those soldiers who will be demobilized. The UN expectation is that this might (and should) be quick, a matter of 8-10 weeks. Perhaps this process might take much more time because the FAA will want more time to complete its selection process. The FAA and UNITA may not share the UN viewpoint that rapid demobilization is preferable and may not be interested in speeding the process. However, both the FAA and UNITA should recognize that keeping troops a long time in the QAs and barracks will increase morale problems and might lead to the "auto-demobilization" that occurred after Bicesse.

Whenever demobilization occurs, it will mean major social changes for the soldiers who become civilians. They will leave the social units where they have been living and working for years, will leave their job, housing, steady food, and the ordered discipline of the army for the uncertainties, liberties, and (hopefully) comforts of civilian life. The change will remove soldiers from an intensively-interactive group of fellow soldiers and place them at least temporarily in the situation of isolated individuals, or members of small family or household groups.

There exists the possibility that only a small proportion of UNITA and FAA troops will be fully demobilized, with many being partially demobilized into an active reserve and civic action programmes (discussed earlier). This will diminish the change in status as well as the demilitarization. Instead of demobilization removing soldiers from the military units where they now live and work, the reserve and civic action programmes will mean that soldiers remain in military or quasi-military groups. The authors of this report are unsure how this will affect

participation in reintegration programmes. Will soldiers in the active reserve be eligible for all of the reintegration programme benefits? Will the civic action programmes be alternatives to, or simply supplemental to, UN and NGO reintegration programmes?

Troops in the QAs and barracks will have vague ideas about what to do (in terms of future livelihood) after they leave the army. Few of them have any adult experience as workers outside of the military. Similarly, none of them will be able to predict the changes that will be occurring in postwar Angolan society. One clear characteristic of interviews with demobilized and active soldiers was their desire to have guarantees after demobilization, but no one (and no organization) can predict or guarantee what programmes or opportunities will be available when demobilization actually happens, or what opportunities will materialize afterwards. Because of this general socioeconomic uncertainty and unpredictability, demobilization and reintegration programmes should try to facilitate rather than limit ex-soldiers' abilities to adjust and adapt to newly emerging situations in civilian life. For this reason, it is important to give demobilizing soldiers multiple-use resources and multiple opportunities, instead of trying to prematurely limit their options.

5.4.4 T4 (First Destination). For most of the soldiers who demobilize, their first destination after leaving the QA or barracks will be their home province, perhaps (if it is reachable) even their home municipality, or a city where they think there are good economic opportunities. The first priority of most demobilizing soldiers will be locating and reuniting with their family, with a strong secondary desire being locating some economic and subsistence security. Finding a way to earn a living will be a high priority for everyone. Many ex-soldiers will be likely to go to places where they think they can earn a living or advance themselves, with the thought that, once they are more established, they will be able to visit their family, or some family members may come to live with them.

For a slight majority of FAA and UNITA soldiers, this first destination will be major cities and provincial capital cities. These are the places most likely to have immediate employment opportunities and also to be the sites for training programmes (professional formation) for drivers, mechanics, etc. In addition, many FAA and UNITA soldiers were from cities or, even though coming from rural backgrounds, had travelled to cities before being recruited into the military. Most FAA (and some UNITA) soldiers have also experienced urban life during their time as soldiers and think that cities have more economic opportunities.

Many observers believe that most UNITA soldiers will choose to go to rural areas where they can start (or resume) life as agriculturalists. This scenario agrees with the assumption that most UNITA soldiers came from rural farming families and continue to be rural-oriented. This also agrees with the belief that many, or most, of UNITA's soldiers have lived with or near their wives (and children) during the second and third wars, that the wives (and perhaps husbands as well) have been farming during the wars, and that the end of the war will permit these soldiers to return to full-time farming.

These beliefs or assumptions may not be accurate for the majority of UNITA's forces and are certainly untrue for the sample of UNITA forces we interviewed. Many of UNITA's soldiers

have experienced urban life during the 1991-92 Bicesse period of peace and during part of the following wartime. Even those who did not live in cities may have gained experience as drivers, mechanics, or in other skilled occupations and want to continue working in these jobs, which are more likely to be found in cities. In addition, the UNITA leadership may want its followers to move into cities and into more skilled occupations, and may insist or pressure its soldiers to go to cities and enroll in training programmes after being demobilized. For these reasons, many UNITA soldiers may choose to go to major cities and provincial capitals immediately after leaving the QAs.

Even those FAA (and UNITA) ex-soldiers whose preferred destination after the QA or barracks is a rural area (municipality or village), either because the soldiers wish to start farming or to visit family, may go first to major cities and provincial capitals. The roads between major cities and provincial capitals will be the first roads cleared of land mines and opened for traffic, and the logistics of transporting many demobilized soldiers will probably be based on first moving them to the major city nearest their destination, after which they would be transported to their final destination. However, many of these soldiers with rural destinations may be delayed for some time in these intermediate transit points (the cities) while waiting for more roads to be cleared and opened, or while attempting to understand better the potential costs and benefits of their postwar options.

Many plans emphasize the importance of agriculture. Rural areas and farming are seen as the only areas with the capacity to absorb large numbers of people and allow them to become productive (and hopefully self-reliant) fairly quickly. This top-down appreciation for rural areas and farming may not be shared by ex-soldiers who are viewing the world from another perspective. However, another important factor is whether those ex-soldiers who wish to go into farming will be able and willing to move out from the cities to municipalities and rural areas. If this move out is delayed because roads and paths are not cleared, or because there is a delay in re-establishing GOA administration in rural areas, and ex-soldiers would not be able to claim their reintegration benefits there, the willingness to move out and farm will be diminished. If farming and settling in rural areas is a top priority, that has to be operationalized by establishing reintegration programmes (and facilities for distributing continuing benefit streams) in rural areas before, or simultaneously with, establishing them in urban areas.

If reintegration programmes are more available in the larger cities than in the municipalities and rural areas, or are available sooner in larger cities than in municipalities, then these programmes will act as magnets to attract ex-soldiers to the cities and away from agricultural areas, or to delay the departure from those cities of rural-oriented ex-soldiers. This means that the proportion of demobilized soldiers going into agriculture will be reduced.

5.4.5 T5 (Changing Opportunities, Secondary Migration and Adjustments). Will soldiers remain in the first post-QA or post-barracks destination, the place where they first settled after leaving the army? This depends on several factors. One is whether there are good opportunities there to earn a living. Another is whether there are better opportunities (for work or training) elsewhere. Another is whether there are changes in the soldier's personal situation (questions of health or security, for example) or his family's situation that require a visit or change of

location. The majority of ex-soldiers will remain probably in one place, which may be the provincial capital instead of continuing to rural areas, because they want to settle and because travelling is costly and exhausting, but the UN, GOA, and NGOs cannot plan on all demobilizing soldiers remaining in one place after leaving the QAs and barracks.

Ex-soldiers may benefit (or think they will benefit) from being able to move away from their first post-demobilization destination; this type of movement is called secondary migration and is very common in situations like this. Secondary migration is normal in these circumstances, since the soldier originally chose his first destination while still in the army and under conditions of a lot of uncertainty. Secondary migration should be perceived as a problem-solving mechanism for the ex-soldier, rather than as a problem for the planner.

Instead of planners attempting to plan everything for the ex-soldier, the plans should facilitate and encourage ex-soldiers learning about and creating opportunities for themselves in the variety of circumstances they will encounter in changing postwar society. Demobilization and reintegration programmes will probably include the soldier being registered for a continuing benefit stream, such as a salary or materials that will be delivered to him (perhaps at intervals) after leaving the QA or barracks. Because of secondary migration, the programmes should allow the recipient to move, and the stream to move with him. Similarly, the ex-soldiers may change their minds about their choice of programmes as the ex-soldiers learn more about their changing society, and as the society changes and new opportunities emerge. The best programmes would allow ex-soldiers enough flexibility to change and adapt.