What to do when the fighting stops

Challenges for post-conflict reconstruction in Angola

Development Workshop

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What to do when the fighting stops: challenges for post-conflict reconstruction in Angola

by Development Workshop

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# GLOSSARY

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>The Angolan NGO Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakongo</td>
<td>The collective name for the people of the old Kongo kingdom of northern Angola and the south-west of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biscatos</td>
<td>Irregular, poorly paid manual work and odd jobs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFB</td>
<td>Caminho de Ferro de Benguela — The Benguela Railway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comuna</td>
<td>The lowest administrative unit of local government in Angola, the level below a Município</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration: a programme (in Angola but also elsewhere) aimed at ex-combatants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fazenda</td>
<td>A large-scale commercial farm employing labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fazendeiro</td>
<td>The owner or manager of a large-scale commercial farm employing labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanya</td>
<td>A language of southern Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humbi</td>
<td>A language of southern Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>IRSEM</td>
<td>The Institute for the Reintegration of Ex-combatants, the Angolan Government body responsible for demobilisation and ex-combatants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kikongo</td>
<td>The language spoken by the Bakongo people of northern Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kimbundu</td>
<td>A language spoken in north central Angola, inland from Luanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lingala</td>
<td>A language spoken in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a language often used in communication between different groups in the RDC especially near the capital, Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola: the governing party of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Município</td>
<td>A Municipality: a level of local administration in Angola below the Province and above the Comuna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nganguela</td>
<td>A language spoken in eastern Angola</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ombala</td>
<td>An Umbundu word for a group of villages under the same customary authority or leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ovimbundu</td>
<td>The collective name for the people of the Central Plateau of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Onjango</td>
<td>An umbundu word, meaning a council or meeting of people in a village, or the building in which this takes place (sometimes written as njango)</td>
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<tr>
<td>QA</td>
<td>Quartering Area (or Gathering Area), areas for ex-combatants and their dependents in existence from April 2002 to June 2003 as part of the demobilisation process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sede</td>
<td>Headquarters, or the main town of a Comuna or Município</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soba</td>
<td>An Umbundu word for a customary leader, but also used elsewhere in Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tchokwe</td>
<td>A language spoken in eastern Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Umbundu</td>
<td>The language spoken by the Ovimbundu, the people of the central plateau of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
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The research teams who worked in extremely difficult conditions in remote areas of Angola, in particular those who worked in remote areas of Huambo Province in one of the worst rainy seasons in memory, spending many long days in the field, sleeping rough and pushing the project vehicle through the mud.

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Maribel Gonzales of Development Workshop in Canada revised and edited the original report “Land and reintegration of ex-combatants in Huambo Province in post-war Angola”.
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TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES

Allan Cain
Following the death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, on the 22nd of February 2002, a cease-fire was agreed in March 2002 and the Luena ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ was signed in April between the Government and UNITA forces. Thus ended 27 years of almost continuous conflict in Angola. The 1994 Lusaka Protocol was restored as the basis for peace, but with revised military clauses that gave more limited provision for integration of UNITA troops into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA).

Demobilisation of over 100,000 UNITA troops was carried out. This involved their quartering, disarmament, demobilisation, transit to areas of resettlement and eventual reintegration into Angolan society. At the same time a process of return and resettlement of internally displaced persons was underway, against a backdrop of a shattered infrastructure and widespread poverty.

Based on the results of two research studies carried out by Development Workshop between 2003 and 2005, this book examines what happens when the fighting stops after a prolonged and intense conflict. Section 2 is based on a research study that looked at the specific topic of access to land by demobilised soldiers in rural areas of Huambo Province. Section 3 is based on a wider-ranging research study that assesses the post-conflict risks and challenges in Angola, using field-studies in four Provinces and on a review of other studies (both published and unpublished).

Both the studies show that there have been some remarkable short-term achievements in Angola since 2002. Demobilisation and disarmament have occurred and peace is holding. Access is possible to all parts of the country. Refugees and displaced people have been free to return home, and there has been some resettlement of refugees, displaced people and ex-combatants.

But both studies also indicate a number of longer-term risks. In most rural areas, small-scale farmers are cultivating small areas, and are not producing sufficient to provide for their needs let alone a surplus that will allow them to rebuild their assets. Many were initially dependent on food aid and subsequent reductions in food aid have meant that new survival strategies have had to be sought, mainly seeking irregular (and low paid) daily jobs and informal market trading. The agricultural sector does not currently have the capacity to absorb large numbers of new arrivals without significant investment to increase productivity on existing cultivated areas as well as increase access to arable land. But even in and near towns there are few non-agricultural employment opportunities in rural areas, many fewer than in the pre-war period.

The difficulty of re-establishing livelihoods in rural areas means that population movements continue towards peri-urban areas of the main cities in the post-conflict
period, more than outweighing the movement from peri-urban to rural areas. There are still people living in what were formerly IDP camps: they may not be the original IDPs from those camps, but appear to be people from various origins who have not found it possible to effectively resettle and reintegrate anywhere else.

The lack of material assets and the availability of only poorly-paid survival strategies mean that poverty levels are high. Large numbers of people are surviving on $1 to $1.50 per day, eating only one meal per day and owning very limited clothing. Particularly vulnerable are those who have lost their assets or who have lost contact during the war with their families, because support from families has been the main form of aid available for social and economic reintegration.

There has been a steep drop in international aid to Angola, and humanitarian aid has not been transformed into assistance for the post-conflict transition. As with DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) programmes for ex-combatants in many countries, the focus in Angola has been on the first two parts (Disarmament, Demobilisation), which reduce immediate security risks and are of immediate interest to Governments of the region and to the international community. Reintegration programmes have been slow to start. Some refugees and Internally Displaced People have returned home but there have been few comprehensive reintegration programmes for them. Reintegration for them depends largely on assistance from family and community networks rather than Government plans or donor help.

Both studies illustrate how conflict leads to weak institutions, but that weak institutions can also lead to a risk of future conflict. There is a link between violent civil conflict and weak institutions. While there is latent conflict in all societies, “conflicts become violent and grow into war when society and governments are unable to resolve these conflicts”\(^1\). Violent conflict then further weakens institutions by breaking up communities, deepening mistrust and preventing the State from functioning in an accountable manner to distribute resources and manage conflicts. Post-conflict reconstruction therefore involves rebuilding institutions. For example, local customary institutions are the main mechanisms for dealing with conflict over land. But local conflict resolution mechanisms are not always able to resolve these conflicts while the judiciary’s capacity to deal with a large number of land conflicts is very low.

The findings of both studies indicate that what has been achieved in Angola in the four years after the peace agreement was only the beginning of the process of post-conflict reconstruction. Angola was described, for many years, as a complex emergency. A complex emergency leads to a complex post-emergency situation. The current situation in Angola is the result of many years of rapid economic and social

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\(^1\) Joseph Hanlon “Roots of civil war: tick all of the above” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006, 78.
change in Angola. The effects of a long-running conflict are profound. “Normality” does not return as soon as prolonged conflict ends. Reconstruction implies dealing with a complex set of inter-related questions, while the capacity to deal with these questions has been weakened and habits of short-term planning have been developed. The challenges of creating a sustainable peace in Angola require dealing with the key issues which can be a block to development and create future conflict risks.

This raises serious issues for humanitarian and development assistance in post-conflict transitions such as Angola. The humanitarian assistance that Angola received prior to 2002 has not been subsequently transformed into assistance for post-conflict reconstruction. No clear strategies for post-conflict reconstruction have emerged from the international community.

Ten years ago there were more than 20 ongoing conflicts in Africa; today there are only five. This is a real achievement, but the World Bank’s Transition Working Group warns that half of post-conflict countries slip back into conflict within five years of peace settlements. There exists a serious gap in international humanitarian assistance strategies for post-conflict contexts, where risks remain if peace is not consolidated. International humanitarian assistance strategies need to be developed for post-war transitions that will help to consolidate peace and to lay the foundations for effective development in war-torn societies.

The Transition Window

There is a short window of opportunity after the end of open conflict in which to create a sustainable peace. A sense of progress needs to be achieved in this limited time, by strengthening the fabric and confidence of society. If this opportunity is missed, weaknesses and fractures remain that can provoke future conflicts.

Humanitarian donors have made major investments in emergency assistance and peacebuilding programmes in conflict countries. These investments risk being wasted if the international community does not consolidate them through effective post-war transition support.

A Vulnerable and Fragile Peace

Post-conflict transitions often fail or turn out to be long, risky or inconclusive processes. Practitioners and policymakers increasingly recognise that disengagement from post-conflict States requires time, care and planning to counter the risks of renewed tension and conflict. Post-conflict transition states are generally “poorly performing states”. The high risk of slipping back into conflict requires strategic
engagement. The increasing number of post-conflict transition States means that the issues cannot be ignored.

These problems are especially acute in Africa. African peoples, governments and the international community have achieved a great deal in recent years in bringing violent conflicts to an end. Yet the continued existence of problematic transitions indicates that the hard work is not over.

Angola has failed three times to consolidate successive peace processes. Transitions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes countries have been slow. Zimbabwe’s failure to deal with its demobilised ex-combatants at the end of the liberation war has come back to haunt the country more than two decades later. Post-war transitions are now recognised to be more difficult than was previously thought. Peace must be built brick by brick, and that takes time. If a post-conflict country slides back into open conflict, there is a risk that same conflict will spread to neighbouring countries. Humanitarian practitioners have realised that post-conflict transition countries require considerable assistance to consolidate peace. Even when they have natural resources, transition countries have difficulty in redeveloping the structures to use them effectively. In fact, in countries with potential exploitable resources, the risks can be greater. Resources are a source of conflict; there is potential for a dangerous crisis of expectations if peace does not bring about a rapid improvement in peoples’ living conditions.

The Transition — Special Needs

Each post-conflict transition is different. There are, however, a number of common features. Sustainable peace, which is more than the lack of war or absence of violence, comes some time after open conflict has ended. But it has to be constructed. Sustainable peace means a civil peace that provides constitutional and legal means to settle differences non-violently and to eliminate indirect violence. It is linked to poverty reduction, and to the presence of social justice, equal opportunities, equal protection and impartial enforcement of the law.

A post-conflict transition involves multiple transitions: security, political, socio-economic and cultural. Among the potential problems are physical destruction of infrastructure, lack of resources and manpower, institutional fragility, political volatility, and social and personal trauma. The flight of capital and the destruction of physical assets and human capital are well-known effects of conflict, as is the dispersal of populations. Peace usually pushes to the foreground deep-seated underlying social problems, which have often contributed to the crisis.
An International Donor Transition Strategy is required

A coherent strategy for post-conflict transitions will make international aid actors more effective. The main elements of such a strategy are evident in current humanitarian practice and may involve adapting existing tools or looking for new instruments outside the old dichotomy of relief and development. The strategy can take a number of different forms.

Some international aid actors have extended the mandate of humanitarian agencies to include the post-conflict period and to include interventions that have grown out of pure humanitarian responses. Agencies have begun to try to maintain, in the post-conflict period, the personnel and structures that have been developed during humanitarian actions, with personnel who have local knowledge, while moving away from the rapid and uncoordinated responses that characterise emergencies. It is now recognised that relief instruments can make useful inputs in such a situation, if they are put into a broader framework.

The Post-War Gap

Humanitarian workers know there is a glaring gap when emergency relief operations end and development projects have yet to be designed and implemented. They understand the need for more efficient and cohesive investment in the transitional periods. The artificial division of relief and development in donors’ assistance programmes remains a longstanding problem. It hinders donors’ efforts to analyse a transition, or to analyse the social transformations that conflicts have created. It also limits what may be done in a transitional situation that requires a combination of responses.

Post-conflict transitions are more complex than humanitarian emergencies, as social needs go far beyond basic survival. But it is also recognised that it is difficult to identify the point at which humanitarian agencies should “exit”. In these contexts, it is not just a case of “restarting development” or putting back the infrastructure that has been destroyed by war. Pouring major financial resources into an environment where there is competition for those resources increase risks of renewed conflict. The main problem is often weak institutions, which cannot use resources, rather than a lack of resources per se. Thus, while peace usually leads to increased donor support, adequate national financial instruments to address post-conflict environments are often only beginning to emerge. Donors will have limited success, for example, if they rely on direct bilateral assistance for service delivery where government implementation structures have been weakened by conflict.
In many cases, there is insufficient stability for classic development interventions. An emphasis on physical infrastructure in development programmes, with little or no emphasis on the institutions, does not address the main needs. Fixed term, inflexible projects are likely to fail due to lack of institutional capacity. Few development agencies as currently structured are agile enough to seize opportunities in post-conflict transitions, and may not be bringing together the mix of tools that are required. The planning cycles of development agencies are long and do not have sufficient flexibility to take prompt, potentially high-risk actions that may be required to produce high returns. The World Bank’s Angolan Demobilisation and Rehabilitation programme, for example, did not become fully operational until well into the third year after the peace settlement. There exists a major gap in international assistance at the very point where actions are required and where there are risks to peace. If at this point, donors fail or are slow to deliver essential, expected or promised assistance, they not only miss an opportunity to consolidate peace; worse, they may precipitate a relapse into conflict and the resumption of seemingly endless cycles of expensive humanitarian aid. Angola expected support from the international community when the war ended in 2002 and called for an international donors’ round table conference on reconstruction. Donors, preoccupied with new crisis elsewhere in the world, failed to respond positively, raising issues of the Government’s transparency, weak pro-poor policy and overly centralised governance (all areas where transition support where needed).

**Investing in Civil Society**

A long-running conflict or crisis can sap a society’s strength to recover from that crisis. It may affect many aspects of society beyond immediate survival needs, such as social structures and people’s ability to express themselves or to speak without aggression. Leadership patterns, dispute resolution and property rights are often in disarray. The agricultural base has changed so that the social organisation and forms of collective action on which they rest have also been disturbed. There has often been a delegitimisation of leadership (often referred to as the dissolution of social capital), with the creation of a fractured society that encourages mistrust. Reinforcing and rebuilding civil society structures through through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and religious-based organisations are essential at this stage. Local civic organisations have played important roles in opposing war and building national consensus for reconciliation. It is important to recognise and support civil society’s new roles in the “transition” to advocate for good governance, equitable access to basic services and human rights. Civil society can become important partners with the international community in voicing demands for post-war economic reform and increased transparency in the management of national resources.
Women’s roles in society have substantially changed during a conflict. Traditional social welfare systems break down and women-headed households increase. Women require assistance to strengthen their capacities for self-reliance as they shoulder a major burden in reconstruction, and to participate actively through civil society mechanisms.

The State’s Role

The State administrative apparatus usually shrinks in area and in competence during conflicts. Debilitated institutional capacity in nearly all branches of public administration leads to lack of authority and to disorganisation. A long-running crisis reduces the capacity of the public sector, especially outside the State capital, and it cannot be rebuilt instantaneously. International aid has often taken over key roles of the State and the State no longer has an oversight of the activities in any specific competency. In wartime, State structures are usually under-funded and often ignored; corruption often becomes embedded and so State structures need to be thoroughly reformed. In States such as Angola, its post-conflict weakness in the delivery of its social services has been described as a delinking of the State, and the political elite, from society. These States are strong and weak at the same time: conflict has strengthened the security and “command-oriented” aspects of the State while weakening institutions that function through trust, dialogue and accountability. The economy is often weak or distorted, and institutional weaknesses (such as the inability to enforce contracts to collect debts) inhibit economic growth and/or hinder reforms to promote market activity. There is an a priori need to focus on strengthening the State as well as civil society in post-conflict situations.

Post-Conflict Transitions — the Priorities

The absence of open conflict thus offers an opportunity for tackling deep-seated problems in post-conflict societies, but the absence of war will not by itself resolve these problems. In many of these States, the ending of the humanitarian crisis has revealed a structural crisis. Accumulated problems need to be specifically addressed:

- Reconstruction involves the return of displaced people and the rebuilding of destroyed infrastructure. It goes even beyond to include the rebuilding of the human, social and institutional fabric, tackling the high level of social exclusion and low level of citizenship.

- Social services such as education and health will have to be rebuilt in a way that deals with new challenges, such as HIV/AIDS.
• Reconstruction means not only reconstruction of physical infrastructure but also the rebuilding of social and institutional systems (planning, policy frameworks, transparency, accountability, supervision, training, finance and supply), policy reforms and institutional measures.

• Peace brings rising expectations, yet there are special needs to be dealt with that can be costly (de-mining, demobilisation and reinsertion of the demobilised, resettlement of displaced people).

Meeting the Priorities with New Strategies and Improved Instruments

National post-war strategies must address not only the rebuilding of physical capital but also the rebuilding of human and social capital. Strategies need to assist in consolidating peace and overcoming the legacies of war and address the root causes of conflict. Stabilising fragile and vulnerable post-conflict transitions is imperative. This should include support to the return of displaced people, de-mining, demobilisation and rebuilding of essential public services. But such strategies need to go beyond to tackle the essential, but often hidden, challenge of mending relations, and trust and cooperation among people and groups, including political actors and institutions.

External actors can make a critical contribution. Their main task should be to revive and complement local and national capacities. This means maintaining essential services while building the capacity for their sustainability and assisting the process of institution building, and the development of trust, dialogue and accountability.

Institutions of the State must be strengthened to enable the State to carry out its essential tasks. The State plays a crucial role in post-conflict transitions and its attempts at rebuilding must be reinforced. It is best to avoid weak State provision of services being replaced by unregulated private sector provision: if the State has failed in the provision of services, it cannot be expected to regulate effectively without considerable support. Effective State institutions for law enforcement, debt-collection, contract-enforcement and regulation of economic activity are necessary for economic growth. Land access and occupation rights issues, which are often at the origin of conflicts in the first place, re-emerge when the internally displaced and refugees return to their areas of origin and sometimes find ancestral lands appropriated by new settlers or redesignated for commercial exploitation by urban or military elites. Newly appointed civic administrations and weak or non-existent judicial systems can rarely cope with managing these new conflicts.
However support to government structures, which in such situations may be contested and have authoritarian tendencies, needs to be balanced by support to civil society. It also has to include transformation of government structures so that they are more accountable and open to dialogue. The civic rights of marginalised groups such as former IDPs require specific attention. People need to be assisted in building their own social organisations and patterns of cooperation. Local-level reconstruction projects are often an opportunity to do this as they can enhance trust, accountability, dialogue and the recognition of mutual interests among various stakeholders. Donors should support activities that connect communities and different stakeholders.

Adapting Existing Tools

Improving instruments for assistance in post-conflict transitions does not necessarily mean more aid but requires changes in the way aid is delivered. Assistance in such situations should be flexible and must respond rapidly to changing circumstances and new opportunities. Addressing temporary needs has to be embedded in the ongoing development process. Constant monitoring and evaluation is required in post-conflict transitions, to ensure that actions fit with a rapidly changing context and that lessons are learned about appropriate actions for such contexts. Risks are high and aid actors must be willing and able to manage them: it is increasingly recognised that previous rehabilitation programmes did not involve sufficient monitoring and evaluation. The quality of aid requires that aid-givers cultivate an in-depth understanding of societies they are supporting, their processes and issues.

The need for stronger policy coherence and donor coordination in post-conflict transitions is recognised. There must be a common vision and information sharing among agencies. Mechanisms are also required to ensure that there is national, political and professional participation in the policy process. Uncoordinated action by international actors can prevent the recreation of coherent State policies. There is a need to track aid delivery and assess the impact of aid. This initially usually means stronger UN coordination while assisting the national government to begin to strengthen its coordination and policy capacity. It is increasingly recognised that the effective UN coordination of humanitarian assistance through the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) should not cease when conflict ends; its knowledge and experience should be incorporated into a new mechanism for coordination in transition. This must happen in Angola and other transition countries, where a common UN assessment has been carried out of post-war needs. In Angola the UN piloted a post-conflict “Transition Coordination Unit” to take over from OCHA with the aim of building capacity of Government humanitarian coordination.
Need for Post-War Transition Assistance Strategies

Many donors have an effective and well-respected reputation in International Humanitarian Assistance but lack the programming tools to move on to meet post-conflict needs. Other international assistance actors have developed special instruments such as “transitional units” for post-conflict transitions, recognising that post-conflict transition countries are not in relief mode but neither are they ready for sustainable development. USAID began the Office of Transitional Initiatives in the early 1990s. Australian Aid adopted a “Peace, Conflict and Development Policy” in June of 2002. WHO has a “Health as a Bridge to Peace” programme. The World Bank set up a Post-conflict Unit to carry forward its interest in social assessments, social capital, governance, accountability and transparency, and exploration of the costs of violence in such contexts. There have been discussions in the European Union about “humanitarian plus” grants. The Netherlands Government created a Stabilisation Fund to assist in transition situations. Canada has recently established a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and created the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). United Nations system has been involved in the “Brookings Process” to explore international institutional and funding arrangements in the gap between humanitarian aid and long-term development programmes.

Donors should consider the two following alternatives. The first is to develop a new funding framework for transitional programmes with its own structure and guidelines; the second is to extend the humanitarian mandate so that it can in the future continue to fund in transition periods. Both options need new, flexible guidelines to allow for strategic interventions over longer timeframes, guidelines that are appropriate to the transition programmes. Resources need to be targeted to build civil society and local institutions as well as consolidate processes of resettlement and reintegration. Programmes should be aimed at preparing national institutions to effectively mobilise their own resources to make the transition to sustainable development. The window of effectiveness for such interventions is limited — yet it affords a short-lived opportunity with time enough for well-developed and timely interventions. Donor engagement in post-conflict reconstruction is an issue of partnership rather than levels of development assistance. Angola’s infrastructure, both physical and social has been devastated by prolonged violent conflict. Even by mobilising its own natural resource wealth, it will take many years to recover.
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LAND AND POST-WAR REINTEGRATION
OF EX-COMBATANTS IN HUAMBO PROVINCE

Development Workshop – Huambo
Imogen Parsons, Moises Festo and Ana Maria Carvalho

Research team members: Henrique Chimble and Francisco Xavier from the Angolan NGO Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA); Moises Gabriel Custodio and Amor Sayoco interns from the National Institute of Statistics (INE); Osvaldo Eduardo, Lino Samunga, Antonio Avelino, Americo Tomas, Augusta Jamba, Rodrigues Katchikualula, Isaias Costa and Boaventura Elias – all from Development Workshop’s Community Publication programme in Huambo.

Advisors: Fernando Pacheco and Fernando Arroyo
Edited by: Paul Robson and Maribel Gonzales

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5 How do ex-combatants obtain land in rural areas
6 Quantity and quality of land
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8 Particular groups
9 Commercial agriculture and the new land law
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This research was carried out by Development Workshop in 2004 for the World Bank supported Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (ADRP) and was funded by the Human Security Programme of Foreign Affairs Canada.
1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

This paper is based on Development Workshop’s research on the land issue in relation to the return, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants in post-war Angola. It aims to contribute to knowledge on the reintegration of ex-combatants in rural areas of Angola, specifically how demobilised soldiers and their families gained access to agricultural land and the constraints, problems and conflicts they faced in this process. It focuses on Huambo Province, which has the highest rural population density in Angola, and a long tradition in agriculture. The Institute for the Reintegration of Ex-combatants (IRSEM) expected about 25,000 ex-combatants (plus their dependents) to resettle in Huambo Province, which this about a quarter of the total number of UNITA ex-combatants.

A need was felt for research on this issue because a large proportion of ex-combatants were expected to be dependent on subsistence agriculture for their economic reintegration and thus need access to agricultural land in their areas of resettlement. At the same time there is often competition for land, and it has sometimes been predicted that land would be a future flash point for conflict in Angola, with the potential to exacerbate underlying social and political tensions and derail reintegration of communities and peacebuilding.

Angola is a large country with a low average population density, but land is not necessarily abundantly available for returning refugees, IDPs or the demobilised. Large areas of land in Angola are of low fertility, located in low rainfall areas or are remote from markets and services. Angola’s population is highly concentrated around the main cities, coastal regions, and in the Central Highlands. The majority of the rural population are today dependent on small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods, and live close to the poverty line. Land is generally the only real asset of rural families and their only source of livelihood. It is essential and heavily contested especially in those areas with access to some services and markets, and with adequate rainfall. There is increasing competition between peasant and commercial farming in these same areas but the State has limited capacity to effectively regulate land access.

Demobilisation programmes appeared to be based on the assumption that rural communities would allocate land to returnees, using ‘customary mechanisms’, and that there would be some official distribution of land to new returnees, but little concrete information existed whether this was the case and about the mechanisms through which this would done. There was no information about the quantity and quality of land available, key factors in the successful reintegration of ex-combatants and other returnees1.

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1 World Bank Aide-Mémoire Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project of 04 June 2002 says that "Ex-combatants access to land would be facilitated by the participative processes used for others who need land" without specifying what these are.
Studies on reintegration expectations of ex-combatants carried out by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and by IRSEM indicated that the majority of ex-combatants wished to return to their areas of origin and that almost half would want to be self-employed in agriculture. Apart from the rapid assessments of the needs and intentions of ex-combatants who left their areas of origin on average 14 years ago and generally have not returned since, little was known about how they would reintegrate in rural communities and access land.

A World Bank document related to the ADRP expressly stated: “Disputes over access to land as individuals and communities return to former home communities now inhabited by others may also present challenges to reintegration... further analysis of the land tenure and access constraints needs to be done.”

However no information was available about whether this had happened and what the consequences were.

Map of Huambo Province showing Municipalities

2 METHODOLOGY

2.1 Selection of Research Sites

The research was carried out in four municipalities of Huambo Province: Bailundo, Caála, Londuimbali and Vila Nova⁴, specifically in rural communities where small-scale agriculture is the predominant livelihood of most families and where a reasonably large number of ex-combatants were expected to resettle. Given the resources and time available, it was not possible to cover a large enough sample of demobilised soldiers in the province to be statistically significant. Instead research was targeted at locations that represent a broad range of characteristics previously identified as likely to impact on the research questions.

The four municipalities are each qualitatively different — in terms of location and characteristics — but were also chosen for the reasonably large number of ex-combatants expected to resettle there, in order to facilitate the fieldwork. Thus Caála is relatively near Huambo city and one of the more economically diversified and populous municipalities, with high associated pressure on land. Caála and Vila Nova are both intersected by the Benguela railway (currently mostly non-functioning), which represents the area of highest population density and concentration of commercial farming, but both also have very remote rural areas that are difficult to access. Londuimbali and Bailundo are both more remote from the central axis of the Province (the Benguela Railway), although major transport arteries intersect each. Most of the communities included in the research have been displaced at some time over the last 25 years but those closer to urban areas have also sometimes received IDPs.

In each municipality, two comunas⁴ were chosen, and within those a number of ombalas selected⁵. This gave a number of research sites with varied characteristics in terms of distance from the Municipal town, distance from the main communications route across the Province, proximity to former Quartering Areas, presence of commercial farms and population density. Table 1 gives a summary of the main characteristics of the research sites in each of the four Municipalities.

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³ Vila Nova is an alternative name for the Municipality of Tchikala Tcholhanga
⁴ The comuna is the lowest administrative unit of local government.
⁵ An ombala is an Umbundu term for group of villages.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Comuna</th>
<th>Ombala</th>
<th>Distance from Municipal town</th>
<th>Proximity to CFB corridor* and Gathering Areas</th>
<th>Presence of fazendas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bailundo</td>
<td>Epamba</td>
<td>Epamba Samuchuka</td>
<td>Medium distance from town (&gt;10km)</td>
<td>Not close to CFB corridor, Chiteta GA nearby</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bailundo</td>
<td>Others: Chilume, Quinze &amp; Velha Chika</td>
<td>Close to the town (1-6km)</td>
<td>Not close to CFB corridor, Chiteta Gathering Area very close</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caála</td>
<td>Kalenga</td>
<td>Kassupi</td>
<td>Medium distance from the town (7-27 km)</td>
<td>Close to CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caála</td>
<td>Sakonombo</td>
<td>Medium distance from the town (10-20km)</td>
<td>Close to CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Londuimbali</td>
<td>Galanga</td>
<td>Pukosso</td>
<td>Far from the town (30-35km)</td>
<td>Distant from CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Londuimbali</td>
<td>Ukonga &amp; Chitaka</td>
<td>Medium distance from the town (11-21km)</td>
<td>Distant from CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby</td>
<td>One active, others inactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Nova (also known as Tchikala Tcholohanga).</td>
<td>Vila Nova</td>
<td>Chitaka: Sao Jose &amp; Jika villages</td>
<td>Close to town (1/2 - 1 km)</td>
<td>Close to CFB corridor No Gathering Areas nearby (Sambo in same Municipality however)</td>
<td>Some active, others inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Nova</td>
<td>Chitaka: other villages, other Ombalas in Vila Nova</td>
<td>Medium/far from town (4-25km)</td>
<td>Part of CFB corridor. No Gathering Areas nearby (Sambo in same Municipality however)</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambo</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Remote from Municipal town</td>
<td>Remote from CFB corridor Sambo Gathering Area nearby</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The CFB corridor is the densely populated area around the Benguela Railway, which cuts across the Province.
CFB means Caminho de Ferro de Benguela.
2.2 Field Research

The research team was made up of a Field Coordinator from Development Workshop’s Policy, Research and Monitoring Unit, two Senior Research Advisors, and 12 Angolan researchers (eight from Development Workshop, two from the National Statistics Institute (INE) and two seconded from the Angolan NGO Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA)). Researchers spent a minimum of four days in each Municipality over the period December 2003 and January 2004. The period coincided with unusually heavy rains in the Province making access to research sites very difficult.

Two researchers specialised in focus group discussions and qualitative data gathering, while the rest worked in pairs administering structured questionnaires. The structured interviews were carried out with 384 individual ex-combatants: these gathered general background and demographic data, specific data on the return and resettlement process, the process of land acquisition and tenure, and on the ex-combatants’ perceptions, future aspirations and hopes. Within each community included in the study, the coverage (in terms of the proportion of demobilised soldiers interviewed) was generally high, at over 75 percent.

The focus group discussions were carried out with focus groups of demobilised soldiers, UNITA women, and community residents. The key informant interviews were carried out with village leaders (sobas) IRSEM officials and local administrators. There was also participatory land mapping of 11 communities.
3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

Angola’s 27-year civil war ended with a cease-fire that was agreed in March 2002 and the Luena ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ that was signed in April between the Government and UNITA forces. The 1994 Lusaka Protocol was restored as the basis for peace, but with revised military clauses that gave more limited provision for integration of UNITA troops into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA).

Demobilisation of over 100,000 UNITA troops was carried out. This involved their quartering, disarmament, demobilisation, transit to areas of resettlement and eventual reintegration into Angolan society. At the same time a process of return and resettlement of internally displaced persons was underway, against a backdrop of a shattered infrastructure and widespread poverty.

The Government of Angola carried out disarmament and demobilisation single-handedly. This was positive for national ‘ownership’ of the process but it was at times done with inadequate resources. Relocation was sometimes delayed, with over 100 000 ex-combatants and families still awaiting transport after closure of the Gathering Areas. Some ex-combatants and their families waited for long periods at military airports and in transit camps where conditions were poor, and assistance minimal. Most registered ex-combatants aged 20 and over received the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) benefit package: demobilisation and photo identification cards, a travel authorisation certificate, a five-month salary based on military rank, and food assistance. They also received a transport allowance and a reintegration kit upon arrival in their destination communities.

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5 The total number of ex-UNITA combatants demobilised was finally given by MINARS as just over 90,000, although the ADRP cites a figure of 105,000.
### Chronology of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration in Angola:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22nd February 2002</td>
<td>Death of Jonas Savimbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th April 2002</td>
<td>Signing of Luena Memorandum of Understanding, putting an end to the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Quartering Areas (QAs) around the country with plans for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>demobilisation of an estimated 50,000 UNITA troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-August 2002</td>
<td>Around 85,000 UNITA troops report for disarmament and demobilisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Official process of integration of approx 5,000 UNITA combatants into FAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and demobilisation of the remainder is completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept-Dec 2002</td>
<td>UNITA combatants continue to arrive, total reported to pass 100,000. UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mission winds up &amp; closure of QAs (renamed Gathering Areas) announced but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>does not happen. NGOs are allowed increased access to Gathering Areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-March 2003</td>
<td>World Bank support for ADRP is approved. UNITA combatants continue to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrive but in smaller numbers. Final date for closure of Gathering Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>is announced and transport begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-June 2003</td>
<td>Quartering Areas are officially closed and transit areas established (many of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>which are former IDP camps). In April 2003 there are 45 transit centres with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between 27,000 and 31,000 people in them. Some Gathering Areas still have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>people in them. 31 of 35 are declared officially shut by end May but, in June,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 of them still contain about 185,000 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-August 2003</td>
<td>Transport of ex-combatants and families continues. Reports emerge of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inadequately prepared transit areas containing 36,000 people, and of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cleared out to make room for ex-combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept-Dec 2003</td>
<td>The majority of ex-combatants are believed to have been transported or made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>their own way by now, in time for the planting season. All Gathering Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reported closed and empty, some 3,650 people still in transit areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-March 2004</td>
<td>Final approval for cash disbursement under the ADRP is given. UNDP/FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Project begins. Number still 'in transit' not known.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

The average age of the 384 demobilised soldiers interviewed was 34 years; 366 were men (95 percent), and 18 women (5 percent).

Figure 1. Age of respondents

The ex-combatants surveyed have a very low level of education. A quarter got only as far as the end of the 1st class — although this may have taken several years — and over three-quarters did not get beyond the end of primary education. Eighty-five per cent of respondents report being member of a Christian church, which indicates the strong Christian influences in the Central Plateau. UNITA has in the past been associated with the Protestant churches, but the results of this survey indicate that 55% the ex-combatants interviewed are in fact members of the Catholic Church and 23% describe themselves as Protestant.

Umbundu is the predominant spoken language within the respondents’ households; only five stated that they did not. Of these five, two were not originally from the area while the other three had been away for between 12 and 17 years, and all five said that Portuguese was the language most commonly spoken in their homes. Overall, two-thirds reported that they sometimes spoke Portuguese within their households as well but it this does not imply literacy in Portuguese.

The population movements during the war, and the consequent diversity of people’s origins within individual communities, are apparent from the linguistic diversity of the respondents. Several other languages were also spoken, including for example, Kikongo, Lingala, Hanya, and Humbi. As shown in Table 3 over
half (235) speak two languages, while 7 percent speak three or more languages. Ex-combatants returning with wives from other areas of Angola and from different ethno-linguistic groups further add to linguistic diversity.

The villages of Chilume and Kavata demonstrate the highest degree of linguistic variation. In Chilume the villages covered here (Vila Moises and Boa Vista) were both established by the Government as resettlement sites for IDPs from other locations. It is also very close to Bailundo town and attracted a comparatively high number of non-residents from different ethno-linguistic groups. In Kavata those that speak 3 or more languages have generally been away from this area for between 15 and 30 years. They have likely learned new languages while living in different areas of the country with UNITA and also through marriage. Respondents in Bailundo and Vila Nova have higher levels of linguistic diversity than those in Caíla and Londuimbali, which may be explained by the proximity of Gathering Areas to Bailundo and Vila Nova.

Table 2. Most common languages spoken

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbundu</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nganguela</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tchokwe</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimbundu (incl. Ngoia)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>384</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Variation by Ombala of number of languages spoken

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipio</th>
<th>Ombala</th>
<th>Number of languages spoken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bailundo</td>
<td>Epamba Samachuka</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quinze</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Velha Chica</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chilume</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caála</td>
<td>Kassupi</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sakanombo</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Londuimbali</td>
<td>Chitaka</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukonga</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pukusso</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Nova</td>
<td>Chitaka: Sao Jose and Jika</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vila Nova)</td>
<td>Chitaka: other villages (further away)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others: Kalunda, Kamjungue, Moma Soya, Ulondo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Nova</td>
<td>Kavata</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sambo)</td>
<td>Others (nearer town): Chiyaya, Kalembe, Kapule, Sambo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others (further away): Etunda Kajombo, Ndele, Ngondo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The majority of ex-combatants interviewed in these rural areas had returned to places of prior residence, often their birthplace. Over half were aged 19 or less when they left. On average, they had spent almost 15 years away from their communities. They are overwhelmingly dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods, with few alternative livelihoods registered: 93 percent reported relying on small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods. Non-agricultural occupations were rarely mentioned in the interviews even in areas near the towns, where some alternative occupations would have been expected. The range of current occupations is noticeably more limited than in the past: 73 per cent said that they relied on small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods before joining UNITA. The high proportion of respondents now employed in small-scale agriculture is expected, given the focus of the research was on areas in which small-scale agriculture is now the main livelihood. It should be noted, however, that in the colonial period other forms of employment were an important contribution to household income even in rural areas. The lack of other forms of livelihood potentially presents an economic vulnerability.
5 HOW DO EX-COMBATANTS OBTAIN LAND IN RURAL AREAS

The majority of the survey respondents were returning to places where they had previously been resident, in most cases their birthplace. For these, the average period they have spent away from their communities and land was around 15 years. Over half were aged 19 or less when they left, and over one third were under 15 or younger — very few were older than about 25. Only 10% returned to their communities at some point during this period.

Table 4. Respondent’s previous residence in community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived before joining UNITA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived while with UNITA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never lived there before</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>384</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those who had never lived in the community before are almost exclusively concentrated in close proximity to urban areas. Even though they had never lived in the community before, the majority said that they had acquired land through their family. In some cases they inherited land from their parents who had lived in the community, or they were given land by family members who now lived there.
Ex-combatants were asked how they had acquired the land that they now occupied, from the following potential sources:

- **Occupation of empty land:** Land which has no prior claims on it is simply ‘settled’ by the ex-combatant.

- **Inheritance of family land:** Implies the ex-combatant returns to land a piece of which is directly inherited by them and claimed by them as rightfully theirs.

- **Granting of land by family members:** A family relative grants a portion of their own land to the returning ex-combatant. This implies that the ex-combatant the ex-combatant does not have any right to claim this land as their own.

- **Land is attributed by the *soba***: A new area of land is identified and attributed to the returning ex-combatant by the *soba*.
• **Loaned land:** A relative or other individual loans a piece of land to the ex-combatant on a temporary basis (even if the time limit is not fixed).

• **Rented land:** The ex-combatant enters an agreement to rent a piece of land in exchange for money, goods or work, even if not formalised with documentation.

• **Bought land:** The ex-combatant buys the land — i.e. there is a payment and the land becomes ‘theirs’.

No cases were reported of the occupation of empty land. Prior claims already exist on virtually all land in areas where this research was conducted. The majority (almost 90%) of ex-combatants interviewed obtained their land through their family. Most inherited the land of their parents or grandparents, but a substantial number were also given a parcel of land by their relatives upon arrival.

Those returning to their community of birth generally inherit land from their parents (or grandparents in a limited number of cases), or are granted land by other members of their family. Among younger ex-combatants half of land access is by inheritance and half by being granted land. The majority of older ex-combatants obtain land by inheritance. This may reflect vulnerability on the part of younger ex-combatants, as they are more dependent on the good will of their relatives in granting them land.

Only 3 respondents reported that they were renting land, in each case from a wealthier individual in the community. None of them had any documentation and security of tenure depended, in their view, on the existence of witnesses.

In an additional 9 cases, demobilised soldiers were borrowing a plot of land. Perhaps surprisingly, this was from family members in only one case, in three cases from ‘an individual’, in three from friends, and in one from the church. None were paying anything for this. Being loaned land is, however, by its nature a temporary solution, and only one said that he could stay on the land for an unlimited length of time.

The *sôba* generally only allocates land when a person has arrived in a community where they have never lived before or when a person does not have access to land through any other means. Sobas do not have an unlimited reserve of land they can allocate at will, however, but more often ask other people to grant a part of their old, infertile or unused land, or allocate land which was not being cultivated but used for community purposes. Even among those people arriving

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6 Confirmed by information from group discussions.
in a community where they had never lived, only a relatively small proportion (12%) were allocated land to which they had no previous ties: most obtained land through family or other connections. Fourteen respondents acquired their land by buying it. Thus more demobilised soldiers bought land on arrival than were allocated land by the soba. The majority (11 out of 14) bought the land from an individual in the community, but one also said they bought the land from the soba. Three say that this land was part of their family’s beforehand, which may indicate that some kind of compensation was made to people who had taken over land during the returning ex-combatant’s absence or that the land was bought before the ex-combatant’s departure.

Figure 3. Means of land acquisition

Figure 4. Means of land acquisition by age of ex-combatant
Prices paid vary from the very low figure of 80 Kwz (though in this case the ex-combatant is more likely to have bought the land for this price before joining UNITA) to 5,500 Kwz (which is approximately the amount of the emergency reinstallation payment or of 5 months back salary for many lower-ranking officers). Only one actually any kind of purchase documents, but all claim to feel secure.

Thus in Huambo Province, traditional land tenure has moved away from a communal land ownership system, under which no one plot of land specifically ‘belongs’ to any one family or individual and under which any member of that community has the general right to cultivate one or more plots of land simply moving to another plot in order to allow fallow periods.

In Angola communal ownership systems are common only in areas with low demographic pressure and relatively isolated communities, primarily in the eastern and south-eastern half of the country. In other areas, such as Huambo Province, they have been transformed into a more individual system but with some basic tenets, such as the ‘right to return’ to land, remaining. The ‘right to land’ pertains more often to a specific parcel of land that is associated with an individual nuclear family. This includes areas of fallow land, which are similarly tied to individual farmers. Communal ownership, where it still exists, pertains to land used for gathering of wood, grass (for house building), and hunting.

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Formal, legal land titles very rarely exist. Rights to land are ‘guaranteed’ by witnesses including the soba (a traditional authority or village chief) who, in case of conflict, attests to the right of an individual or family to cultivate a given parcel of land. This creation of a definite link between families and a particular piece of land has also created the possibility for other forms of ‘transaction’ associated with land however (buying, selling and renting). There is now a market for land, which can be bought, sold and rented. However only three percent of those who have acquired land possess written documentation of ownership.

Large-scale movements of populations have broken the traditional links between people and land. Communities and families, uncertain if those who left would return, understandably took over cultivation of their land. Many people are now settled in new areas where they could not inherit land. Therefore the ‘right to land’ is no longer as clear-cut as it once may have been, but may be contested, with different ‘systems’ overlapping and interacting with each other.
6 QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF LAND

6.1 Quantity of land

Access to a sufficient land is problematic for many of the demobilised in Huambo Province. While most of the demobilised did gain access to land, only around half (48%) have access to over two hectares, which the minimum needed to establish a sustainable economic livelihood for a family over the medium to long-term. The quantity of land available decreases closer to urban areas. Only a third has 2 hectares or more within a 4 km radius of the Municipal towns, and a half has less than 1 hectare.

Figure 6. Quantity of land according to distance from urban area

An even smaller proportion actually cultivates this amount. Over half (52%) replied that they were only cultivating a small part of their land. The average (mean) area of land actually cultivated by ex-combatants was 0.75 hectare (the median was even lower, 0.5 hectare).

The main reasons given for this were lack of access to animal traction (77% cited this as a constraint), seeds and tools (59%), and lack of physical strength/"força" (17%) to work larger quantities of land. While many cite lack of

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*Fernando Pacheco’s paper, Footnote 7, estimates around 2ha, WFP Huambo gave the figure 2.5ha in a recent interview.*
seeds and tools as a problem, only three said they did not have access to any seeds and tools. Forty-two per cent had been able to buy seeds and tools in their community of return, 20% had borrowed them, and 19% had received them from an NGO. However the implication is that programmes of seed and tool distribution are no longer sufficient for the development of small-scale farming. The need for support in animal traction is backed up by earlier research (Pacheco, 20019) which claims that, while 2ha is the minimum cultivation area needed for a family's sustainable livelihood under current agricultural conditions (i.e. in the absence of proper irrigation and fertilisers), “it is difficult for an average-sized family to cultivate such an area without animal traction” and “it is impossible for a single woman.”

Table 5. Quantity of land owned and quantity of land actually cultivated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What proportion of your land did you cultivate this year?</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>A small part</th>
<th>Half</th>
<th>More than half/most</th>
<th>All or almost all</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How much land do you possess?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1/4 ha</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4 - 1/2 ha</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 - 1 ha</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – 2 ha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 2ha</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, it seems that only 30 percent of those surveyed had access to land that is both of reasonable size and reasonable quality. The majority therefore remained dependent on food aid, mainly from the World Food Programme (WFP) which was being phased out.

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6.2 Quality of land

Land is classified in Umbundu according to its location and position in the cultivation ‘cycle’ or, in other words, according to its fertility. Soil fertility in Huambo Province is low and believed to be decreasing. Contrary to popular belief, soils have been degraded in many areas of the Central Plateau, particularly those easily accessible from the Benguela Railway, and would require quite high levels of fertiliser even after long periods of fallow. The “very fertile agricultural land” of the Central Plateau was a myth of the colonial era that has tended to persist10.

Rotation of crops and the use of fallow periods, are required. A ‘slash and burn’ system wherein a family clears and cultivates a portion of land until it is devoid of nutrients and then moves on to another is still used in some regions. But in Huambo the increased pressure on land has replaced that with a system of more individual land ‘ownership’. Thus each family would divide their land into cultivated and fallow parts, and rotate crops accordingly.

The most valuable land is Onaka, small, low-lying plots of land near a watercourse, which are used for the cultivation of vegetables and potatoes, and also for small maize harvests during the ‘lean season’. For the main harvest of staple crops such as maize and beans, other fields (Omundi or if newly cleared Osenda) are also necessary however, which are generally higher and larger in size. Plots immediately around people’s houses (Ocumba) are also used. These are often more fertile (due to the addition of household rubbish as compost), but tend to be small and are often used for fruit and vegetable cultivation as well as for other more staple crops, especially where pressure for land is high and other larger fields may not be easily available. While these represent the kinds of land a normal family would hope to possess, there also exist other types that are less useful. Ocipembe notably is land that has reached the end of its fertility and as such would require large inputs of fertilisers and work to make it productive, and Ocisoso is abandoned land that would require a large amount of work and tools in order to prepare it for cultivation.

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Nina Birkeland, (1999), "Construction of a myth - "the very fertile agricultural land" in the Planalto Central, Angola.". Trondheim: Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
Common land types:

- **Osenda** unirrigated dryland fields at start of the fertility cycle and already cleared
- **Omundi** unirrigated dryland fields in the middle of the fertility cycle
- **Ocipembe** unirrigated dryland fields at the end of the fertility cycle
- **Ocisoso** unirrigated dryland fields, abandoned and require work to bring into cultivation
- **Onaka** generally small plots of humid land near a watercourse
- **Ombanda** slightly humid land just up the slope from the Onaka (larger than Onaka)

Varying levels of access to different types of land by ex-combatants can be identified on the basis of these land categories. Out of 384 cases, 204, or just over half, had access to Omundi or to Osenda, which are reasonable quality fields. A further 140 did not have access to either of these but did have access to Ocipembe or Osenda which are reasonably sized fields (significantly larger than Ocumbo or Onaka) but of poor quality, either infertile or requiring a large amount of work to be done to clear and prepare them (work which necessitates access to cattle and a plough, something 77% of all respondents mentioned as being an impediment to their cultivation of the land). The majority of demobilised soldiers therefore had access to some kind of reasonably sized field (i.e. not only Ocumbo or Onaka), but a significant proportion (36%) have access only to infertile land or land that needs to be cleared.

However those with no previous ties to the community are more likely to have poorer quality land or limited land types — only 7 (16%) of this group had access to either Osenda or Omundi, less than the total that have no land (8) and only one more than the number with access only to Ocumbo. It should be pointed out, again, that it is not generally possible for a family in Groups B, C, D or E to subsist over the medium to long term without alternative means of support. Furthermore, this subgroup not only tends to have lower quality land, but have a lesser quantity as well. As Table 7 shows, there is a positive correlation between having access to above 2 hectares of land and to having better quality land.

Overall, it seems that only 30% have access to land that is both of reasonable size and reasonable quality. Although the dataset is clearly skewed towards those who have returned to their birthplace, a comparison of the types of land to which demobilised soldiers have access is nevertheless revealing. Those who have been attributed or loaned land are considerably more likely to have access only to land around their houses than those who have gained land through their family members.
Table 6. Type of land according to previous ties to community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Previously lived in community</th>
<th>Never lived there before</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Have access to osenda or omundi, ie have access to dryland fields of good or reasonable quality</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Have no access to osenda or omundi but does have access to ocipembe or to ocisoso, ie have access to larger fields but only those that require clearing or are low fertility</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Have no dryland fields. Have onaka/ombanda or have onaka/ombanda plus ocumbo</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Have access only to ocumbo, ie to small patches of land around the house</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Have no land at all</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>324</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>384</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Quantity of land according to quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Have more than 2 ha</th>
<th>Have less than 2 ha</th>
<th>Data missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Have access to reasonable quality fields</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Have access to reasonably sized fields but only if they are infertile or uncleared land</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7. Type of land according to means of acquisition

A  Have access to *osenda* or *omundi*, i.e., have access to large fields of good or reasonable quality
B  Have no access to *osenda* or *omundi* but does have access to *ocipembe* or to *ocisoso*, i.e., have access to large fields but only those that require clearing or are low fertility
C  Have no large/unirrigated fields. Have *onaka/ombanda* or have *onaka/ombanda* plus *ocumbo*
D  Have access only to *ocumbo*, i.e., to small patches of land around the house
What to do when the fighting stops: challenges for post-conflict reconstruction in Angola

7 CONFLICTS, INSECURITY AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

7.1 Causes of Conflicts

Only 10 people interviewed in surveys directly reported conflicts. In most cases these related to disputes over the right to land within families or between a returning family and people who have taken over land while ex-combatants were away. Those who are in a weaker position are those who have been away the longest, or were the youngest when they left. Local conflict resolution mechanisms are not always able to resolve these conflicts while the judiciary’s capacity to deal with a large number of land conflicts is almost non-existent.

Five of these conflicts were reported to have been resolved. The focus group discussions revealed additional conflicts had taken place, but since they had been resolved were no longer considered as such. It was also suggested that demobilised soldiers might be unwilling to report problems for fear of aggravating them. In many cases resident community members report conflicts with demobilised soldiers while the ex-soldiers themselves deny any specific problems.

Focus group discussions revealed a widespread fear of witchcraft in rural communities in Huambo, which seems to indicate tensions within communities. One focus group with resident women reported the following: “When returnees arrive here they cannot complain about anything, because if they do they will be the victims of witchcraft.” Other demobilised soldiers and communities also complained of a rise in the number of cases of witchcraft, One demobilised soldier specifically linked this to the advent of peace saying that the only bad thing peace had brought was “increased freedom for those who practice witchcraft.”

Some of the demobilised reported verbal abuse and insults from longer-term residents. The ‘root causes’ of such conflicts and accusations of witchcraft are difficult to pin down. Land is only one factor, which must be situated in the context of general poverty, social and political tensions. Witchcraft, notably, is often a proxy for other kinds of tensions and underlying problems. To really understand the causes and manifestations of conflict in communities, further, more in depth research on this would be required and would not be easy since people are often reluctant to discuss this issue.
7.2 Means of Conflict Resolution

Focus group discussions suggest that conflicts are reported first to traditional authorities. However, it also seems that they are not always able to resolve these conflicts — or not in a way that is satisfactory to one or other party. In such cases, they are reported to the administrator. Solutions to land conflicts reported in this research included the further subdivision of land between family members, a practice already prevalent as a ‘means of acquisition’ of land. The concern is that the range of solutions is not great; people have few alternative options and few resources with which to support them. In many cases solutions seem to be temporary as in land is loaned or rented to the ex-combatant while they establish an alternative.

Case One

A 28-year-old ex-combatant returned to his village after nine years with UNITA, the last four of which he was away from his land. He returned and found that his uncle had sold his land while he was away. He consulted his remaining family members, the soba and the community, and the case was resolved as the uncle returned the money to the purchaser of the land and the ex-combatant was able to resume cultivating the land.

7.3 Land Tenure Security

Overall, the number and severity of problems facing demobilised soldiers was not found to be alarming in this study. Nevertheless, problems do exist and may intensify in the future.

Problems faced by ex-combatants relating to land can be categorised into four types:

- **QUANTITY & QUALITY OF LAND**: those demobilised soldiers without access to sufficient quantities of land for self-reliance in agriculture, or the land is infertile or difficult to cultivate and unlikely to produce enough for self-reliance without major inputs.

- **SECURITY OF LAND TENURE**: those ex-combatants whose land tenure is insecure or limited due to failure to access own family’s land and need to borrow/rent while arranging alternative, or lack of availability of sufficient land in a community to allocate for all new arrivals.

- **LOCALISED LAND CONFLICTS**: those who experience intra-family or intra-community conflicts relating to the acquisition and ownership of land, driven by poverty and greed or simply the result of a confusing process over the past decades. This may exacerbate underlying personal and political tensions and social divisions.
Almost all respondents said that they feel secure about land tenure. Of those who say that they do feel secure only 11 per cent have any kind of written documentation of land tenure status. By far the most common reason given for feeling secure (cited in 84 per cent of cases) is the existence of witnesses, while 49 (13 per cent) mentioned the fact that they had gone through a process of consultation of the soba and community as conferring security of tenure. In future there is a possibility that this might be put in question by people arriving from the city with formal land deeds but, currently, this not even perceived to be a problem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you feel secure in the possession of your land?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a system in which land rights are attested to orally, large-scale displacement and population movement have caused problems. In a number of reported land conflicts, it was mentioned that the case could only be resolved upon recall of witnesses, who were in Huambo, Luanda or elsewhere. Some conflicts have been difficult to resolve since the new occupier paid for land and witnesses to the transaction were no longer present. Written documentation may thus become increasingly important in future.

Those who say they do not feel secure are a different group from those who report land conflicts. Of the nine who did not feel secure, seven had returned to their village of birth, but only three were now cultivating their family’s former land. The other four had been unable to retake that land, because they arrived and found to find land taken over by people who claimed the returnee had no right to inherit since his relatives were dead.

Only one of the three who were cultivating their ancestral land had actually managed to inherit that land. The other two had been granted land by relatives and one of them also reported conflict with his relatives who did not agree with
this acquisition. In addition, two report that they had formerly possessed other, better quality land in the same community, which they were now unable to cultivate. Of the others, three had been allocated land by the soba, two were borrowing land and one was renting it. Most of them (5 of 9) said they would only be able to continue to cultivate that land for one season.

Case Two
A 27-year-old ex-combatant returned to his village in Londuimbali after 11 years away. When he departed, at the age of 16, he left all his belongings with his sister. On his return, his sister agreed to give him some land, but his cousins disagreed because he is a stepson. This caused a conflict within the family, which was resolved by agreeing he could stay there for the moment because he has no other means of support. The land he cultivates now includes one good quality piece near the river, but is mostly infertile land. No long-term solution had been found yet.

7.4 Ex-combatants’ perspectives on the future

Overall, ex-combatants surveyed appear to have reached their ‘final destinations’ and the majority are content to settle there. Only 17 of the 384 survey respondents (4.4 percent) said they expected to relocate. Economic motivations — difficulties in earning a living or expectations of better possibilities elsewhere — are the main reasons cited by those who expect to relocate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why would you prefer to stay?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because it is birthplace</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because fields are here/to continue cultivating</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because family/family members are here</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwilling or unable to move location again</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevented returning to area of origin by problems there</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reason</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reason given</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>318</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: In some cases more than one answer was given, percentages are therefore a proportion of the total number of respondents.
When asked if, given the choice, they would prefer to stay or to move, a slightly higher number — 55 (14 percent) — said they would choose to leave if there were better economic conditions or employment elsewhere (Table 10). The majority, however, had returned to their terra natal (birthplace) and so wanted to stay there.

Table 10. Reasons for Wanting to Move

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why would you prefer to move, if given a choice?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would prefer to return to area of origin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would like to join family members elsewhere</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would move if employment was available elsewhere</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would leave if education or training was available elsewhere</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would leave if better standard of living/’conditions’ were available elsewhere</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would leave because of land related problems here</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would leave because of social/community problems here</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason not specific but ‘might change their mind’</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reason</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8 PARTICULAR GROUPS

8.1 Ex-combatants outside family networks

Those who have resettled in a community where they have not lived previously, or where they do not have family members, have less land and land of poorer quality. Some of these may be planning eventually to relocate elsewhere, so having access to less land is less important. However the majority of respondents stated that they had reached their “final destinations”. This implies that they have resettled in their current location because they have no other alternative.

There is no evidence in Huambo Province that the Government has allocated land or resources for the resettlement of people who have not been able to return to a community where they have not lived previously, or where they do not have family members. Nor does there appear to be any specific provision for them in reintegration programmes at present. The demobilised in this subgroup are particularly vulnerable because they lack family and kinship support structures that are a key element in survival strategies of Angolans, and have less access to land. They are less likely to be successful in establishing themselves in agriculture and will need alternative means of support.

This research focused on rural areas, but the key informant interviews indicated a tendency for those who have not been able to return to a community where they have not lived previously to settle in or near urban centres. Similarly IRSEM’s data about the demobilised suggests that fewer have resettled in rural areas than was expected and hoped, and that the numbers in Huambo Municipality (Sede) in particular are much higher than expected. Further analysis of the registration data also shows that a very high proportion (at least a third, sometimes much more) in each Municipality are actually concentrated around the Municipal town (Sede).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Comuna</th>
<th>Number of Ex-Military</th>
<th>Number of Ex-Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3556</td>
<td>5187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
<td>4771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caíla</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3462</td>
<td>2141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
<td>981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>1160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecunha</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tchicala Tch.</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1031</td>
<td>1513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katchiungo</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mungo</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1684</td>
<td>1694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bailundo</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5919</td>
<td>4124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
<td>2470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>1654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Londuimbali</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2408</td>
<td>1722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>1152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longonjo</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1742</td>
<td>1165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tchinjenje</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sede</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>24322</strong></td>
<td><strong>20802</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>
Focus groups conducted with demobilised soldiers in a former IDP camp on the edge of a Municipal town, which had also been used as a Transit Centre, showed that a large number of the demobilised were still there and had not returned to their areas of origin due to the lack of an area to which they could return, difficulties they faced in being received by their relatives and the practice of witchcraft in particular. Some do not wish to return to their areas of origin at all and some only want to return at a much later date. Transit camps and peri-urban areas provide a suitably anonymous alternative for them.

Proximity to municipal or provincial centres provides them with alternative employment possibilities. They cultivate land that they were loaned by people already resident, and in addition they do paid manual labour for other people (biscatos), some sell charcoal and all should receive food aid from the World Food Programme (which has since ceased).

### 8.2 Women

Although customary and public laws on land ownership are changing in Angola, traditions that deprive women the right to directly own or inherit land persist in Huambo Province, and make the position of widowed, divorced or abandoned women particularly difficult. A daughter does not generally inherit land, though there are now some cases where a father may divide his land before he dies to ensure that his daughter does inherit land. In general a daughter is expected to marry and thus gain access to her husband’s land though a woman does not automatically gain the right to land through marriage. If her husband dies, she may keep it ‘in trust’ for her children but has no ownership rights herself. If she is childless, her husband’s family has the right to dispossess her. If she has joined her husband in a community other than her own, a widow may be additionally vulnerable, because it is assumed that women will return to their own family and receive land and housing there. Many wives of UNITA demobilised soldiers have come long distances from their own families and it is difficult for them to return.

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11 Focus group discussion with demobilised UNITA soldiers in Kantão Pahula, Huambo, January 2004.
Case Three and Four

Upon demobilisation, a 25-year-old woman accompanied her husband and their children to his birthplace, a village in Bailundo. They settled and were given land by his family, which they began to cultivate. Soon after this he died, however, and his relatives promptly turned against her, demanding the land they had given them back. She was thus left with nothing. The soba was aware of the problem but had not been able to resolve it so at the time of the interview she was expecting to have to return to her own family in another part of the Province.

Another woman interviewed in a peri-urban area of Huambo reported that her main problem was lack of land. She had tried to return to her area of origin but her paternal uncles had not agreed to give her even a small piece of her father’s land. When asked why, she claimed it was because she was a woman.

Women ex-combatants also appear to be able to access only smaller quantities of land. Five of the 18 women interviewed said that they did not have any land at all, compared with five out of 362 men. Even if they have access to land, they face additional obstacles in cultivating it simply because of the physical effort required to clear land for cultivation. As noted earlier, two hectares is difficult for an average family to cultivate without access to animal traction, but for a single woman or a female-headed household it is impossible.

Single women and widows from UNITA (unless part of the very small minority officially registered as combatants) are not eligible for reintegration support under the ADRP, which expected women to benefit as family members of the men who were targeted as beneficiaries. Social integration also seems more difficult for women, at least those interviewed in the research. Because the majority of ex-combatants were young when they joined UNITA, many married women from outside their community of origin. The status of wives as ‘outsiders’ appears to be a source of increased social conflict. Most often, it is women who report (in group discussions) that they have received verbal abuse or aggression from resident community members.

8.3 Disabled ex-combatants

A very small number of the ex-combatants in this survey had any kind of physical disability but it was mentioned in one or two cases as an impediment to the cultivation of land (one was only cultivating the land around his house, the Ocumbo, as a result). These ex-combatants did not appear to benefit from any additional support and were highly restricted in their abilities to support themselves. They are potentially one of the most vulnerable groups of ex-combatants.
8.4 Underage ex-combatants

Although anecdotal evidence exists about ‘child soldiers’\(^{12}\), there is little data on boys and girls who were forced or abducted into the war. Estimates by advocates for children’s rights estimates range from 7,000 to as many as 11,000 children (on both the Government and UNITA side) were involved in the last years of the fighting\(^{13}\). Some had combat duties and learned to use weapons. Many others acted as porters, foragers, cooks, spies, labourers. Girls were also ‘assigned’ as wives to the soldiers. The Government’s DDR process makes no provision for those aged below 20\(^{14}\).

This group was not eligible for the normal DDR benefit package, receiving only an identification card and food aid. Those who were still underage at the time of quartering benefited from a special family reunification programme.

The registered numbers of underage combatants was considerably lower than estimates and previous experience would indicate\(^{15}\). It is likely that their numbers are underreported — particularly the females — as many are members of extended families of male ex-combatants rather than registered on their own as ex-soldiers. Officially, “the problem of girls involved in Angola’s armed conflict does not exist\(^{16}\).” The evidence gathered by Christian Children’s Fund (CCF), an international NGO, is that these when these girls return to their communities, they lack the emotional, social, legal and economic support needed to reintegrate and move ahead in building their lives\(^{17}\).

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\(^{12}\) Defined as "any person under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to, cooks, porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members." Definition adopted at Unicef International Symposium in Cape Town South Africa, 1997.

\(^{13}\) Human Rights Watch Angola. "Forgotten Fighters: Child soldiers in Angola". April 2003 Vol. 15 N\(^{o}\), 10 (A).

\(^{14}\) The official conscription age of the FAA is 20 years but boys are registered at age 18 for future military conscription; thereafter they must get an authorisation from the army to leave the country. Boys cannot be forcefully conscripted until they are aged 20 but they can join the army voluntarily at age 18. The demobilisation process required [on paper] integration into the FAA and then all (except 5000) the UNITA ex-combatants were demobilised from the FAA. The Government’s position was that it could not legally conscript the under 20s, in order to formally demobilise them. In the process the soldiers who were aged below 20 did not qualify for the standard DDR benefit package.


\(^{17}\) Vivi Stavrou, Ibid.
None of the respondents in this research were underage at time of interview but half of them were when they were originally recruited. The duration of the war meant that children who were forced into the war (many through abduction) grew to adulthood during the course of the war, and most returning child ex-soldiers have now reached the age of majority. Many have had very little education or the opportunity to gain job skills outside of the war and given their experience in the war could have added difficulties in rejoining community life.
9 COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE AND THE NEW LAND LAW

9.1 Commercial agriculture

Fazendas, or large-scale commercial farms employing labour date back to the colonial era when much of the best, most accessible land was given as concessions to Europeans. Fazendas are concentrated around Huambo city and in the two municipalities closest to the Benguela Railway: Caála and Vila Nova. Between them, the three municipalities account for around 73 percent of all commercially farmed land in Huambo province.

Most fazendas were abandoned at Independence and were later, under the 1992 Land Law, transferred to new claimants (mostly urban based) who, due to the war, were not able to farm them. War-affected populations have occupied some of these concession lands. Some returnees may now find that their ancestral lands fall within a demarcated concession. Following the end of the war, some of these new concession-holders have begun to reclaim fazendas but often do not have access to sufficient capital to cultivate it; the hoped-for foreign investors have not yet appeared as the current decline in world agricultural markets, particularly for the commodities traditionally exported from Angola such as coffee, sugar and sisal, does not yet make them attractive.

In one of the areas studied a fazenda owner was not only taking over land that had been cultivated by local families but was pushing back the limits of the old fazenda beyond where they had previously been. People in this area were highly worried about this.

“In the future I think there will be a lot of problems over land because many fazendeiros are beginning to arrive here and this means they are going to get our land — this will affect old residents and ex-combatants alike. This is the only fear the community has, and the process has already started.\(^\text{18}\)”

In the areas studied people were living near old fazenda sites, which have been vacant since 1975, and have become accustomed to using them for community purposes such as wood gathering and hunting, even if not for actual cultivation. If and when these fazendas resume operations, land availability will decrease further and pressures are likely to mount. Furthermore, since the majority of people do not have any kind of official documentation, this puts them in a vulnerable position relative to well-connected outsiders. The reoccupation of

\(^{18}\) Focus group discussion, Caála Municipality.
fazendas and competition for land as resettlement progresses may put small-scale and peasant farmers at risk and provoke conflicts over occupation rights.

### 9.2 Implications of the New Land Law

The proposed new Land Law may have important implications for land acquisition and tenure in rural areas. The new Land Law leaves in place the concession system established in the colonial period, but also recognises traditional and communal land ownership. However very little land in Huambo falls under the exclusive influence of traditional authorities or could be considered communally held, and there are still areas of uncertainty about the rights of the small scale and peasant farming sector, which will provide security and subsistence to most of the ex-combatant families and former IDPs. It is possible that, as resettlement progresses and competition for good lands increases, conflicts will emerge over lands with multiple claimants.

Under the proposed new Land Law, those IDPs and families of ex-combatants who have settled in peri-urban areas around the provincial centres or capital, run the risk of losing their occupation rights. Most of these populations have been unable to secure land titles for the land on which they may have lived for many years. In rural areas the implications are less clear, but the renewed cultivation of abandoned fazendas may displace people who have been cultivating these areas during the war. One case of this was found in communities where research was conducted but more are known to exist in Huambo Province.

The new Land Law will provide the Government with increased powers of expropriation but does not in turn articulate guidelines on compensation. The land registry system is not sufficiently organised. Municipal courts are rare in provinces such as Huambo. The judicial system is weak and is at present incapable of dealing with land conflict cases on a large scale.
10 CONCLUSIONS

The disarmament and demobilisation of over 100,000 former UNITA combatants undertaken single-handedly by the Government of Angola was completed relatively quickly and almost without incident. The number of conflicts appears low and the situation is generally more stable than many had feared. However, effective and sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants remains a long way off.

The majority of respondents opted to return to places they had previously lived in with 84 percent returning to their place of birth. Most of the demobilised did gain access to land but the amount and quality of land they have secured is cause for concern. Only around half have access to over two hectares of land — the minimum needed to establish a sustainable economic livelihood for a family over the medium to long-term. An even smaller proportion actually cultivates this amount, primarily due to the lack of animal traction that would enable them to clear abandoned land and work larger areas. The average (mean) area of land actually cultivated by ex-combatants was 0.75 hectare (the median was even lower, 0.5 hectare). Overall, it seems that only 30 percent of those surveyed have access to land that is both of reasonable size and reasonable quality.

The majority of the demobilised at the time of the research were dependent on food aid from the WFP and NGOs. Subsequent reductions in food aid have meant that new survival strategies have had to be sought, mainly seeking irregular (and low paid) daily jobs and small-scale trading.

Among demobilised soldiers in areas surveyed, there are subgroups whose livelihoods may be said to be more precarious. There are those who have not returned to their birthplace or areas where they have previous ties, either because they cannot or do not wish to. Without family connections in their chosen return location, they are particularly vulnerable, because family networks (the previous relationship of a person to the community and their family ties there) are required to gain access to land of a reasonable quantity and quality. Customary mechanisms for land allocation in rural communities in Huambo Province do not allocate land to returnees who do not have strong family connections, as most land is already occupied. There has also been very little official distribution of land to those who cannot access land by other means.

Those without family connections depend on temporary loans of land. There are also significant numbers of the demobilised who have settled in and around the provincial capital and some municipal capitals (Caála and Bailundo in particular) who have access to no land, or very limited amounts of land. Alternative areas
have not been allocated for the resettlement of people who have not been able to access sufficient land. Fewer ex-combatants than expected have returned to rural areas and made agriculture their livelihood strategy. More ex-combatants have gone to urban and peri-urban areas than expected.

Women appear to be particularly vulnerable. DDR programmes have targeted male demobilised soldiers, not their wives. Since so few women (0.4 percent) were registered combatants, currently they only really benefit if they have remained in a family unit with a demobilised UNITA combatant. Women’s roles in agriculture and other economic activities largely go unrecognised. Traditions that deprive women the right to directly own or inherit land persist in Huambo. If single, widowed, separated or abandoned, they are particularly vulnerable in the land allocation and inheritance process. More often they seem to be the target of abuses and hostility in communities where they settle. In addition some women may have been forced into relationships with combatants during the war and may prefer to separate.

The disabled and under-aged are potentially among the most disadvantaged groups of ex-combatants but little data is available on these groups. The Government’s DDR process makes little provision for those aged below 20 years. Furthermore, the duration of the war meant that most returning child ex-soldiers have now reached the age of majority. Having little education or civilian job skills and possibly psychologically traumatised by their war experience, many could have added difficulties in rejoining community life.

The agricultural sector does not appear to currently have the capacity to absorb large numbers of new arrivals without significant investment to increase productivity on existing cultivated areas as well as to increase the amount of arable land. Even in and near towns there are few non-agricultural employment opportunities, many fewer than in the pre-war period when non-agricultural employment was an important part of the livelihood strategies of even rural people in Huambo Province. The reoccupation of fazendas (large farms and commercial concessions) and competition for land as resettlement progresses can put small-scale and peasant farmers at risk and provoke conflicts over occupation rights.

Without significant investment, agriculture cannot provide sustainable livelihoods for ex-combatants and other returnees who may face similar challenges in accessing land. Livelihoods for ex-combatants and other returnees will depend on a combination of strategies. There is a need for programmes that will combine targeted intensive agricultural support and extension with
diversification of vocational training opportunities, and creation of non-farm rural employment to absorb surplus labour, particularly in the off-season. The World Bank funded ADRP, which will provide skills’ training, was formally launched in Huambo in April 2004, and there have been further delays before project proposals could be approved, funds disbursed, and activities actually begin.

Many conflicts that have occurred so far have been resolved often by traditional local authorities (soobas), and/or expressed themselves in other ways — accusations of witchcraft rather than outright violence. Social and political tensions may further exacerbate community level reintegration and the consolidation of peace. Local conflict resolution mechanisms are not always able to resolve these conflicts while the judiciary’s capacity to deal with a large number of land conflicts is currently nonexistent. There have been no major conflicts as yet, but there continue to be a number of risk factors and conflict-resolution mechanisms may need to be reinforced.
11 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The processes of economic and social reintegration of the demobilised (and other groups such as IDPs) has hardly begun. The resettlement of demobilised soldiers needs to be monitored and information systematically collected about their livelihood and coping strategies.

2. At present agriculture provides the main livelihood strategy for the demobilised, even though it presents many difficulties. Alternatives need to be developed. Those who are unable to support themselves over the medium to long term in agriculture — whether because of access to, quantity or quality of land, or inability to cultivate it, should be given flexibility to choose other reintegration options.

A non-farm rural employment strategy is required, linked to the massive reconstruction and rehabilitation needs in the provinces, these can include:

- Rehabilitation of schools and clinics, public buildings & markets
- Labour-intensive rural road construction and maintenance especially of farm-to-market roads
- Construction of water supply systems and hand dug wells
- Vocational training in support of the above mentioned activities. Training programmes should incorporate development of functional literacy given the very low levels of education of the population.

3. Reintegration programmes should be redesigned to address the needs of vulnerable subgroups — women, those with 'nowhere to go,' under-age and disabled ex-combatants — who are currently either underserved or do not qualify in existing programmes. In some cases some of their problems are not acknowledged. Much needs to be done to raise awareness about the particular vulnerabilities of these subgroups.

4. Agriculture based reintegration programmes need to diversify beyond the distribution of seeds and tools.

- Increase availability of farm power particularly animal traction.
- Provide fertilisers for smaller, poorer quality plots. Reactivation of traditional means of fertiliser production is preferable to commercial inputs.
- Establish simple, gravity-fed irrigation systems to counteract erratic rainfall. In some areas larger scale projects including damming of rivers, may be feasible and appropriate.
• Initiate community rehabilitation of the remains of irrigation systems in former fazendas, if these are not privately owned.
• Make the development of drought tolerant low-input crop varieties a research priority.
• Re-establish agricultural markets and networks by developing economic linkages between rural producers and the market places.
• Improve capacity to provide agricultural extension services.
• Revitalise the Huambo Agricultural College as an agricultural and rural development college.

5. Rural credit programmes are required, targeted to help small landholders, small-scale producers to increase agricultural productivity as well as to develop rural farm and non-farm enterprises. There are ongoing microfinance programmes (mostly urban or peri-urban based) that can provide useful lessons.

6. Financial, business development, and training services are required to assist the establishment of farm and non-farm enterprises.

7. Support is required for local conflict resolution mechanisms, and the progress of reintegration and reconciliation within communities needs to be continually monitored. NGOs and civil society organisations should not undertake projects seen to privilege ex-combatants, but must also ensure they are not excluded from projects and associations.

8. Civic education programmes are required that raise awareness about the proposed Land Law, and which ensure that the rights of small scale and peasant farming sector in the proposed Land Law and that national/Provincial land and agricultural policies do not increase pressure on land in Huambo. This should be accompanied by resources to update the system of land registration, including development of a simple means of regularisation of rural land titles accessible to all.

9. The relevant institutions should be supported in the process of delimitation and regularisation of communities’ land, with involvement of local traditional leaders.

10. Further research is required about livelihood strategies, especially after the withdrawal of food aid, on the functioning of communities, local power structures and conflict resolution mechanisms, and on the demobilised who have not chosen to return to rural areas.
Introduction

Angola: 40 years of rapid change

Key issues for post-conflict reconstruction

Analysis of conflict risks

Mitigating conflict risks

This paper is based on research carried out by Development Workshop financed by the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada (IDRC), Christian Aid London UK, and the Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa (NIZA).
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objectives

This paper is based on an assessment of post-conflict Angola by Development Workshop, carried out in 2004 and 2005 through a review of existing recent research and situation reports, interviews with key informants, visits to four Provinces\(^1\) and localised case studies in these four Provinces.

The aims of the paper are to examine the outlook for peace in Angola, the challenges of creating a sustainable peace in Angola and the issues, opportunities and constraints for Angola four years after the ceasefire of April 2002.

The paper examines the impact of the prolonged and chronic conflict in Angola and of the processes that have occurred since the end of the conflict, and from this assess what needs to be addressed after such a long-running conflict and what support Angola requires in post-conflict period.

This has been done by examining some of the processes that have occurred over the last 40 years in Angola, from the last years of the colonial period, which were years of rapid change, through the years of conflict and the first four years of the post-conflict period. These processes are examined in Section 2 of the paper, which brings together recent information about the impact of the war on the population, and on processes such as reintegration and normalisation.

It questions assumptions that are often made about the return of displaced people, reintegration and normalisation and suggests that these processes are far from complete. It questions the assumption, implicitly made in many post-conflict situations, that the end of conflict in itself is sufficient to lead to the resolution of social issues that arose during the conflict.

Section 3 of the paper examines more closely a number of key issues, namely migration and social geography, local institutions, livelihoods and vulnerability. Section 4 is a Conflict Risk Analysis: it examines the implications of the various process and the key issues for human security and risks of future conflicts. Section 5 is about mitigating conflict risks: it makes recommendations for organisations that are providing support to Angola in the post-conflict period.

\(^1\) Zaire, Huambo, Moxico and Benguela.
1.2 Post-conflict transitions

There are major challenges in the achievement of a true and sustainable peace in almost all post-conflict contexts. Post-conflict transitions involve a large number of processes (economic, social and political) that have to be carried out under difficult circumstances. Physical, human and social capital is lost during a long-term conflict. There are thus enormous challenges in transforming the cease-fire into a sustainable peace and in ensuring that the country does not, once again, lapse into violence. Lack of progress with the key post-conflict transition processes could have important implications for creating a sustainable peace. It is widely recognised (internationally and nationally) that there is only a short “window of opportunity” after the end of open conflict in which to do create a sustainable peace.

This paper is based in research carried out by Development Workshop in 2004 to 2006 to understand how the challenges in achieving a true and sustainable peace were being addressed in Angola, particularly in areas distant from the capital where the challenges are greatest, where the capacity to implement some of the post-conflict processes is probably weakest and where a lack of progress may go unnoticed. Only if progress could be monitored, and the dynamics of and challenges to peace understood, would it be possible to advocate actions that support peace-building. This involved also understanding more about what had happened during the years of conflict: chronic and prolonged conflict causes important socio-political and socio-demographic transformations, ranging from changes in household structure and domestic gender relations, to the reorganisation of local community authority and institutions and these local social processes in turn affect peace-building and reconstruction efforts. As much attention needs to be paid in reconstruction efforts to local social relations and institutions as to national reconstruction and rebuilding state-level institutions and attention needs to be paid in peace-building to unresolved tensions within society as to resolving conflict between national-level parties who are contesting state power. Rebuilding national institutions will not necessarily reconstitute fragmented, disrupted, and significantly transformed societies.
The research was carried out through a review of existing recent research and situation reports\(^2\), interviews with key informants, visits to four Provinces\(^3\) and localised case studies in these four Provinces. The main categories of information that have been collected, analysed and organised in a useful form are:

- the main post-conflict processes (such as population movements linked to return of refugees, closure of camps for displaced people and demobilisation of UNITA soldiers)

- the state of infrastructure and the existence of plans to rehabilitate that infrastructure

- the functioning of infrastructure or social services and plans to make it more functional

- the functioning of local administration and community structures

- the vulnerability of the population, according to social grouping and geographical location

- the existence or risks of conflict, latent or open, in communities or between communities or outsiders.

Field studies were carried out in four provinces representing different geo-social regions of Angola. These were chosen to demonstrate a range of different settlement and reintegration issues. This permitted the mapping of a range of risk situations where different configurations of actors come into contact with each other in their attempts to reintegrate at the end of the war.

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\(^2\) Such as the World Food Programme's Vulnerability Assessments, situation reports of various UN agencies, provincial profiles produced for the Government's reconstruction programmes, Government plans for infrastructure rehabilitation, vulnerability studies carried out for the Social Action Fund and research being carried out for the NGO Land Network about land conflicts.

\(^3\) Zaire, Huambo, Moxico and Benguela.
2 ANGOLA: 40 YEARS OF RAPID CHANGE

The current context of Angola is the result of many years of rapid economic and social change in Angola, throughout the era of effective colonial occupation (beginning at the end of the 19th Century) and post-Independence. Yet there is a lack of information of the various social and economic changes in Angola. This paper will begin by examining some of the processes of change that have taken place in Angola. It will then go on to examine some of their implications: for poverty, vulnerability, access to resources, institutions and conflict risks.

2.1 Late colonial period social change

Although the pre-Independence war was limited to eastern and northern border areas, it led to significant population movements. There was a mass migration of people in 1961 from the north of Angola, mainly to Kinshasa and other areas of the Congo (now the RDC), because of the violent reaction of the Portuguese colonial power to the uprisings in the north at that period. There were also movements of population in Moxico Province during the 1960s and 1970s due to the guerrilla war (which may have been small-scale but had significant local effects).

During this period there were also significant population movements for economic reasons, both forced migration (the “contract”) and voluntarily. The inhabitants of the Central Plateau (the Ovimbundu) were particularly likely to migrate, and surveys now show that their language, Umbundu, is found in most Provinces of the country. Young people have been particularly likely to migrate, as they have perceived rural social institutions as holding them back from economic advancement. Surveys in rural areas (such as those by Rede da Terra⁴) indicate in many areas groups of people from other areas (particularly the Central Plateau) living in rural communities. These are often people who migrated (or whose parents migrated) during the colonial era and have been unable to return.

Integration into the colonial economy also caused significant social changes, particularly in the centre of the country. Customary institutions were drawn into the colonial administrative system and land tenure systems became more individualised and less communal⁵. The economy and the customs of the Ovimbundu as described by Childs⁶ (based on field studies in the 1940s and 1950s

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⁴ Rede da Terra, 2005.
⁶ Childs, 1949.
in the Central Plateau) had been significantly transformed by the 1970s. Change was less rapid however in areas where the colonial economy had not penetrated so much, such as the southern pastoral areas and the extreme east of Angola.

2.2 Social change during conflict

Large areas of Angola were insecure during the conflict, effectively controlled by neither side. Richardson\(^7\) describes these as UNITA “pillage zones” which UNITA did not control and regularly raided. However they were not effectively protected or fully administered by the Government either. Some people fled from these areas, some were forcibly removed from these areas by the army or local authorities, while others were unable to flee from these areas.

There were also areas described by Richardson as UNITA’s “tax zones”. These were areas that were under UNITA’s control for several years. UNITA provided few services in these areas\(^8\) but did offer some protection and peasant farmers were able to remain and farm. Those living in “tax zones” had to provide food and labour to UNITA. From 1998 until the end of the war, UNITA was under increasing pressure, and its demands became heavier and it was less able to provide protection. The population became directly affected by incursions of the army, and some were forced to flee or had their houses destroyed. Some were forcibly removed by the army from the war zones.

The most visible impact of the prolonged post-Independence conflict has been population displacement, and much of the literature has focused on this. Displaced people are those who fled, or were forcibly removed, from conflict areas. Several million\(^9\) people were displaced because of war during the period 1975 to 2002. More recent research shows, however, that for the people concerned there are issues that are just as important as displacement:

- dramatic loss of assets
- forced recruitment and abduction of children
- dispersal of families and communities
- planting of land-mines
- destruction of infrastructure
- further weakening of customary institutions.

\(^7\) Richardson, 2001.
\(^8\) As described by Richardson, UNITA provided services mainly to its core supporters, in Jamba and in Huambo (1993-1994), Bailundo (1994-1999) and Andulo (1994-1999) when these were under UNITA’s control.
\(^9\) OCHA estimated that there were 4 million internally displaced persons plus another 457,000 refugees at the time of the cease-fire in April 2002.
People who were able to flee from conflict areas before they were attacked were often able to conserve their assets, and were able to move to areas where there was more support; those who fled after being affected by war were less likely to have conserved their assets, and those who were forced to move by the army or local authorities were least likely to conserve their assets as they were usually asked to leave without notice. Recent research in Huambo Province\(^{10}\) found that just over a half of children (aged 8 to 21) had moved house at some time, almost always for some reason due to conflict. More than a third of these had moved more than once. But, more importantly, two-thirds of children reported that their house had at some time been destroyed in armed conflict, accompanied by loss of family assets. Three-quarters of children had either been displaced due to armed conflict or had their house destroyed.

Since the end of the war in 2002 it has become clear that substantial numbers of children, both male and female, were kidnapped by UNITA in conflict areas and forced to be porters, camp-workers and eventually combatants. Escape was almost impossible, and release only came in 2002, by which time many were already adults. In the attacks in which they were captured, adult family members were often killed or forced to flee. After kidnap, children were separated from siblings and moved over long distances to guerrilla bases. These children therefore have lost contact with family members. Kidnapped girls often have had children, who they bring up unsupported. These young people have few assets and no social networks to support them. They rarely are able to remember an “area of origin”, do not know the location of their original family and community, and have few resources to pay for travel back to their home areas\(^{11}\).

In some cases communities have been displaced together, as a group, from conflict zones. They have decided to move together, or were forced to move by the Government. But in many other cases, displacement has meant the dispersal of communities, especially where this occurred in the midst of conflict. This has led to the breakdown of rural community structures.

### 2.3 Post-conflict: achievements and questionable assumptions

Since the ceasefire of April 2002 there have been many achievements. Angola was the first country to transform the United Nations’ Guiding Principals for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) into national legislation. Almost 4 million Internally Displaced People were free to move at the end of the war. Refugees living in

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\(^{10}\) Christian Children’s Fund research in 2004 about children in conflict.

\(^{11}\) Christian Children’s Fund research on kidnapped children.
neighbouring countries were free to return (estimated as numbering 457,000). Over 100,000 UNITA ex-combatants were disarmed and demobilised by mid-2003 in a programme managed almost entirely by the Government of Angola. UNITA transformed itself from a military movement into a parliamentary opposition party.

However there is still insufficient information about the return to normality since 2002 and some statements made are based on questionable assumptions. The macro-level data about returning or re-settling populations does not reveal the complexity of population movements and reintegration strategies, and masks the fact that there are groups of people who are not following the assumed movements of population and that some of these are groups are ignored in reintegration programmes and are in situations of high vulnerability.12

While it is true that there were some spectacular movements of displaced people returning to their places of origin in 2002 and 2003, these appear to be people who were displaced in the last phase of the war (1998 to 2002) and stayed close to their area of origin: they had not lost the skills of farming or the social contacts. Not all the 4 million displaced people and 457,000 refugees have in fact returned to their areas of origin: statements such as “in 2003-2004, 4 million displaced people returned to their areas of origin” are commonly made13 but there is not in fact sufficient data to support such statements. A survey in Huambo Province shows that 40 % of those who were displaced have not returned to what they consider to be their area of origin14. All surveys in rural areas suggest that the population of rural settlements is very much below what it was before the war15.

As is the case with DDR16 programmes in many other countries, there is also little information about the resettlement and reintegration of former UNITA combatants. Reintegration programmes took more than two years to get underway. There are strong indications that many of the demobilised have not gone to their “areas of origin” and remain in peri-urban areas and small towns. This is because they no longer have an “area of origin” (having been combatants for a considerable period of time during which their original communities have been transformed and dispersed) and because they wish to avoid potential conflicts. There are special challenges for those who were forcibly recruited as under-age soldiers, for females

12 For example refugees who return spontaneously to Angola because the official process is too slow, under-age soldiers, single women who were living with UNITA.
13 For example in the “Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Angola” of the World Bank” of January 2005, but also made in other official documents.
15 Rede da Terra, 2005. Also field studies for this research.
16 Programmes of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of former combatants.
and for the large numbers of handicapped ex-combatants. Many of these have received no direct benefits (because the assumption was made that they were part of families) and because of long delays in programme for vulnerable groups. These groups are particularly likely to have lost contact with their original community.

There have been refugees from Angola in Zambia and the RDC for more than 20 years. Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries have also been free to return since 2002. Official statistics indicate that 80% of the estimated number of refugees (457,000) had returned by the end of 2005. However 42% of those who are shown in official UNHCR data as having returned are classified as spontaneous, unassisted returns and there is no information of how and where they have returned to Angola. Field research in Moxico and Zaire Provinces shows that return to areas of origin in border regions devastated by war is problematic. “Areas of origin” frequently are inaccessible (due to land mines or damaged infrastructure, such as in the south of Moxico Province) and/or lack services. The majority of those who returned from Zambia to Moxico Province were still, in 2005, living in makeshift settlements around the main settlements. There are Angolans still in Zambia, despite pressure to return, because they are aware of the difficult conditions for resettlement and reintegration in Moxico Province, their main “area of origin”.

Population movements continue towards peri-urban areas of the main cities in the post-conflict period, more than outweighing the movement from peri-urban to rural areas. The field studies for this research show that there are significant numbers of people living around cities and small towns: some are ex-soldiers from UNITA, others are displaced people who were displaced to those areas, and others are displaced people who are making a return to rural areas in stages. There are still people living in some former IDP camps: they may not be the original IDPs from those camps, but appear to be people from various origins who have not found it possible to effectively resettle and reintegrate anywhere else.

Interviews with people in small towns, peri-urban areas and former IDP camps indicate a large number of reasons for not immediately returning to rural areas. Interviews in rural areas confirm that these are barriers to effective resettlement in rural areas. There are severe difficulties of re-establishing a rural survival strategy: there is a lack of oxen, ploughs, axes, hoes, seeds and fertilisers; access to services is poor; much effort is required to bring land back into cultivation, the marketing opportunities and lacking. People who are impoverished do not have the means

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17 Returned refugees who were interviewed in Moxico Province reported that they had been told that they could, and should, return to Angola and that the camps would close. There have also been international press reports to the same effect. However official sources claim that refugees took the initiative to return to Angola, and that there had been no pressure on Angolans to leave the refugee camps in Zambia.
necessary to invest in re-establishing themselves in a barely functioning rural economy. All services and infrastructure are poor in rural areas, and in particular in the more remote eastern and northern areas where refugees are trying to re-establish themselves.

In many cases people have been away for long periods, up to 25 years, and lived in distant areas and have married people from distant areas: these have sometimes brought their spouses with them from other areas of the country. It is unrealistic to expect that they will return to their areas of origin, especially the Central Plateau where there is competition over land. There are significant numbers of people from the Central Plateau in Cuando Kubango and Moxico Provinces, who have been there since before 1975, or are from families who were encouraged by UNITA to follow them when they retreated from Huambo in 1976. These people seem unlikely to return to the Central Plateau, even though they are in competition for land and other resources from local people.

Demobilisation

In 2002, 34 Quartering Areas were set up to accommodate UNITA troops and to permit the incorporation of some into the Government army and to permit the demobilisation of the majority\(^\text{18}\). Attached to each Quartering Area was an area for dependents of UNITA soldiers (Family Gathering Areas). These ‘Areas’ were closed in 2003 and all UNITA troops were effectively demobilised\(^\text{19}\). Some former UNITA soldiers have undoubtedly returned to “areas of origin”\(^\text{20}\) but there are various indications that many have not. Having been in the army for many years (and the data suggest that 60% had been recruited before 1991 and a quarter had been recruited before 1980)\(^\text{21}\) there are many who have lost contact with their areas of origin. They do not know what their reception is likely to be. The only way of making a living in their area of origin would be from farming, which they have not practiced for many years. Thus many former-UNITA soldiers have settled in and around towns and cities\(^\text{22}\). Interviews with demobilised former-UNITA soldiers in small towns indicate that, while they were in the Quartering Areas, they visited the surrounding areas and in this way located relatives who could help them to reintegrate socially and economically. Alternatively people who managed to locate no relatives or friends got off the lorry from the Quartering Area in the first town that it stopped as “it seemed as good a place as any”\(^\text{23}\).

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\(^{18}\) The number quoted in reports varies as some large Quartering Areas were later divided, and some Quartering Areas do not occur on all lists.

\(^{19}\) For more detailed information about this process see Porto and Parsons, 2003.

\(^{20}\) Development Workshop, 2004 is a study of demobilised UNITA soldiers who have gone to rural areas and their access to land. This indicates that there are some former UNITA soldiers who have gone to rural areas in Huambo Province and have managed to access land to cultivate (though in small quantities) but only if they have close family ties to the village. The report suggests that there are others who have lost their links with rural areas, have not been able to access land and have therefore gone to urban areas.

Other reasons mentioned for not returning to rural areas include the possibility of conflicts in areas of origin, and the fear of investing too much in a return to a rural area before the elections planned for 2006. The experience of many people has been that transitions where power is contested (such as 1975 and 1992) leads to conflicts in which they are likely to lose their assets and livelihoods.

There has been a significant reduction of international aid to Angola since 2002. Humanitarian assistance has not been transformed into aid to resettlement or reintegration. Field studies show that the family is a much more important source of assistance than any official aid agency. Those who have lost track of their families face significant difficulties.

It is other family members who provide credit to enable those who are re-establishing themselves to begin to trade. It is mainly through the family that land is accessed in rural areas, except in some of the more sparsely populated areas of the south and east of Angola where there is an abundance of land and village institutions will make land available to people from outside the community.

There are few indications of official assistance to people to re-settle and re-establish themselves. Although in 2002 and 2003 there were some statements by the Government and aid agencies that suggested that they would make land available for resettlement at 500 sites in 384 Comunas (for people who prefer not to return to an “area of origin”) the indications are that this has only happened in very few places. There are also few indications of any particular assistance to areas that were identified in the UN Appeal for Transitional Assistance as requiring support. There are thus few mechanisms to assist the considerable number of people who are not returning to an area of origin, and are in practice starting their lives again from scratch.

People who try to resettle by their own efforts find significant barriers to reintegration: access to assets such as land is limited for those who are not native to an area and do not have family ties to an area. Other types of assistance, such as loans or information, are mainly provided by the extended family and interviewees report little assistance from the State, NGOs, churches or communities. Those who resettle away from their areas of origin tend to be marginalised and particularly vulnerable.

Thus while the context in Angola has been transformed since 2002, it would be misleading to say that there has been a return to “normality”. The very terms...

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22 In a few cases demobilised former-UNITA soldiers have created new settlements close to their Quartering Area (such as Chiteta in Huambo Province) but the sites of most Quartering Areas and surrounding areas are now empty.

23 Interviews for this research in Bocoio and Katchiungo.
“normality” and “reintegration” are questionable in a country like Angola where there are few remains of a framework into which people can reintegrate. There are still many people in Angola who have not “returned”: and there are significant numbers of people who have not resettled and reintegrated (economically, socially or psychologically). Many people who are trying to re-establish themselves say something like: “We are no longer displaced people, but we are living just like displaced people”.

Humanitarian agencies and Government often focus on displacement and, as a result, make unrealistic assumptions about “reintegration” when conflict ends and people are free to return to the “areas of origin” and about. Agencies have underestimated the complexity, time and resources needed to invest in post-conflict transition.

"Vulnerable groups" and demobilisation

There were large numbers of dependents (women and children) in the Family Areas alongside the Quartering Areas. It was assumed by those responsible for the demobilisation that these were all dependents of soldiers. Demobilisation benefits were supplied to soldiers only and it was assumed that those in the Family Areas would indirectly benefit through being dependents\(^{25}\). All those under-18 were considered as dependents or as “minors accompanying soldiers” even though some of them had directly participated in combat and transport of war material. Interviews subsequently with women and those under-18 suggest that there were some who did not benefit from the demobilisation package, even indirectly, because they were not in reality part of the permanent household of ex-combatants.

During the last phases of the war, when UNITA was under a great deal of pressure, some of those who had been kidnapped managed to escape. In a few cases, interviews indicate, young people were found at the end of the war by their original families who went looking for missing relatives in the Quartering Areas, refugee camps and the towns close to the war zones. In fact it is remarkable how much effort some families made after the end of conflict to try to locate missing relatives, though it is only relatively wealthy families who were able to travel by aeroplane and car to do this, and there were many young people in these places who were not found by relatives.

\(^{24}\) See particularly Yngstrom, 2005, on the exclusion of people resettling from outside the area. The exclusion from access to land to non-natives is most accentuated in areas such as parts of Huambo Province where there is a shortage of land. In Lunda Sul or Moico it appears that village leaders will allocate land to those from outside the area, though this tends to be land at some distance from a road or settlement. However in these areas economic re-establishment is hindered by an even greater distance to markets and services and even greater lack of inputs.

\(^{25}\) Very small numbers of women were considered as soldiers and received benefits directly.
Reasons for slow return and resettlement by displaced people

People who were displaced lost most of their assets and resources, and do not have enough to rebuild their lives in a rural area. They do not have enough food to live until the next harvest, and they do not have enough money to buy sufficient seeds and tools. The amount of aid from the State or from international agencies is very limited. Some of those who did return to rural areas have come back to spend time in former IDP camps to do odd jobs to earn money as they cannot survive just from agriculture. Also people who were displaced, and have lost their assets, often do not have enough money to pay their transport to their "area of origin".

A major reason given for not returning to rural areas is poor public services. While public services are poor everywhere, they are slightly better in the towns. Schools in urban areas are more likely to have material and furniture.

It is also commonly reported that people are reluctant to return to rural areas because they have received reports about accusations of witchcraft in such areas. In the circumstances of rural areas where the health services are deficient, and where poverty, illness and death are common, an explanation is sought for these phenomena in witchcraft. People are reluctant to move back to these areas for fear of being accused of bringing bad luck to the area. This appears to be particularly so when there is also some dispute about reclaiming assets. Reports from rural areas suggest that there are very few conflicts between people who stayed in rural areas with UNITA and those who fled to government areas. Yet various interviews suggest that some people have avoided going back because they fear that there might be conflicts: conflicts are few because those who might provoke conflicts avoid going back.

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26 Semi-structured interviews for this research. Also Personal communication with Christian Children's Fund regarding research in 2004 about children in conflict.

27 Personal communication with Christian Children's Fund regarding research in 2004 about children in conflict. Results show that the number of children in secondary education in Huambo is much less further away from the city, and that schools away from the city are much less likely to have furniture and educational material.
3 KEY ISSUES FOR POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

The processes of change over the last 40-50 years in Angola raise a number of important issues for post-conflict reconstruction.

3.1 Migration and social geography

Population movements have created new forms of settlement that are different from the cohesive, homogeneous, “traditional” rural communities implied by the “return to areas of origin” model. Care is therefore required with the concept of community. There are various types of “communities” throughout the country. The level of social capital is low and in some cases there are clear social divisions: different social groups may be in competition or certain groups may be excluded and vulnerable.

As will be discussed below, it is informal, customary institutions at the community level that have been most important for managing local access to resources and managing conflicts. These have their origins in cohesive, homogeneous, “traditional” rural communities. Institutions are weakest where this form of community does not exist. Customary institutions at the community level have “traditional” references that can exclude certain groups, such as women, young people and those perceived as being from outside.

Much of the migration that has been common in Angola for 40-50 years is unlikely to be reversed. People from Central Plateau are found throughout Angola28. They are unlikely to return to an area where they no longer have family ties, where there is a shortage of land and where access to land is only available through purchase or through inheritance29.

The population of cities and small towns is still growing. Such settlements are heterogeneous, in terms of ethnicity and identity. People in these areas report that they prefer the less intense social relations of such areas: they avoid too much contact with the rest of the community, “so as to avoid intrigue”.

In rural areas there are cohesive, homogeneous, “traditional” rural communities, inhabited only by people who are descendants of the original population of that area and belonging to one ethnic group. But there are also rural communities

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28 VAM, 2004a. The database shows that the language of the Central Plateau is spoken in a wide range of Provinces away from the Central Plateau.

29 CCF research on kidnapped children includes cases where young people were kidnapped and have lost contact with their family; their parents were originally from the Central Plateau but were living in another place and had in turn lost contact with their areas of origin.
where there are obvious fault lines between different social groups. For example, in many settlements in Zaire Province there are people from Bengo Province and from the Central Plateau who were brought to the north of Angola to work after 1961 when the local people had fled various origins. A Development Workshop study shows that in 2004 there is a wide range of languages spoken in the villages sampled in Huambo Province. In some settlements there are women who have come to the area as wives of demobilising soldiers. The surveys by Rede da Terra indicate that frequently settlements in the north of Angola have people who have come from other areas as migrant workers in the colonial period and are unlikely to return.

In other cases, such as near to Luena (Moxico Province), there are groups of residents, displaced people and returned refugees living in close proximity because the conditions have not been created for them to return to an area where they can resettle. There are also cases where migration in search of work (for example to the diamond areas or to villages where casual agricultural work is available) has led to settlements with people from the area and outside. This also includes migration to Angola from neighbouring countries because of economic crises in neighbouring countries and the perception that Angola, with its oil and diamonds, is a land of opportunity. Despite periodic “operations” to remove illegal migrants they continue to return because there are no regular mechanisms to effectively control this form of migration.

This implies social divisions within communities, though not necessarily ethnic divisions. People of the same ethnic group have in some cases developed different identities. Returning refugees and displaced people (particularly the former) have acquired new skills and habits (and identities) while being away. Refugees have often had opportunities. They have learnt new languages and skills. They have been exposed to, and adopted, new values in the country of exile, and have adopted attitudes to livelihoods and the informal sector of the economy that are more prevalent in the RDC than in Angola.

Some returning refugees from Zambia have formed cohesive communities, with high levels of social capital, even though their ethnic origins are different. Shared

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30 Development Workshop field studies for this research. The original population in Zaire Province fled in the early 1960s when the colonial regime tried to concentrate them in settlements where they could be more easily controlled, or to force them to work on Portuguese-owned farms. Labour was brought from the Central Plateau or from Bengo Province to work on Portuguese-owned farms. These groups of labourers, or their descendents, have not returned to their “areas of origin” and are unlikely to. However there has been a return of descendents of those who sought exile in the DRC. This has created highly heterogeneous communities.


32 Rede da Terra, 2005.
experiences over many years in the camps in Zambia, and habits of joint discussion and problem resolution, have led to them learning each other’s languages and learning to work together. They had educational opportunities, received new skills from aid programmes, learnt new languages and developed group cohesion despite their disparate origins. There are thus cases of divisions within communities between “residents” and “returnees” from the same ethnic group.

3.2 Institutions

There is a link between violent civil conflict and weak institutions. While there is latent conflict in all societies, “conflicts become violent and grow into war when society and governments are unable to resolve these conflicts”\textsuperscript{33}. Conflict then further weakens institutions by breaking-up communities, deepening mistrust and preventing the State from functioning in an accountable manner to distribute resources and manage conflicts. Post-conflict reconstruction therefore involves rebuilding institutions. “One factor is clear: the primacy of institutions”\textsuperscript{34}. This requires an understanding of existing institutions and how they have been affected by conflict.

In Angola, the field studies for this research and other studies\textsuperscript{35} have shown that rural customary institutions have survived. They still have an important role in managing local resources and in managing conflicts within communities, and appear to maintain considerable legitimacy. Specific customs and nomenclature vary between areas but a common feature is an accountable and democratic local council representing the main interests in the settlement (known as the Njango in Umbundu) as well as an individual leader (usually known as the soba in most areas, though the original name varies between areas).

However there are also clearly a number of weaknesses. Firstly the linkage between the soba and the colonial administration (and later the post-Independence State) has weakened their legitimacy: in practice they have not been able to obtain support from external institutions, while they have had to transmit orders and information from outside. Secondly, population migration has led to heterogeneous communities: there are groups in communities who do not feel that the customary leadership represents them. Legitimacy, based on customary values, has been challenged by those from other groups. There is also a rejection of customary

\textsuperscript{33} Page 78 of Joseph Hanlon “Roots of civil war: tick all of the above” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006.

\textsuperscript{34} Page 159 of Tony Addison and S Manssob Murshed “The social contract and violent conflict” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006.

\textsuperscript{35} Rede da Terra, 2005.
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institutions by some younger people or by those who are returning from outside the community.

Thirdly, intuitions of community mutual assistance have declined in importance in Angola, even in rural areas, as individual and family land tenure has grown in importance over communal tenure. Rural institutions of mutual assistance are rarely reported except in the pastoral areas (south of Lubango, Huila Province) and in Kuando Kubango Province\textsuperscript{36}. Community mutual assistance is of little importance in urban and peri-urban areas because of the heterogeneity of the population, who no longer have social links that are the basis of trust and reciprocity.

What are institutions?

Institutions are rules or norms that govern behaviour in economic, social and political systems and organisations, and so reduce uncertainty in exchange, transactions or cooperation. They are intrinsically linked to enforcement mechanisms\textsuperscript{37}. “Institutions are stable, value, recurring patterns of behaviour. "They are complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes\textsuperscript{38}.” Institutions reduce uncertainty: individuals can plan their own actions on the assumption that others will follow the rules. The rules of the game create expectations of how people will behave to each other, thus reducing the costs of interaction. People will invest more when there is less uncertainty about the behaviour of others. High levels of trust characterise societies with strong social contracts and functioning institutions. When this is not the case, people are reluctant to interact with others in ways that exposes them to others’ opportunistic behaviour. Institutions work when those involved can clearly see that other parties are acting according to the rules and that there will be sanctions against those who do not follow the rules.

They can be modern or customary; international, national or local; have an organisational form, involve various organisations or be diffuse; be formal or informal. Institutions exist at various levels, from the family up to the State. Weak institutions can reflect weak institutions throughout society. In many societies there are strong and legitimate working rules that do not closely resemble the formal laws: many of these are customary local institutions for management of local natural resources. They are strong and legitimate because they are well-known to all those affected by them, and they have worked successfully for many years. They work well in situations where it is clearly defined who is affected by them and what geographical area they include. They can be weakened when there is growing interaction across the boundaries, or when there is movement of people in or out of their area or there is some discontinuity in their operation (conditions that are often provoked by prolonged violent conflict).

\textsuperscript{36} VAM, 2004a. Results from the database.
\textsuperscript{37} Ostrom, 1990.
\textsuperscript{38} Page 8 of Uphoff, 1986.
While customary community institutions have had an important role in managing conflicts within communities, they often find it difficult to deal with conflicts with outside parties. They have difficulty in dealing with conflicts over access to resources that lie between communities or when formal sector institutions claim access to local resources. These are new issues for which customary institutions do not have experience, but the lack of capacity of the State to regulate and coordinate, and the particular weakness of local administrations, means that neither customary nor modern institutions having adequate capacity.

State institutional capacity has been weakened by the chaotic transition from colonial rule and the effects of prolonged, chronic conflict since then. In particular local administrations are weak, and are seen as weak and as ineffective in dealing with contemporary challenges. This can be seen most clearly in relation to institutions for land tenure, planning and management. The administrative capacity barely exists for recording and arbitrating land tenure rights. This is a due to the lack of trained staff, lack of materials, and poor communications between the State organisations involved, especially between local, Provincial and national levels. There is a low level of trust in such institutions, as they are not transparent and it is unclear how decisions are taken.39

The weakness of official institutions has meant that the informal markets in land and the informal economy have developed with informal institutions, new sets of rules and mechanisms to manage and regulate them. These are unsatisfactory as they are usually unaccountable and lack transparency. However simply removing them is not a solution: they continue to be useful while official institutions do not effectively manage and regulate the economy.

### 3.3 Livelihoods

Formal sector employment is now scarce in Angola, in contrast to the last years of the colonial era. Formal sector employment at present can be divided between low-skill and low-income, or higher-skill and higher income. Low incomes mean that other family members who are involved in informal trading provide the bulk of the family income. International agencies and companies are important sources of high-skill and high-income employment. People with skills are in demand, and can also sell their skills overseas. This means that the State has difficulty in retaining highly skilled staff: skilled people within State institutions are concentrated in the capital and some Provincial capitals. State services at the Municipal and Comuna level are provided by poorly trained staff.

Survival strategies therefore depend on the opportunities that people can create for themselves and thus on the various types of capital available (financial, human and social). Large numbers of people have lost their assets during the conflict and have few skills. Families try to improve their livelihoods by putting various family members to work (or by giving responsibility to children or old people for home-based activities allowing women to work outside the home). Children are more likely to work outside the home when the family is poor.

In rural areas, peasant farming is a livelihood strategy. However research by Rede da Terra and other NGOs suggests that peasant farming faces significant difficulties in most areas, such as the lack of inputs and difficult access to markets. In almost all cases, farmers are only cultivating a small part of their potential land and yields are low. In only one case studied by Rede da Terra was a community achieving a successful livelihood through farming and this was because it had access to remittances from young people who had migrated to urban areas and had access to a pool of cheap, casual labour in an ex-IDP camp nearby.

The difficulties of making a living from peasant agriculture mean that there is a tendency for people of rural areas to also develop other livelihoods and survival strategies. These often depend on access to, and extraction of, other natural resources, such as stone and sand (for building materials) or wood (for sale or for transformation into charcoal). This has led to depletion of woodlands in accessible areas, which tend to be the areas where there was less woodland to begin with. Income from sale of wood or charcoal appears to be low as many families include it in their livelihood strategy, leading to abundant supply and low prices.

In both rural and urban areas, large numbers of people survive through casual labour: work on other people’s fields, collecting wood or building materials for others, carrying goods in markets or odd-jobs in people’s houses. The income from casual labour is low (about one dollar per day): the barriers to entry are low which implies intense competition between those seeking work.

In both rural and urban areas a common livelihood strategy is informal trading. This is considered to be a better survival strategy than casual labour and sale of charcoal, but requires some capital investment and still generates low returns. Access to more lucrative trading opportunities depends on access to financial capital. Displaced people who fled after their assets were destroyed tend to enter the informal trading sector at a low level, with small amounts of capital lent by family

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40 There is little extractive use of woodland resources in Moxico Province, despite the large areas of woodland, because of its remoteness from areas of demand.
members or close friends. Those who migrated before losing their assets have tended to be able to enter the informal trading sector at a higher level with more capital. The large number of people with few assets and skills means that large numbers of people turn over small amounts of low value goods, and thus generate low returns. There is intense competition among those involved in trading in low-value goods. However generally trade is perceived as providing a better income, and have better long term opportunities, than farming or casual work. The perception is that trading will allow, eventually, accumulation of capital that will give access to more lucrative trading opportunities.

The large numbers of people who have been involved in trade as a survival strategy have as a result accumulated important skills. This applies particularly to women, who have been particularly important in informal trading. Informal traders who have begun to trade over longer distances also appear to have developed considerable skills of negotiation and identifying of market opportunities, and to be better prepared to develop internal trade networks (when transport improves) than formal sector traders who have tended to rely on imports and preferential access to credit and foreign exchange.

However casual labour, peasant farming, sale of natural resources and most informal sector trading are survival strategies and not livelihood strategies. They are barely sufficient for subsistence and do not allow any accumulation of assets.

### 3.4 Poverty and vulnerability

The lack of material assets and the availability of only poorly-paid survival strategies mean that poverty levels are high. A representative survey of Huambo Province indicated that half of all children had only meal the day before and a quarter have no boots or shoes. Large numbers of people are surviving on $1 to $1.50 per day.

The primary cause is material vulnerability caused by the destruction of productive assets during the war, the difficulties of re-accumulating assets and poor access to basic infrastructure and services. Surveys in rural areas show how dramatic has been this loss of assets. This affected not only people who were displaced but also people whose home was destroyed but stayed in the same area. Since the end of the war there has been very little possibility of rebuilding those

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41 CCF research on kidnapped children.
42 see CARE, 2004a, Pacheco, 2001 and the information Rede da Terra, 2005.
assets. Those who have returned to rural areas, or stayed there all along, are usually only cultivating small areas. Few are producing enough food to cover their needs, even less to rebuild their assets.

Access to services and infrastructure is difficult throughout the country. The Government of Angola’s Provincial Profiles and the WFP Vulnerability Assessments indicate the level of degradation of essential services, as well as the regional disparities. Distances to the nearest hospital can be more than 100 kms in the eastern Provinces. The quality of service declines away from the main Provincial centres (or between the coast the interior). Services often have to be paid for, either officially or unofficially, which restricts access. Access is not only unequal but also inequitable, in that it appears that those with most needs have poorer services. Poor access to health services causes loss of income and considerable expenditure during sickness. Improvements to infrastructure and services since 2002 have been much less than was originally expected. Provincial Governments have been provided with few funds, and it is unclear that they have the capacity to effectively manage and use what they did receive. The expected international aid has not materialised. Logistics continue to create difficulties for improving access to services in remote areas, though most of the areas prioritised in the UN Transitional Appeal because of poor services and large numbers of returnees are remote. There is a risk that the inequalities between areas will increase as a result and that the low level of services in resettlement areas will continue, accentuating the difficulties in resettlement.

There are also social and institutional dimensions to vulnerability. The main sources of assistance for reintegration have been social networks, particularly the family. Access to land and credit depends on these social networks. Resident families are also impoverished and are often not in a position to assist members of the family who arrive and attempt to re-establish themselves, and those who have lost those networks are particularly vulnerable. Given the lack of other sources of assistance, they have great difficulty in re-establishing themselves and end up with a very low income survival strategy such as casual labour.

Those who live in eastern and southern areas of the country appear to have easier access to sources of social capital: there are more likely to be supportive community institutions of mutual assistance. But this is counterbalanced by the lack of access to services in these remote areas.

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43 Those whose survival depends on odd jobs report that they may be advanced money by an employer who they know to cover health costs, but then have to work several days without payment to repay. It is unclear how they manage to eat in these cases, given the low pay and their absolute lack of savings.
4  ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT RISKS

This section examines the implications of the various process and the key issues for human security and risks of future conflicts. It is partly based on an analysis of actual conflicts in four Provinces (Benguela, Moçico, Huambo and Zaire), chosen to demonstrate a range of different settlement and reintegration issues. It is also based on the analysis of the factors that usually create conflicts.

Social geography (in particular groups of people with different identities and values), weak institutions (and the lack of means for dialogue between different groups and a lack of experience of creating patterns of cooperation between groups) and high levels of poverty and vulnerability (leading to intense competition for access to resources) create particular problems for post-conflict reconstruction and also create future conflict risks. Conflict is the “result of parties disagreeing about the distribution of material or symbolic resources and acting on the basis of these perceived incompatibilities”44.” The intense competition for resources between groups of people with different identities and values and with few means of dialogue, and the weak institutional framework, create future conflict risks in Angola.

There have been very few incidents of open, violent conflict in Angola since 2002 although there are indications that this is because individuals try to avoid open conflict, knowing from experience that violent conflict has left them more vulnerable.

What is conflict?

The following definition of conflict is used in this paper:

"Conflict is the result of parties disagreeing about the distribution of material or symbolic resources and acting on the basis of these perceived incompatibilities." "Conflict occurs when two or more parties believe that their interests are incompatible, express hostile actions or take action that damages other parties’ ability to pursue their interest. It becomes violent when parties no longer seek to attain their goals peacefully, but resort instead to violence in one form or another." (FEWER, 2004). Violent conflict is the resort to physical or psychological force to resolve a disagreement. It is used to describe acts of open hostility. Latent conflict is used to describe situations of tension that may escalate into violence (FEWER, 2004).

In this paper conflict does not necessarily mean violent conflict. It is an examination of the risks of conflict based on an analysis of factors that are likely to cause conflict. Conflictual relations are those where the parties perceive only incompatible goals. Co-operative relations are those where the parties seek mutually beneficial outcomes. This requires communication channels, and institutions that have the capacity to perceive and work for mutually beneficial interests, or that can help those involved to see their mutual interests and negotiate for such an outcome.

Civil society organisations previously hypothesised that the most likely source of conflict would be in communities that had been divided by conflict, and in which people who had been living with the two sides in the conflict were resettling together. Research in rural communities where resettlement of people from the two sides has happened indicates little conflict. In part this reflects the effort made by civil society organisations to promote peaceful resettlement. In many rural communities community organisations have continued to exist to manage and resolve conflicts and manage access to resources.

However it is important to note that there are limits to these informal mechanisms. While those who have resettled in rural areas may report no problems in doing so, there are indications that many people have not returned to these areas because they fear conflicts in these areas, or because they are concerned about how they will be received there. Many of the demobilised and the displaced have resettled in cities or small towns and appear to prefer the greater anonymity that is possible in such areas.

The indications are that people do not have full confidence in social institutions in resolving conflicts. Accusations of witchcraft are reported to be common in many rural areas, which are often taken as an indicator of a breakdown in institutions. Many people still have arms and, although at present arms appear to be little used, they say that they keep them as insurance for the future (Leão, personal communication).

Another limit to such informal mechanisms is that they are most effective in communities that have a long history and are homogeneous. Such mechanisms have a tendency to marginalise people from outside the community, and give low priority to women and young people. Such informal institutions are less common in peri-urban areas or in the new settlements that have developed where people come from a number of different origins. Such informal institutions work best within communities and are less useful in managing conflicts between neighbouring communities and where there are conflicts between local communities and outsiders.

Thus, while the level of reported conflict is low for a post-conflict country, there are future conflict risks. At present there is a strong tendency to avoid conflict. This avoidance of conflict may not last. While respondents to interviews mention few present conflicts, they consider that there might be future conflicts.

Latent conflict has been noted within families, within communities, between neighbouring communities, between communities and outside interests, between regional and national interests and between national and outside interests.

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Within families there can be conflicts between the various wives that one man may have acquired during the war years or between different members of an extended family over access to land when one member has been away for some time and then reclaims it. The weakening of the extended family, and the difficulty of some communities in providing support to families, are also factors.

Within communities, tensions are manifested through increasing numbers of accusations of witchcraft, exchanges of insults and cases of domestic violence. The lack of channels to deal with feelings of resentment about vulnerability or inequality leads to diversion of these feelings into exchanges of insults with neighbours and cases of domestic violence.

There can be conflict between neighbouring communities such as where different communities have been exploiting one area of woodland for charcoal (reported in Huambo Province) or are forced to obtain water from the same source (reported around Luena and in Zaire Province). Cutting wood (for sale as firewood or as charcoal) has become an important survival mechanism and this has led to people cutting wood outside their own communities, particularly where the amount of woodland has already diminished and where the difficulty of survival from other means is most acute. It also occurs where institutions are weak for managing conflicts between neighbouring communities and where neighbouring communities have different identities (such as between resident, displaced and returnee communities in Moxico Province).

Conflict and weak institutions

There is always, in all societies, latent conflict: disagreements about the distribution of resources. In most societies there are mechanisms for settling these disagreements without resorting to violence. In fragile states, particularly in post-conflict countries, these institutions are weak and there is a risk that latent conflicts become open and violent conflicts (though it is impossible to predict whether this will happen and when). Latent conflicts are however also a block to development: various parties who could work together to achieve a development goal fail to do so because they lack means to develop co-operative relations.

46 Accusations of witchcraft are often made against people who have more assets than their neighbours; being unable to explain rationally how, for example, two demobilised soldiers have returned with different size “demobilisation kits” or have more assets than the resident population, the accusation is made that they must have obtained their wealth through some supernatural powers.

47 The World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework recognises that violent conflict is possible when there are no established norms and mechanisms for dealing with differences of interest (World Bank, 2002).
There are latent conflicts between local communities and outside interests. Examples include:

- between artisan fishing communities and industrial fishing (reported in Benguela and Zaire Provinces)\(^4^8\)
- local communities and outside interests exploiting forest resources
- over access to land between local communities and outside interests (as shown in the study of Kwanza Sul for Rede da Terra)\(^4^9\)
- where outsiders are attracted to employment opportunities in an area (such as where there are oil or diamonds) and complete with local people

**Rural land as a conflict risk?**

Customary institutions have survived and manage local level conflict over land successfully within communities. Official institutions that manage land allocation among communities and between informal and formal sectors are, on the other hand, weak and have a very low level of capacity to register land titles. As yet most rural communities have difficulty in cultivating all their land and interest by commercial interests in large-scale farming is as yet low. Access to rural land is a potential but not yet a widespread area of conflict. There is a risk that conflict may increase when the commercial demand for land clashes with peasant and small scale untitled users of land. The new Land Law gives some protection to customary land access, but it is unclear how it will delimit areas of customary land systems and how these will interact with formal land titling. There is also a lack of clarity of which local institutions will be involved, and there is a risk that the State will deal only with the individual (the Soba) leading to a lack of transparency to the rest of the community.

Risks of conflict over land are highest around the main cities (such as Luanda) where land of very high value for formal economic activities is at present occupied.

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\(^4^8\) This is an example of the effect of weak institutions at the formal, State level for regulating access to resources. The transition to a market economy in the 1990s was not accompanied by the creation of institutions that could regulate access to resources between local and global private interests. Fishing communities say that it was in the mid-1990s that conflicts developed with industrial fishing; in the 1908s it was rare for industrial fishing boats to come close to the shore and State institutions would take measures if they did, but this is no longer the case.

\(^4^9\) This is another example of the effect of institutions at the formal, State level for regulating access to resources. One weakness is the poor communication and collaboration between different levels of the State institutions, associated with their hierarchical relations: as the Kwanza Sul study shows, land parcels over a certain size are allocated as concessions at the national level but information is rarely sought about whether this land is at present occupied and by whom, and local levels of Administration do not see it as their responsibility to make representations when land is allocated that is already occupied. In cities, land is often allocated by the Provincial Government without the knowledge of the Municipal and Comuna administrations, even though officially requests should start at the Comuna level and only work upwards after site visits by local level officials, and this creates overlapping claims.
by informal housing and economic activities, but where there are no effective mechanisms for re-allocating land without creating conflict. Risks of conflict over rural land are lower in the short-term because the agricultural economy is developing only slowly, but there are longer-term risks when access to inland agricultural areas improves and outside interests are attracted to agriculture

Urban land as a conflict risk?
Economic growth has been stronger in the cities since 2002. The operation of the market means that formal private sector economic growth is in competition for land with informal markets and housing. Government institutions for land management and urban planning are weak. The actors involved have very different values and interests, and few forms of dialogue and negotiation. There is little understanding about communities' livelihood and survival strategies among groups outside the communities (national players or external ones). The informal housing market and the informal economy in urban areas are perceived as a problem by elite groups, rather than as a necessary means of survival that have developed due to the inadequacy of formal structures. Governance structures tend to having little capacity to deal with such issues.

Future conflict risks are therefore not due to the historic conflict, which was linked to a split in the national elite: the elite appear to be reconciling while becoming more remote from the rest of society. Future risks of conflict are linked to

- access to resources: there is intense competition for resources, both natural resources (land, wood, oil, diamonds, fishing) and others (such as jobs, training courses)

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50 There is competition for land in urban areas and other places where the formal economy is developing. Peace has meant a revival in the formal economy, which is seeking to occupy land occupied by informal housing or informal economic activities in urban areas or where there is a strong presence of the oil industry (such as the coats of Zaire Province). There is competition for land in the diamond areas between farmers and those seeking to occupy the land to look for diamonds.

51 For example, Government documents about land tend to highlight the low population density in Angola as a whole and downplay the existence of land scarcity in parts of the central highlands or in urban areas, which are precisely the areas to which foreign investment is being attracted without policies to deal with the resulting competition for land.

52 Though information about this is difficult to obtain, as diamond areas are relatively closed and those involved are unwilling to provide information.

53 Fishing people on the coast of Zaire Province report competition between themselves and people moving into their area to take up fishing because they cannot make a living from their former occupations. Also when private companies arrive in an area there is often competition for the jobs between local people, people who migrate spontaneously from other areas and those specifically brought in by the company. The lack of social infrastructure also leads to competition for access. Examples include the competition for access to wells between neighbouring villages in various parts of the country (where wells have become unusable or the population has increased).
- differences in identity, for example where two groups with clearly different identities are competing for the same resource. There may be some political or ethnic undertones to these differences in identity, but the main differences in identity are usually due to other factors.

- the lack of institutions to mediate this access, or by overlapping claims due to informal mechanisms (developed due to the lack of practicality of the formal ones) being in conflict with formal ones.

Identity and conflict

There is a latent conflict between different groups of residents, displaced people and returning refugees who are living around Luena. The main source of conflict is their competition for access to water, land, health services, jobs and the small amount of aid that is made available. Returning refugees from Zambia have a different identity as they have learnt English and have adopted other cultural signs from Zambia. Each perceives the other to have obtained advantages that they do not have: residents see IDPs and refugees as receiving official aid while they get none, even though residents have often suffered acute loss of assets and have not had the same opportunity to accumulate assets that those who fled had; residents see refugees as having received access to better training opportunities in exile; refugees who arrived last perceive IDPs as having been resettled in better locations with better access to land and water; refugees and IDPs perceive residents as having better linkages to local power structures and information, and to institutions that regulate access to resources; refugees and IDPs also feel that they are not receiving the assistance that they were led to believe they would receive before they returned. Returning refugees from RDC in Zaire Province have a different identity as they have learnt French and Lingala and have adopted other cultural signs from the RDC. Local people perceive them as having an advantage in dealing with aid agencies and as deliberately moving to settlements where aid agencies are working. Returning refugees perceive local people as trying to exclude them from benefits of development projects.
Conflict in Kuando Kubango Province

Despite the vast area of Kuando Kubango Province, there is a limited amount of agricultural land. People from the Central Plateau migrated with UNITA in the post-1976 period and settled in Kuando Kubango, and are unlikely to return to the Central Plateau. Some of these then fled to Zambia as refugees, as did some of the original residents of the region. Government institutions are weak in a remote Province. The return of refugees to Angola and the end of the war have led to conflict over the limited amounts of agricultural land and access to water. People from the Central Plateau are numerous and other groups fear that they will dominate the Province.

The reliance on local, informal institutions for conflict resolution and resource management (which has developed during the years of war) implies a need for the State to attempt to integrate them into a formal system. This process is not without its risks, given the weakness of formal institutions and the possibility that informal institutions will be weakened without successfully creating formal ones. There is risk of conflict if the re-establishment of the rule of law in practice means adopting laws and procedures based on foreign models that do not take into account the actual mechanisms that people are using today, or that destroy people’s survival strategies. There is risk of conflict if the “establishment of order” moves ahead more quickly than the creation of accountable institutions to manage this.

Elections and conflict

Many respondents to surveys say that they fear that elections will be a trigger of conflict. This is because previous occasions when power has been contested (1975 and 1992) have led to violent conflict. There is a low level of confidence in the social institutions that should regulate conflict on such occasions, and elections are perceived as giving access to a control of a State with weak institutions that can be a source of patronage without responsibility. There are sporadic reports of violent conflict around political events, which ought to be monitored in the run-up to elections. Political organising is also perceived by many Angolans as the occupation of territory and denying it to opposing parties: thus the establishment of offices with their flags is perceived as an important part of political organising. Many local people genuinely are fearful of such activities, as the risks of it becoming violent appear to them to outweigh any possibility that it will lead to more responsive, accountable government.
Angola has been “destabilised” by many decades of war with, as a result, weakened social structures and large-scale movements of population that bring different groups (with different identities and levels of assets) in contact with each other; while this was justified by outside actors in the past as being the price of bringing democracy to Angola, the final result has been a society with one dominant social power and without the mediating institutions necessary for transparency and accountability and for discussing ways to address the enormous needs of re-settlement, reintegration and reconstruction.

Angola is a low-income oil producer, where people have “unrealised expectations of the benefits of being in an oil-rich country” (Myers, 2005). In such countries there are “raised expectations that are not met. (...) Petroleum is good for countries with lots of it and a small population (...) but bad for human development in less developed countries with an annual production level of under 25 barrels per head. (...) Where people have unrealised expectations of the benefits of being in an oil-rich country, conflict follows and a vicious cycle develops.” The amount received in oil revenues raises expectations, damages governance and damages the non-oil economy but is not enough to eradicate poverty. Exposure to oil price volatility is acute, leading to further instability (Myers, 2005).

Conflict between national and outside interests

There are also a number of cases of conflict between national and outside interests. Foreign companies, for example in the oil industry, have little awareness of their effects on the surrounding areas. There are resentments at the “fence-line” where the contrast between impoverished communities and company compounds is highest. Foreign companies use other foreign companies as their suppliers and seem unaware that this causes resentment among local companies and workers about the lack of linkage between the resource industries and the local economy. They rarely have policies to assist local companies to build capacity to be suppliers.

Foreign embassies and donors seek to influence Angolan policy. They seem unaware that this can create conflict, because of an Angolan perception that outside interests have often been wrong in the past about Angola and that outside interests have little information about the Angolan reality and are promoting their own interests. Advice from outside is often perceived as contradictory or badly developed. While it is true that much Angolan Government policy is based on inadequate information and models, much foreign advice is based on the model of a transition country that is reluctant to open up its economy and society. Foreign advice does not take into account the colonial nature of many of the models used by the Angolan elite and the need for building of local institutional capacity.
5 MITIGATING CONFLICT RISKS

Angola was described, for many years, as a complex emergency. A complex emergency leads to a complex post-emergency situation. The current situation in Angola is the result of many years of rapid economic and social change in Angola. The effects of a long-running conflict are profound. “Normality” does not return as soon as forty-year conflict ends.

Reconstruction implies dealing with a complex set of inter-related questions, while the capacity to deal with these questions has been weakened and habits of been developed of short time horizon planning. The challenges of creating a sustainable peace in Angola imply dealing with the key issues which can be a block to development and create future conflict risks.

Conflict risks could be addressed by attempting to reduce the economic vulnerability of the majority of the population, by addressing the gap between rich and poor and the gap in wealth between different regions, by assisting in the development of livelihood strategies and reduce their competition for resources. They could be addressed by helping to build links between different population groups and outside players so that they can understand each other’s values and outlook. And they could be reduced by building on links between groups so as to develop accountable institutions that manage the relations between different stakeholders.

Addressing conflict risks implies “conflict sensitivity”. Development usually aims to reduce poverty and so to prevent conflict, as poverty is one of the causes of conflict, but it is now also recognised that development sometimes contributes to conflict. In situations where institutions are weak, economic growth increases disparities and tensions, conflict is expected or there has been recent conflict, conflict sensitivity is required. Conflict sensitivity involves understanding the context of a development intervention and monitoring it, and looking at development interventions through a human security lens rather than an economic lens. This may involve compromises, with the emphasis shifting towards reducing vulnerability rather than simply boosting growth, efficiency and production targets.

Dealing with social divisions involves building on the work that Angolan civil society organisations have developed, encouraging dialogue within communities in the post-conflict environment. There is a need to extend it to help create dialogue between the many different parts of a fractured society, between neighbouring communities and between the State and citizens. This involves recognising that some of the most acute social divisions are in most logistically difficult and remote areas like Kuando Kubango and Moxico.
Institutional development is a major challenge in post-conflict contexts and there are few guidelines for this process. States with weak institutions have difficulty in reforming and building their own institutions, and outside help will be required. External players should avoid large-scale institutional reform, as there are significant risks, but they could take opportunities to build institutional capacity and accountability at the local level. For example local level projects, such as basic service provision, provide an opportunity for strengthening local-level institutions: in fact the development of institutions are vital for their success as they are important resources in a resource-poor environment and require well thought-out structures of rules and accountability for their management. This will require bringing the various stakeholders together, helping them to develop rules for the management of the service as well as accountability and sanctions’ mechanisms.

Local level institution building

Although there is a growing consensus that “the avoidance of war and the fostering of economic progress both require institutional building and regeneration”\(^\text{54}\), there is much less clarity about how this can be achieved and the role of external agents. External advice to Africa in the 1970s and 1980s downplayed the role of institutions except the role of the market, which was assumed to function best with a minimal presence of State institutions: only slowly has outside advice begun to concede the importance of institutions and the role of the State. There may be a lack of will by Angolan political leadership to create accountable institutions, but there is also a lack of capacity for what is in fact a complex task. “Many [multi-party democracies] have slid back into autocratic practices even when periodic elections are held. One reason for this decline could be that these new democracies and the institutional framework and social contract sustaining them are not entirely home grown”\(^\text{55}\). This is an argument for external agents avoiding trying to create national-level institutions. However external agents could assist institutional regeneration by being clearer in their discourse about the importance of institutions. At a local level, they could assist by recognising the importance of institutions for local level projects. Building local infrastructure involves not only a question of physical building but also a question of building the institutions to manage and maintain it. Rules are required to define what each partner provides, what the local community provides, how this is monitored, and how and when sanctions are applied. These rules need to be created at the outset, before any investment is made. Investment by those directly involved, is more likely if the rules are agreed first. There is a role here for those with conflict-resolution skills. Institutions will probably need to be built across the divides between different communities and different interest groups: this will require some mediation skills to help to bridge the gap in interests and perceptions between the various parties.

\(^\text{54}\) Tony Addison and S Manssob Murshed “The social contract and violent conflict” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006.

\(^\text{55}\) Page 159 of Tony Addison and S Manssob Murshed “The social contract and violent conflict” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006.
The new Land Law offers an opportunity for institution building through pilot projects that could test how customary and informal rights could be brought within the framework of a national Law, what State capacities are required, how they can be developed, what the costs would be and how these could be supported. It offers an opportunity for learning-by-doing in a realistic, incremental approach to developing and formalising the mechanisms of establishing land rights and providing formal titles. This could be based on what has been done elsewhere, and on a realistic review of what worked best in Angola in the past, taking into account the changed circumstances.

Recognition by Government of Angola of the need to tackle the low capacity of local administrations also offers an opportunity. It is recognised that they need to work in collaboration with local civil society, both customary civil society at the community level and the more modern forms of civil society. Pilot projects, including components of practical local development, can assist the process of learning-by-doing in making customary and informal institutions more transparent, accountable and inclusive; and in improving dialogue between the State, civil society and citizen; and in improving the performance, transparency and accountability of the State at the local level. This implies a great deal of dialogue between new State organs and local people, which rarely exists at present, and that they have the financial and other resources to manage activities and pressurise higher levels of Government to carry out actions relevant for local development. It implies bringing customary institutions within an overall framework, while modernising them and while avoiding that they serve to exclude certain groups.
Institutions are the “rules of the game”, the constraints (both formal and informal) on political, social and economic activities, such as access to resources, contracts, property. Institutions are altered by conflict and weak institutions can lead to conflict. Institutions are an area of intervention for resilience but research on practical policy interventions for institutions building is at an early stage.

Institution-building and capacity issues were not emphasised by the World Bank reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. The role of the State, in these reforms, was planned to reduce. If the State was corrupt it was better to get rid of the State. Thus by the 1990s many African States had reduced institutional capacity. The evidence is now supportive of the important role of institutions in promoting growth. But institutional change is incremental and path-dependent.

In the absence of a strong State and formal rules, a dense social network can lead to the development of a fairly stable informal structures that help to organise activities. But the risk of this dynamic is that trust, and economic activity, remains only within one group.

There are practical constraints on the implementation of institutional reform. Human capital is usually not available for complex legal reforms. An alternative strategy is a “rules-first” strategy. This involves introducing simple rules that can be easily applied and monitored, and using them to show the importance of rules and institutions.

These processes could involve non-traditional donors such as international oil companies. Because of their difficulties in areas such as the Niger Delta in Nigeria, where they have suffered the consequences of the lack of trust and lack of accountability between local people and local levels of government, oil companies appear to be beginning to understand the need to help to develop dialogue between local people and the local-level State.

Finally there is a need for the systematic collection of information throughout Angola that will permit a deeper understanding of post-conflict dynamics and the monitoring of change. Previous information systems that provided information about the acute emergency are being closed with no clear replacement. While there are now more one-off studies in Angola there is little continuing monitoring of the post-conflict evolution. It cannot be assumed that “normalisation” will occur at the end of conflict: processes need to be monitored and on this basis risks need to be assessed.

Based on Aron, 2002.
The level of international assistance to Angola has decreased since 2002. Although “traditional donors” have not given a clear rationale of why they have not transformed their pre-2002 humanitarian aid into reconstruction assistance, they sometimes refer to the fact that normality has returned with the end of the war and that Angola has access to other forms of assistance. It also seems that foreign assistance to Angola is being made conditional on reforms, such as those that would reduce corruption. However following the conditionality route could lead donor agencies to withdraw from Angola. While it is correct to bring into the open the question of corruption, there are various difficulties with a strategy of conditionality. The first is that it assumes that there is one, obvious route to reform and that there are instant answers to the key questions. This creates the risk that the Government of Angola looks for instant solutions to complex questions.

Democracy and resource rents

There are increasing numbers of resource-rich developing countries (such as Angola). Conventional wisdom is now that significant income from natural resources (resource rents) reduces economic growth. Resource rents undermine governance and are linked to bad economic policies and dysfunctional state behaviour. It is therefore important to understand, theoretically and empirically, how democracy and resource rents are likely to interact.

The evidence is that electoral competition reduces economic growth in the presence of resource rents. Stronger institutions enhance economic growth in the presence of resource rents. Countries with bad institutions suffer a resource curse. Resource booms create perverse political incentives that elections do not counteract. Elections do not counteract patronage, and may encourage it.

Reform is difficult not only because there are vested interests, but also because

- there may not be a clear reform path
- reform requires coordination between different Government institutions and a variety of outside interests, while the capacity for coordination is low
- reform involves risks and could involve conflict
- it is difficult for countries that are in situations like those of Angola, to reform themselves without considerable assistance from outside
- the resources required not just financial but of knowledge and organisational skills

57 Based on Collier and Hoeffler, 2005. Also Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2002.
International advice tends to point out what is lacking (such as the rule of law or unclear land rights) but is less specific about how it might be rebuilt. Outside advice that land titling would increase certainty about property rights, for example, is correct but it cannot be achieved in the short-term given how much effort would be required to create the administrative infrastructure for effective land titling. Reform programmes proposed by outside agencies should not include such proposal without a realistic assessment of what would be required and how long it would take.

Similarly international advice that portrays the need for reform as being the need to move away from post-Independence ways of thinking and portrays the difficulties of Angola as being due to the post-independence period (and decision-makers trained in Eastern Europe)\(^59\) ignores the fact that many regulations date from the colonial period, and have as their basis the discriminatory society of the colonial-era, aimed at restricting African (informal) economic activity. Developing a regulatory framework for a post-Independence society where the majority of economic activity is informal, where such activity is the main survival strategy of the population and where the dynamism in informal sector could be the basis for future economic development, is complex.

Development of a number of alternative scenarios may assist Government of Angola to explore the implications of various options. There will also need to be a considerable amount of “learning-by-doing”. This implies that international agencies will need to deepen their knowledge of Angola, and have an institutional memory of the problems, the attempted solutions and their results. There will need to be a depth of knowledge, so as to avoid jumping to conclusions and avoid making facts fit into a framework that is derived from elsewhere or from theory.

\(^{58}\) While land titling would increase certainty about property rights, for example, it cannot be achieved in the short-term given how much effort would be required to create the administrative infrastructure for effective land titling. Reform programmes proposed by outside agencies should not include such proposal without a realistic assessment of what would be required and how long it would take.

\(^{59}\) The lack of vision of intermediate solutions, such as the tendency to see development as involving a jump from hoes to tractors, is as much a product of the dualism of the colonial era economy as it is the product of the influence of the former Soviet-bloc.
It will be necessary to understand the details and the nuances of the complex situation in Angola. It is encouraging that programmes such as LICUS have been developed that show that international agencies do attempt to work in complex situations such as Angola and do recognise that this may even mean that the institutions change their working methods so that they have better knowledge and better institutional memories. It is encouraging that, with the increasing focus on poverty reduction and the realisation that the world is currently not on track to meet the UN’s Millennium Development Goals by 2015, the spotlight is turning more and more on the world’s lower income oil exporters, which are mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. It is encouraging that some international advice now recognises that fragile states have difficulty in reforming themselves. However the risk with such programmes is that they focus on the Millennium Development Goals and how services can be delivered to meet these goals, with the possibility that they will focus on mechanisms that deliver services rather than focus on the more complex task of strengthening the local institutions that are required for sustainable peace.
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“What to do when the fighting stops: challenges for post-conflict reconstruction in Angola” is a publication by Development Workshop (Angola). DW is an NGO working to improve the living conditions for the disadvantaged by empowering communities and organisations to address development problems and opportunities. Its work focuses on: shelter, water supply and sanitation, peacebuilding, governance, micro finance, small enterprise, and disaster mitigation.
Based on two research studies carried out by Development Workshop between 2003 and 2005, this book examines what happens when the fighting stops after a prolonged and intense conflict. There have been some remarkable short-term achievements in Angola since peace was achieved in 2002, but there are a number of longer-term risks. Returning refugees, displaced people and ex-combatants have great difficulty in re-establishing their livelihoods in rural areas. Population movements continue towards peri-urban areas of the main cities and small towns, more than outweighing the movement towards rural areas. Large numbers of Angolans survive on US$1 to $1.50 per day and eat only one meal daily.

"Normality" does not return as soon as prolonged conflict ends. The book highlights the serious gap between peace agreements and demobilisation of combatants on the one hand, and longer term socio-economic development and new governance regimes on the other. Ironically, international aid to Angola has fallen sharply; humanitarian aid has not been transformed into assistance for the post-conflict transition. There has been relatively little support for post-conflict reconstruction strategies from the international community. Particularly lacking are strategies for rebuilding institutions that have been weakened by violent conflict. The book points out areas for improved targeting of interventions and investment. It underlines the need for international assistance for post-war transitions that will help to consolidate peace, rebuild institutions and lay the foundations for effective development.

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