Ordering power? The politics of state-led housing delivery under authoritarianism – the case of Luanda, Angola

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Abstract
The urban studies literature has extensively analysed the modernist, developmental or neoliberal drivers of urban restructuring in the global South, but has largely overlooked the ways in which governments, particularly those with authoritarian characteristics, try to reinforce their legitimacy and assert their political authority through the creation of satellite cities and housing developments. From Ethiopia to Singapore, authoritarian regimes have recently provided housing to the middle class and the poor, not only to alleviate housing shortages, or bolster a burgeoning real estate market, but also to ‘order power’ and buy the loyalty of residents. To evaluate the extent to which authoritarian regimes realise their political objectives through housing provision, we survey nearly 300 poor and middle class respondents from three new housing projects in Luanda, Angola. Alongside increasing social and spatial differentiation brought about by state policies, we document unintended beneficiaries of state housing and uneven levels of citizen satisfaction. We explain that internal state contradictions, individual agency and market forces have acted together to re-shape the government’s efforts to order power.

Keywords
Angola, authoritarian regimes, housing delivery, middle class, urban politics

摘要
城市研究文献广泛分析了南半球城市重构过程中的现代派、发展派或新自由派驱动力，但在很大程度上忽略了政府，尤其是那些有威权特征的政府，如何试图通过建造卫星城和住房开发来巩固其正当性，并主张其政治权威。从塞内加尔到新加坡，威权政体近年来为中产阶层和贫困人口提供住房，不仅是为了缓解住房短缺或促进方兴未艾的房地产市场，也是为了“施展权力”，并收买居民的忠诚度。为评估威权政体通过住房供应在多大程度上实现了其政治目的，我们对安哥拉首都罗安达三个新建住房项目中近300位贫困居民和中产阶层居民做了问卷调查。除了通过政府政策增加社会和空间的分异外，我们记录了政府住房的意外受惠者和市民的均衡满意水平。我们的解释是，政府内部的矛盾，个人的能动性和市场力量共同发挥作用，重新塑造了政府施展权力的努力。

关键词
安哥拉、威权政体、住房交付、中产阶层、城市政治学
Introduction

From Bangkok to Rio de Janeiro, urban areas in the global South have experienced steady expansion in recent decades. Informal settlements on the peripheries of Johannesburg or Jakarta have swelled to accommodate rural migrants or foreigners searching for work or better services. Almost overnight, satellite cities and peri-urban developments in Beijing and Luanda have materialised to house an emerging middle class. In urban areas as diverse as Addis Ababa and Dubai, city building projects showcasing a country’s world class aspirations or its resource wealth have multiplied (Schindler, 2015).

To explain the reconfiguration of urban spaces, the emergence of enclaves, the proliferation of informal settlements and the appeal of urban ‘fantasy’ projects, the urban studies literature often focuses on the modernist, developmental or neoliberal drivers of city expansion in the global South. Scholars have critiqued the utopian excesses of master planned cities such as Brasília or Abuja (Elleh, 2017; Holston, 1989), or highlighted the selective blending of Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wright with modernist, vernacular designs in cities such as Baghdad and Tehran (Marefat, 2004, 2009). Grandiose master plans of urban revitalisation and infrastructural expansion in contemporary Kigali, Addis Ababa and many other African cities belie the developmental aspirations of their central governments, even if they are unmet (Muindi, 2016; Watson, 2014). Finally, inspired by the work of David Harvey, Jamie Peck and others, numerous scholars have underscored the neoliberal interests and ‘circuits of capital’ that have sparked property booms and ‘commodity housing enclaves’ in China (Cao, 2015; Wu, 2005), land speculation in Hong Kong or Singapore (Haila, 2016) or the construction of City Improvement Districts in South African cities (Didier et al., 2012).

Existing studies allow scholars to conceptualise more clearly the macro-historical processes that have informed urban restructuring across diverse urban contexts in the South and to situate particular Southern cases within broader theoretical frameworks. Yet this work tends to homogenise different experiences of urban expansion under overarching rubrics such as modernism, development, neoliberalism and globalisation. By contrast, Parnell and Robinson (2012) argue that theorists should pay greater attention to the role of national (and, where appropriate, local) states in determining the particular spatial attributes, economic configurations and sociological purposes of contemporary urbanism. Relying on evidence from the urban interventions of the post-apartheid South African state, they highlight the ‘importance of theorizing the agency of the local state as potentially developmental, even progressive’ (Parnell and Robinson, 2012: 594). They suggest that urban policy agendas by other states in the global South such as Brazil and Mexico equally provide a counter narrative to the totalising logic of neoliberalism observed by critics.

The South African case, on which Parnell and Robinson rest their claims, conveys well the social concerns informing urban policy debates and the efforts to provide public

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goods by newly democratic governments. It also underscores the importance of civil society, which often contributes to democratic transitions and holds government officials accountable following the transition process (Dubash and Morgan, 2012). Although democracies are consolidating in parts of Latin America, South Asia and Africa, many countries in, but not limited to, the global South remain authoritarian (Brownlee, 2007).

We argue that existing theory must assess more systematically the impact of hierarchical, undemocratic and coercive states on three elements of urban policymaking and policy outcomes: the political purposes behind city building and the distribution of goods including housing; the policy instruments used by authoritarian governments to implement their objectives; and the extent to which states actually accomplish their policy goals.

Although democracy and authoritarianism exist on a continuum, authoritarian regimes are noteworthy for the concentration of power among elites, the prevalence of arbitrary and predatory behaviour, and the constant threat of repression should organised opposition emerge. Such regimes may genuinely endeavour to improve urban conditions for their poorest residents, or they may try to nurture the growth of real estate markets – as many democratic governments do – but they also use housing provision to assert political control, to co-opt factions critical to regime survival and to build legitimacy (Goodfellow and Smith, 2013; Shatkin, 2013). In these contexts, authoritarian governments do not undertake urban transformation through widespread consultation with ‘stakeholders’ or via participatory budgeting, but through highly centralised, exclusionary and often large-scale planning organised from above (Arandel and Wetterburg, 2013; Njoh, 2011). Regime officials may deliberately target lower level government employees or members of the military to buy or retain their loyalty. Moreover, they may rely on socially disruptive approaches such as forced removals of informal residents, the razing of ‘slum’ neighbourhoods and markets or the resettlement of the urban poor in peri-urban areas to realise their objectives. By these means, authoritarian regimes ‘order power’ through the conscious construction of, and control over, urban space (Slater, 2010). Policies selectively implemented from above, however, commonly get revised by forces from within and below. As the case of Egypt illustrates, corrupt state officials may capture policy for their own uses; and ordinary citizens may ignore, or subvert, policies with which they disagree (Blaydes, 2011). Since opportunities to use legal channels or the media to challenge policies are frequently circumscribed under authoritarian conditions, urban residents often employ more subtle means of contestation: they may evade state efforts to displace them or move back to former residences following resettlement. This limits the extent to which the desired urban social, political and spatial transformation may effectively and durably take place.

To illustrate our claims regarding the objectives, instruments and outcomes of urban policymaking under authoritarianism, we explore urban transformation in Luanda, the capital city of Angola. Angola is a resource rich, post war country in West Africa where the same party has continuously occupied power since 1975. It has political complementarities with authoritarian countries in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Since the end of civil conflict in 2002, the central government has aimed to reconstruct and transform Luanda through ambitious city building projects, infrastructural development and housing provision (Croese, 2016; Pitcher, 2017; Pitcher and Croese, 2017).

In this article, we employ legislation on land and housing, fieldwork, site visits to
new housing projects and selected interviews with government officials to illustrate how the state employs different spatial locations, architectural designs and construction materials to socially engineer its relationships with the urban poor and the middle class. We then present results from a public opinion survey of nearly 300 residents in three state housing projects in Luanda that expose the extent to which the government has fallen short of its intended goals. To explain the findings, we demonstrate that internal state contradictions, individual agency and market forces have acted together to re-shape the government’s efforts to order power.

The politics of state-led housing delivery under authoritarianism

A number of scholars highlight the coalitions, institutions and distributive policies constructed by authoritarian governments to reproduce their dominance over time (Blaydes, 2011; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Slater, 2010; Svolik, 2012; Tsai, 2007). Slater observes that the distribution of housing in Singapore is not simply intended as a form of service delivery, but also serves as a strategy to ‘order power’ by integrating urban residents into evolving institutions of the state (Slater, 2010: 237–241). This has contributed to cementing the power and political legitimacy of Singapore’s ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), since 1959 (Chua, 1997; Park, 1998). Shatkin also notes that state dominance of the land market and directed housing provision in Singapore allow the government to be the ‘preeminent market player’ in the real estate sector and to rely on urban planning to exert social control (Shatkin, 2013: 119). In recent years, authoritarian regimes across Africa, such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, have also increasingly depended on urban renewal and goods provision, including housing, to pursue political objectives (Goodfellow, forthcoming).

As an ‘electoral authoritarian’ regime (Schedler, 2006), Angola shares many features with these governments. Since the end of the war in 2002 it has held three elections for the 220-seat legislature, but these have been highly controlled and manipulated by the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which has ruled continuously since the country gained independence from Portugal in 1975. Alongside the monopolisation of governmental institutions and the widespread use of intimidation and coercion to stay in power, the distribution of goods such as housing represents an essential element in the efforts of the MPLA to sustain and co-opt supporters (Croese, 2017). As is the case in other southern metropolises (Schindler, 2015), housing is one of the cornerstones of governmental aspirations to create a ‘world class city’.

A high rate of urban population growth, poor housing conditions and a chronic shortage of housing in Angola’s capital of Luanda mirror features seen elsewhere on the continent. But owing to the long period of conflict from 1975 until 2002, overcrowded and inadequate conditions are even worse than in other African cities. UN-Habitat (2014) estimates that 86.5% of Angola’s urban population lives in informal settlements, which is 30 to 40% higher than the estimated informal settlement population in Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Lusaka. The war halted construction, prevented repairs and sent many internally displaced people to the relative safety of the cities. Currently, about 7 million people, a quarter of Angola’s population, live in Luanda (GoA, 2016).

The lack of adequate urban housing explains the high demand for housing across all socio-economic classes by the end of the war and the building frenzy that subsequently followed. Until oil prices dropped in 2014, lucrative oil revenues together with oil backed loans, mostly from China, enabled the
Angolan government to deliver housing at an unprecedented scale (Croese, 2012). In 2011 funding for the housing programme stood at US$4 billion. Between 2004 and 2014, 3.2% of the annual state budget went to housing development, and the National Urbanism and Housing Program had financed the construction of more than 150,000 houses by 2016 (CAHF and DW, 2016). Approximately 180 residential construction projects funded either by the state, the private sector or public private partnerships had been completed or were underway in metropolitan Luanda as of 2017 (Pitcher, n.d.).

Yet, state-led housing delivery has been as much about guaranteeing the ruling party’s survival as it has been about meeting a need for decent shelter. The centralisation of policy implementation and the rhetoric associated with housing provision attest to the government’s efforts to project political power through the transformation of the physical landscape. In contrast to the decentralisation initiatives undertaken by the Kenyan or South African governments, the re-making of the Luanda city-region is designed and implemented at the highest levels of government, particularly the Presidency. Having served continuously in power from 1979 to 2017 without ever having been directly elected, President José Eduardo dos Santos has partially rested the legitimacy of his regime on the reconstruction of Luanda and the provision of urban housing.

The government has couched state-led housing delivery in the language of democracy, participation and citizenship. Master plans and legislation guarantee the universal right to housing and promise the delivery of essential amenities such as infrastructure and healthcare (GoA, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2015). In practice, the government has focused most resources on the direct and top-down delivery of housing in the capital rather than across the country. In Luanda, the government selectively targets low-income families through the provision of so-called ‘social housing’. Satellite cities, locally known as new cities or novas centralidades, provide housing and other amenities to middle-income families. Within this group, the government wants to maintain the loyalty and support of the MPLA’s historic urban base in Luanda, which includes veterans and public servants. Furthermore, it seeks to pacify a young, educated, urban, emerging middle class that has benefited from post-war economic growth but has criticised the lack of democratisation and growing socio-economic inequalities (Schubert, 2016).

Government officials have employed different urban settings, architectural designs, construction materials and modalities of housing access in order to socially engineer political and economic relationships with different classes. The settings and designs are meant to conform to residents’ ‘socio-cultural realities’ (Interview, Director, National Housing Directorate, Ministry of Urbanism and Housing, Luanda, 23 June 2014). Low-income families receive free social housing to compensate for the demolition of informal housing that is located in areas targeted for high end vertical redevelopment in the city core. Social housing consists of single story, semi-detached, two- or three-bedroom homes similar in design to public housing in South Africa or Brazil. It is often built by a mix of local and foreign contractors using low quality materials and is located in peripheral areas of the city with few public services. By contrast, housing designed for the middle class is often built by Chinese companies. It is multi-unit and multi-storied, constructed of higher quality materials, closer to the urban core and more reliably serviced with water and electricity. Access to houses in these projects is granted through highly subsidised ‘rent to buy’ schemes, thereby providing an accessible alternative to the costly and still incipient commercial mortgage finance market (CAHF and DW, 2016; Pitcher, 2017).
Assessing the outcomes of state-led housing delivery

Survey responses from approximately 300 residents in three state housing projects allow us to determine: first, the extent to which the government has managed to deliver housing to the intended beneficiaries; second, the extent to which it has satisfied residents by providing goods that previously were unavailable; and third, whether levels of satisfaction correlate with broader approval of the government’s policy performance on goods delivery.\(^1\) Our focus on the relationship between satisfaction and policy approval draws on survey research in political science and public administration that associates citizen satisfaction and dissatisfaction in democratic contexts with potential actions such as exit, voice, loyalty and neglect (see Hirschmann, 1970; Lyons et al., 1992; Tiebout, 1956). Exit and voice are more circumscribed and all four actions are harder to measure under post-conflict, authoritarian conditions. On the other hand, citizens in authoritarian contexts are rarely able to disengage completely from politics and its effects. Hence, survey responses together with ethnographic work provide valuable insights into the collective policy preferences of respondents, even if they cannot fully act on them by voting against the party in power or moving to another district. The findings indicate that state-led housing delivery has only partially met its political goals. In subsequent sections we demonstrate how contradictions within the state, individual agency and incipient market forces explain these results.

Characteristics of the housing projects

The combined projects contain 56,000 units and together house an estimated 300,000 urban dwellers. Two main types of state-provided housing were surveyed: Zango, which is social housing for low-income households; and the new satellite cities of Nova Vida and Kilamba, designed for the middle classes (Figure 1).\(^2\)

Zango is located in the fast-growing municipality of Viana, about 30 kilometres south-east of the city centre in an area of 90 km\(^2\). It was initially created in the early 2000s to accommodate residents that the government evicted from an informal settlement located on the coast. In the last decade it has re-housed residents from areas in the city that the government has deemed unsafe for living or that it has targeted for urban renewal (Croese, 2013). By 2012, the government had built 30,000 housing units in Zango, which housed about 200,000 residents according to local authorities (PPHS, 2012).\(^3\) Households in our survey were located in a newly developed section of Zango II consisting of casas evolutivas. These are semi-finished, two-bedroom houses on a 15m\(^2\) plot of land each, with space for the resident to enlarge the house.

Of the two satellite cities we surveyed, Nova Vida is located approximately 18 kilometres outside of Luanda in the municipality of Belas. It is a mixed-use project which includes in the master plan not only infrastructure for electricity, water and sanitation, but also commercial, leisure and residential areas (Lara and Bekker, 2012). Its residential zone contains four and six story apartment blocks as well as vivendas or detached homes on large plots. Built in two phases between 2001 and 2014, the 430-hectare site consists of nearly 6000 units for approximately 30,000 residents. Nova Vida was initially conceived to house civil servants, former soldiers and even government ministers, but in the second phase the government offered houses to the public through the emerging real estate market (Cruz, 2013). Residents were surveyed in apartments and single, standalone homes.

The ‘new city’ of Kilamba is the largest satellite city designed for the middle class in Luanda. It is a wholly planned, mixed-use city located on a plot of land of about
5200 hectares, 20 kilometres southeast of Luanda’s downtown just off the recently repaved dual ring road. Construction of phase I of the project started in 2008. It consists of 20,000 units in 740 buildings of four to 12 stories in height together with schools, shops and sports fields on 906 hectares (Angola, n.d.). Since its 2011 completion, the government has promoted and branded Kilamba in international media outlets and offered guided tours for high-profile, foreign dignitaries in order to showcase its housing development efforts. The first phase of Kilamba, where the survey was conducted, housed over 70,000 people by 2015 (interview, Administrator, Kilamba, 18 August 2015).

**Survey data and methods**

The survey was administered in 2014 just before the austerity conditions that followed the drop in oil prices. We relied on purposive sampling to choose the housing projects and then randomly identified households within each neighbourhood. The sample of nearly 300 households is relatively small, but comparable to other studies of urban residential neighbourhoods (e.g. Addo, 2015; Mohit et al., 2010). The response rate averaged around 20%, which is reasonable considering that survey research is rare in Angola. International or regional surveys on public attitudes such as Afrobarometer do not include Angola, and the first national census since 1970 was only conducted in 2014. Moreover, scholars have reported that there is still a ‘culture of fear’, which limits the extent to which citizens feel they can freely voice their opinions (Schubert, 2010). The findings of the survey regarding residential satisfaction and attitudes should be viewed in light of these considerations. Perhaps future studies based on larger samples can expand upon our findings.

Despite increasing interest in state housing in Angola (Buier, 2014; Croese, 2017;
Gastrow, 2014), quantitative information on households living in state-built housing is scarce. Our survey sought to capture a broad array of socioeconomic characteristics of residents including income, education, marital status and place of birth. We also used a 4-point Likert scale to determine levels of individual satisfaction with the quality of the house, the availability of water and electricity and the distance to health clinics – all goods that everyone needs or that the government had promised to provide. We equally used a 4-point Likert scale to identify respondents’ evaluations of the government’s broader policy performance with regard to housing, water, electricity and health.

We then relied on linear regression to determine whether opinions of government policy performance were conditional on respondents’ satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with goods they had received. This inquiry extends research analysing whether citizens evaluate government performance based on egotropic or sociotropic criteria (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). The assumption that citizens are egotropic implicitly informs the logic driving goods delivery by the Angolan government. That is, if goods delivery elicits personal satisfaction from citizens, then they will also positively evaluate the government’s broader policy performance, which could enhance loyalty and reduce protest. The regression models control for neighbourhood and employment status. They also use dichotomous measures to control for gender, birthplace (Luanda or not), education (beyond high school education or not) and income (more than US$800 a month or not).

**Characteristics of residents in relation to state goals**

Although no systematic study has identified high-, middle- and low-income residents in Angola, the socioeconomic profiles of our survey respondents roughly correspond to the population groups that these state funded projects were intended to serve. As Table 1 illustrates, respondents from Zango were mostly low-income residents: a majority of them earned less than 40,000 kwanzas (about US$400 at the time of research) per month. Zango respondents also lacked access to higher education and 59% of them were unemployed. By contrast, the majority of respondents from Nova Vida and Kilamba had been educated beyond high school. Most of them had employment, although a quarter of respondents averaged across the two neighbourhoods stated they were unemployed. Monthly incomes were over Kz 80,000 (about US$800) for the majority of residents sampled. High levels of access to computers and the internet in Kilamba and Nova Vida, in contrast to Zango, further illustrate that residents in these two former neighbourhoods were wealthier and better educated than those in Zango.

Notwithstanding evidence of social and spatial differentiation, which was one of the government’s objectives, the government has fallen short of several other goals. First, it has failed to fully capture public sector workers or the military for resettlement either in Kilamba or Nova Vida. Only 29% of the respondents in Nova Vida were civil servants or army veterans. Similarly, in Kilamba, only 27% of the respondents worked for the government, although the majority reported having received their house through the state’s ‘rent to buy’ scheme (90% in Kilamba). In Zango, 80% of respondents reported having freely received their house from the state. Yet the results from Nova Vida, which was completed earlier than the other projects, indicate that over time the state has exercised less control over the ways in which beneficiaries accessed or maintained state housing. Here, only 30% of respondents accessed their houses through ‘rent to buy’. By contrast, almost half had either bought their
## Table 1. Descriptive statistics by selected neighbourhood: Luanda, Angola.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Neighbourhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kilamba %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>114 (62.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>76 (41.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Luanda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>108 (58.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>76 (41.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income</td>
<td>&lt;= 40,000 KZ</td>
<td>20 (10.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40,000–60,000 KZ</td>
<td>23 (12.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60,000–80,000 KZ</td>
<td>19 (10.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 80,000 KZ</td>
<td>122 (66.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>71 (38.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>113 (61.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job sector</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>58 (31.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Service/Parastatal</td>
<td>49 (26.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>28 (15.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>42 (22.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>7 (3.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Computer</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>164 (89.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>20 (10.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Access</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>142 (77.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>42 (22.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How House Was Accessed</td>
<td>Bought</td>
<td>14 (7.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rent to Buy</td>
<td>163 (88.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>4 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By Employer</td>
<td>1 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allocated by State</td>
<td>1 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-Built/Inherited/Other</td>
<td>1 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N = 296 (total sample = 298; two missing values are dropped). Higher education refers to education beyond high school.
homes outright or were renting, which suggests that they were not the beneficiaries anticipated in the state’s housing plans. Third, nearly 30% of respondents in Kilamba and Nova Vida stated that they had another house, an indication that they were upper-income residents rather than the middle-income residents for whom the housing was intended.

### Variation in personal satisfaction and approval of government performance

As Table 2 indicates, the majority of residents across all three housing developments reported being satisfied/somewhat satisfied with the quality of the house and the availability of electricity. Most residents favourably compared their current to their former home when responding to open ended questions. Kilamba residents, for example, noted that their new apartment was ‘better’, ‘more spacious’ or ‘more comfortable’ than the one they lived in previously. Similarly, respondents in Nova Vida remarked that services were better, or that the current residence was preferable because ‘it’s my own house’. High levels of satisfaction with housing or electricity suggest that the government has succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of low- and middle-income residents in these projects. Yet responses also reveal shortcomings in the provision of goods, and negative assessments of government performance. A majority of Zango residents were dissatisfied with the supply of water and a majority of residents from all three neighbourhoods expressed dissatisfaction with the distance to health clinics. Moreover, when

### Table 2. Satisfaction with services and assessment of government policy performance by neighbourhood.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Satisfaction With:</th>
<th>Kilamba %</th>
<th>Nova Vida %</th>
<th>Zango %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of House Satisfied</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity Availability</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Availability Satisfied</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to Health Clinic Satisfied</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Assessment of Government Policy Performance On: | Kilamba % | Nova Vida % | Zango % | Total % |
| Housing Well | 67       | 36.4        | 27      | 46.6    | 18      | 33.3    | 112     | 37.8    |
| Policy Badly | 111      | 60.3        | 29      | 50.0    | 27      | 50.0    | 167     | 56.4    |
| Don’t Know   | 6        | 3.3         | 2       | 3.5     | 9       | 16.7    | 17      | 5.7     |
| Electricity Well | 105 | 57.1 | 35 | 60.3 | 11 | 20.4 | 151 | 51.0 |
| Policy Badly | 74       | 40.2        | 21      | 36.2    | 34      | 63.0    | 129     | 43.6    |
| Don’t Know   | 5        | 2.7         | 2       | 3.5     | 9       | 16.7    | 16      | 5.4     |
| Water Well   | 89       | 48.4        | 30      | 51.7    | 4       | 7.4     | 123     | 41.6    |
| Policy Badly | 91       | 49.5        | 27      | 46.6    | 43      | 79.6    | 161     | 54.4    |
| Don’t Know   | 4        | 2.2         | 1       | 1.7     | 7       | 13.0    | 12      | 4.1     |
| Health Well  | 28       | 15.2        | 9       | 15.5    | 2       | 3.7     | 39      | 13.2    |
| Policy Badly | 152      | 82.6        | 47      | 81.0    | 44      | 81.5    | 243     | 82.1    |
| Don’t Know   | 4        | 2.2         | 2       | 3.5     | 8       | 14.8    | 14      | 4.7     |

Notes: N = 296 (total sample = 298; two missing values are dropped). The authors thank Afrobarometer for permission to use questions from Round 5 of the Afrobarometer survey.
asked to name the three biggest problems their neighbourhood faced, over 80% of respondents mentioned health. Site visits in December 2015 verified the concerns of residents: all three projects lacked adequately staffed and serviced health clinics in close proximity.7 Besides their personal satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a particular good, a majority of residents also thought that the government had performed badly with respect to housing, water and health policies (Table 2). Answers diverged regarding electricity policy: middle class residents thought the government had performed well whereas residents in the low-income neighbourhood of Zango thought it had done badly.

We then wanted to determine whether a respondent’s personal satisfaction with the receipt of a good had any relationship to his/her evaluation of the government’s more general policy performance with respect to that good. Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 suggest that assessments of government policy performance on housing or electricity were not conditional on levels of individual satisfaction with these goods. In other words, respondents may be personally satisfied with their housing or with electricity, but their evaluations of government policy performance are unrelated to their egotropic concerns. Most residents assessed government performance on broader housing or electricity policies as bad or very bad.

By contrast, the relationship between the evaluation of government policy on water and a resident’s satisfaction with water was statistically significant, although the effect was weak (Table 3, Model 3). Most importantly, evaluation of the government’s health policy was strongly, positively and significantly associated with individual levels of satisfaction regarding the distance to health clinics (Table 3, Model 4). Since we saw above that the distance to health clinics had generated much dissatisfaction among residents across the sample, the results suggest that the government has ignored health care delivery. This oversight has influenced respondents’ evaluations of policy performance regarding this good.

As for the control variables, there are some statistically significant neighbourhood and socio-economic differences with respect to assessments of the government’s policy performance on housing, water, electricity and health. Residents who earned more than US$800 per month were more positive about government policy performance on electricity and health than those with incomes below that amount. The reliance on generators for electricity provision and the use of private health clinics by higher-income residents may explain their more favourable assessment of government policy performance. Across the whole sample, unemployed residents were more positive about housing and water policy than the residents who worked in the private sector (the reference group). This may be because the unemployed derive the most benefit from the supply of such goods – when they receive them.

However, the results reveal several differences among neighbourhoods. Residents in the poor neighbourhood of Zango were more likely than those in Kilamba (the reference group) to negatively evaluate government policy with regard to electricity, water and healthcare (Table 3, Models 2–4). The robust relationships across three sectors from respondents in Zango suggest that the government has not succeeded in producing positive evaluations of policy amongst low-income residents in this neighbourhood. Finally, healthcare receives additional criticism from the most educated respondents in the sample, who were more likely than less educated residents (the reference group) to negatively evaluate the government’s policy on healthcare (Table 3, Model 4). This suggests that more educated respondents had more information or felt more strongly
about the consequences of the government’s failure to deliver this essential good.

**Unrealised and unintended outcomes: State contradictions, individual agency and market forces**

The survey results suggest that the government has fallen short of its objectives to spatially fix residents and secure political approval through development projects, housing provision and service delivery. In this final section, we explain why government efforts to order power have been undercut. We point to the lack of state capacity and the actions of state officials, but also to market forces and the agency of those who are seeking to avoid or subvert existing constraints.

Referencing the housing programme in Singapore, Slater notes that the ability of the government to deliver housing rested on its capacity to enforce property rights laws, housing provision and service delivery. In this final section, we explain why government efforts to order power have been undercut. We point to the lack of state capacity and the actions of state officials, but also to market forces and the agency of those who are seeking to avoid or subvert existing constraints.

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to engage in land seizures, to distribute housing and to offer loan opportunities to prospective homeowners (Slater, 2010: 238–239). Additionally, Shatkin (2013: 116) observes that the Singaporean state’s near monopoly over land ownership facilitated its policy actions. In Angola, all land also formally belongs to the state, which greatly aids its efforts at social engineering. But in contrast to the Singaporean government, the Angolan government lacks the institutional and administrative capacity to regulate land tenure arrangements and transactions, to provide the necessary accompanying infrastructure to housing projects or to control the self-interested actions of individuals inside and beyond the state. This may explain why we do not see a correlation between individual satisfaction with one’s own housing and assessments of the government’s housing policy.

Government investments in housing do not take place within the framework of an integrated plan for the development of Luanda. Instead, special government agencies that answer to the presidency finance and commission housing projects, whereas a weak local government is responsible for urban planning and public service provision. Owing to a fragmentation of responsibilities, there is little coordination around urban land and planning and an inadequate provision of employment opportunities, basic services and infrastructure outside of the urban core. The effects are evident in the high rates of unemployment in the low-income neighbourhood of Zango, the dissatisfaction with the distance to health clinics and the negative assessments of government policy performance with respect to housing, water and health across all neighbourhoods in the survey.

In addition, the state’s institutional and administrative weaknesses provide space for private interests and market forces to undermine its intentions to engineer socio-spatial relations. These conflicting pressures explain why a low percentage of public employees live in Nova Vida despite the fact that in phase 1 of Nova Vida’s construction, 80% of the units were designated for government employees while the remaining 20% were sold at market rates by a private real estate company (Imogestin, 2013; Lara, 2009: 10). In 2006, the government fixed the price of the most inexpensive apartments at approximately US$80,000 per unit, so that the public employees for whom they were intended would be able to afford them. It then offered residents a highly subsidised ‘rent to buy’ scheme at an interest rate of 3% for 10 or 20 years (Cruz, 2013).

However, high demand for homes in Nova Vida led to a rapid escalation of prices on the emerging real estate market. Within five years, Nova Vida was no longer affordable for an ordinary civil servant earning approximately US$600 a month. By the time Phase II was completed in 2014, the government had reduced the portion allocated to civil servants from 80% to 35% and raised the cost of the least expensive three-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment from US$80,000 to US$136,000 (Imogestin, 2013). In the meantime, sale prices of the same size unit had climbed to US$234,000 on the open market (Proimoveis, 2013). These great differences between the fixed and the market price ultimately undercut the original distributive goals behind Nova Vida and may explain why only a third of respondents were employed in the public sector.

In Kilamba, lack of demand and mismanagement by state officials nearly unravelled government plans for middle class settlement. When Kilamba opened in 2011, the government fixed the price of the most inexpensive unit at US$125,000. Owing to the distance from the city, the lack of available mortgages and the high cost, only 200 families or about 1000 people out of an expected 100,000 residents initially bought apartments there (interview, Administrator, Kilamba, 11
June 2012). Units in Kilamba remained empty for over a year and foreign journalists ridiculed Kilamba as a ‘ghost city’ (Redvers, 2012). In response, the government lowered prices, introduced a ‘rent to buy’ scheme modelled on the one implemented in Nova Vida and hired the real estate arm of the national oil company to allocate apartments.

Unfortunately, mismanagement and favouritism have marred housing allocation and revenue collection in Kilamba. Some potential buyers completed the registration process and made down payments on flats, but never received them. Political loyalists of the regime allegedly obtained flats in return for their services during the 2012 elections (Angonotı´cias, 2013; Pitcher and Moorman, 2015). In addition, the real estate company (which has since been dismissed) never formally registered 1234 flats and the government subsequently declared these to be ‘illegally occupied’. Finally, 40% of nearly 13,500 residents who took advantage of the ‘rent to buy’ scheme have failed to make payments in the past two years (Agência Lusa, 2017). When the government’s newly appointed company attempted to charge rents retrospectively through double monthly rents or lump sum deposits, Kilamba residents refused to pay. Many argued that the state had failed to issue payment notices in a timely manner. They also contested the high cost of payments, which had been pegged to 2014 kwanza-dollar exchange rates before the kwanza markedly depreciated in value. After hiring a lawyer from the newly created Angolan Association of Consumer Rights to represent them, residents negotiated more favourable payment terms with the company (Cain, 2016).

Zango represents a different dynamic because here the state gave houses to residents free of charge as compensation for demolition. In the project’s early stages, a shortage of employment, infrastructure and services initially drove many residents to resist relocation from their original homes, or to sell or rent out their houses in Zango and return to the city core (Croese, 2013). Despite continuing difficulties with access to, and the quality of, services, however, the growth of informal trade and shops, the construction of roads and the relatively low cost of housing have made Zango a more attractive place to live. Houses on the informal market in Zango ranged from about US$20,000 to US$80,000 in 2013, depending on the quality and location of the house. Their characteristics make them suitable for extension or renovation, allowing for incremental additions to housing, unlike the vertical housing in Kilamba and Nova Vida. Zango has thus been subjected to ‘downward raiding’ by middle-income residents looking for affordable housing – a process also observed in South Africa (Lemanski, 2014). Whilst direct beneficiaries are not formally allowed to sell, rent or use their houses for any purpose other than residency, local authorities estimate that 50 to 70% of residents who now live in the project’s first houses do not represent their original beneficiaries (interview, PHS official, Luanda, 8 December 2011). Across all three projects, then, the actions of state officials, the agency of ordinary individuals and market forces have subverted the logic driving the state-led delivery of housing and other goods.

Conclusion

Post-war policies adopted by Angola’s authoritarian government have sought to address chronic housing shortages in the capital, Luanda, to improve housing quality and affordability and to provide services. Besides seeking to address real needs, these policies intended to boost the government’s legitimacy amongst a core group of loyal supporters and to assuage the discontent of urban residents. The government pursued these political objectives by spatially fixing particular socio-economic groups in designated housing
developments and using different modalities of access and architectural design. Despite these initiatives, the Angolan state has been unable to fully and consistently control the outcomes of state housing and service delivery. Residents of state housing projects only partially fit the socio-economic profiles intended in the policies, and resident turnover rates seem to increase as modes of access change over time. Dissatisfaction with the shortage or unreliability of services, negative evaluations of government policy performance, a lack of institutional capacity and administrative weaknesses have further undercut the state’s ability to ‘order power’. Inadequate land regulations combined with speculative property deals have fuelled a largely uncontrolled, informal real estate market. As in other instances where governments have engaged in utopian urban planning projects that rest on the widespread dislocation and relocation of residents (Holston, 1989), the familiar themes of revision, adaptation and subversion re-emerge in the Angolan case.

Authoritarian regimes from China to Rwanda are extensively intervening in their rapidly growing cities and projecting state power onto the urban landscape through the regulation of space, the embrace of signature mega projects or the construction of entirely new cities (Schindler, 2015; Wu, 2016). While much of the urban studies literature currently analyses such interventions through a modernist, developmental or neoliberal framework, this article has highlighted the political calculations behind city making by authoritarian regimes. Equally, it has demonstrated the ways in which such calculations can fail to build the legitimacy and control associated with ‘ordering power’, especially when states are highly centralised, coercive, administratively mismanaged and institutionally weak.

Studying these calculations as well as their realised and unintended outcomes then helps to explain the form and the timing of urban redevelopment, who gets displaced by transformation, why some neighbourhoods have services and others do not, why certain classes of people occupy particular spaces in the city and why levels of personal satisfaction may not align directly with assessments of government performance. Taking seriously the political aspirations of different regimes will draw attention to the recurrent similarities, but also the systematic variation driving urban transformation across the global South.

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Notes
1. All data in this section are from Cain, Croese and Pitcher (2014).
2. There are theoretical and methodological difficulties determining the middle class in Luanda, since data from the 2014 census are not fully available. As Schubert (2016) observes and our survey reveals, members of Luanda’s ‘middle class’ rely on diverse livelihood strategies and material conditions are uneven. Considering these observations and the high cost of living in Luanda, we use average monthly income of over 60,000 kwanza (about US$600 at 2014 exchange rates) or US$20 per day to identify the ‘middle class’. This income roughly corresponds to the base salary of a third class, medium-skilled civil servant.

3. The number offered by officials may overestimate household size. Our survey suggests the average is five members per household.

4. Our survey sampled households, and women accounted for 60% of respondents. Our models control for the possibility that gender may affect answers to questions about housing satisfaction and quality of housing and services.

5. An exception includes the study of Belchior et al. (2016) on policy issues, but respondents in their survey were limited to members of parliament and university students.

6. We used a 4-point Likert scale for questions on personal levels of satisfaction and policy performance which we collapse here for ease of interpretation.

7. MA Pitcher, site visit, December 2015.

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